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SUBJECT: Impact Evaluation Report on Korea
Delayed Development of the Cholla Region
Secondary Cities Regional Project (Loan 1070-KO)
Second Gwangju Regional Project (Loan 1758-KO)
Jeonju Regional Development Project (Loan 2388-KO)
Attached is the Impact Evaluation Report (IER) on the above mentioned regional development
projects in the Cholla region. The main objective of the impact evaluation was to assess the medium and
long-term impacts of the projects, five to fifteen years after completion. The study focused on (i) industrial
development in the region; (ii) institutional leaming at both the national and local levels of government; and
(iii) the impact of bridges on the development of island economies.
The Cholla region did not develop early on because of the policy bias of the national government.
The Govemment played an important role in the first two decades of Korea's development, but the people of
Cholla were excluded from participating in the process of development and institutional learning until the
1980s. This study offered an opportunity to examine the nexus of the role of government, of institutions,
and development in Cholla as a specific case study, since, by default, Cholla could be viewed as a
"controlled area" in the early phase of Korea's development "experiment."
Tlhe study documents that the Bank intervention acted as a catalyst in triggering the industrialization
process in the Gwangju area. It made a strong and positive impact on the development of the island
economies: by linking the Tolsan Island to Yeosu city, the bridge expanded the urban area of Yeosu and
helped transform Tolsan into an urban community; the Chindo bridge brought a significant change to the
Chindo Island's economy by increasing the share of cash crops for export to the mainland. Institutional
development was substantial at all levels of government. The overall project impacts are expected to be
sustained.
The study showed the "centrality of side-effects" in project-induced development. The projects'
success and spillover effects over time in Gwangju were due to a series of side-effects which contributed to
the growth, expansion, and sustainability of the projects: (i) The local authorities learned how to plan,
finance, build and operate a large-scale industrial estate, and executed three more estates after the initial
Bank-financed project was completed. Backward and forward industrial linkages were established. (ii) The
extension of the first industrial estate to the second phase by the city alone was a significant turning point
for the city government's institutional learning which involved manv organizational changes and improved
its capacity and quality of project management. (iii) New rules. through a series of devolition and
deregulation, changed the incentive structure to the benefit of the industrialists, and resulted in close
cooperation and coordination between the local governments and the private sector.
Attachment

Contents
Preface ................................................................ 3
Evaluation Summary ................................................................ 5
1. Introduction.....
Regional Bias in Korea's Development ......................................................... II
Korea's Experience with Industrial Location Policy ......................................................... I I
World Bank Projects Description ......................................................... 12
Rationale and Objectives of the Study ......................................................... 13
Scope of the Study and Two Distinct Approaches ......................................................... 13
Information and Data Collection ......................................................... 14
PART I. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING
2. Direct Impacts: "Triggering" the Industrialization Process .............................................. 15
Baseline Conditions in the 1970s ......................................................... 15
Evaluation Framework ......................................................... 16
Impact on Industrial Infrastructure: Hanam Phase I ....................................................... 18
Impact on Manufacturing ......................................................... 19
Manufacturing Establishment Survey Results ........................................................... 20
Impact on National-Local Government Relations and Management Capacity ................ 22
Impact on Public-Private Sector Interaction ......................................................... 23
3. Side Effects and Spillovers ............................................................... 25
Industrial Base and Linkages ......................................................... 25
Industrial Infrastructure: Hanam II, III, and Pyung-Dong Follow-up Projects ......... 25
Backward and Forward Industrial Linkages ..................................... 26
Local Bureaucracy's Behavior and Capacity Building ..................................... 28
"Rules of the Game", Private Sector Confidence, and Public-Private Partnership .......... 29
Ultimate Impact: Regional Growth ......................................................... 30
Necessary Conditions for Success ......................................................... 32
A Caveat on Attribution ......................................................... 33
4. Lessons from Industrial Development ............................................................... 35
Centrality of Side-Effects: the Hirschman Effect ......................................................... 35
"Rules of the Game" and Private Sector Responses: the Baumol Effect .......................... 35
"Piloting" and "Mainstreaming" .......................................................... 36
This Report was prepared by Mr. Kyu Sik Lee (Task Manager), Mr. Roy Gilbert (consultant), and a
study team at the Kwangju-Chunnam Development Institute consisting of Messrs. Chang Soo Moon
(President), Jong-Pyung Jeon (Team Leader), Jae-Oh Kim, and Sangho Kim; and Messrs. Dong Ho Shin
and Yang-Jae Lee at Wonkwang University in Iksan, Korea. Ms. Stacy Ward provided administrative
assistance.
2Shortcomings of Industrial Estate Development Strategy . ............................... 36
Transferability ............................................ . 37
PART II. INTEGRATING ISLAND ECONOMIES INTO REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
5. Project Rationale for Improved Transport Linkages .................................................. 39
Island Development: The Baseline ............................................. 39
Evaluation Framework ............................................. 40
6. Tolsan Island: A New Threshold for Urban Development .................................................. 43
A Solution to Yeosu City's Acute Shortage of Urban Land ............................................ 43
Transforming Tolsan's Population into an Urban Community ......................................... 43
New Patterns of Urban Living on Tolsan Island ............................................ 45
Increased Tourism ............................................ 47
Bridge Impact Upon Activities in Rural Areas ............................................ 48
Environmental Impacts ............................................ 49
Impacts Upon Local Government ............................................ 49
Need for Complementary Infrastructure ............................................ 50
Economic Rate of Return ............................................ 50
7. Chindo Island: Incorporating as Part of the Mainland ................................................... 51
Chindo: No Longer an Island .................................................. 51
Restructuring Chindo's Rural Economy .................................................. 51
Impact Upon Islanders' Standard of Living ............ ........................ ............ 52
Modest Urban Development Impacts .................................................. 54
Accelerated Out-Migration .................................................. 54
Impact on Tourism .................................................. 55
Environmental and Social Vulnerability .................................................. 56
Impacts Upon Local Government .................................................. 56
Is Chindo Better or Worse-off9 .................................................. 56
Economic Rate of Return .................................................. 57
8. Lessons from Integrating Island Economies .................................................. 59
References .................................................. 61
Annexes
1. Statistical Tables .................................................. 65
2. Project Description and Timelines .................................................. 83
3. Institutional Development Timelines .................................................. 91
4. Summary of Establishment Survey Results .................................................. 95
5. Study Questionnaire .................................................. 115
6. List of People Interviewed .................................................. 127
Map IBRD No. 28484
3Preface
This is an Impact Evaluation Report (IER) for three World Bank supported regional development
projects in Korea: Secondary Cities Regional Project (Loan 1070); Second Gwangju Regional Project (Loan
1758); and Jeonju Regional Development Project (Loan 2388).1 The main objective of the impact
evaluation study was to assess the projects' medium and long-term impacts, five to fifteen years after the
completion of the projects.
The Bank-supported regional development program in Korea was unique in that no such sustained
efforts extending over a period of two decades can be found elsewhere. Among more than twenty project
components included, this study focused on (i) industrial development in the Cholla region; (ii) institutional
learning at both national and local levels of government; and (iii) development of island economies via
bridge connections.
The IER was prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank. The
study was launched during the first impact evaluation mission to Korea in June 1995. A local study team at
the Kwangju-Chonnam Development Institute participated in all phases of the study: formulating
hypotheses, collecting the data, participating in informant interviews, and providing inputs to drafting the
report. During the second mission in February 1996, a preliminary draft report was discussed with the local
team and government officials, and additional information needed was collected.
The kind assistance and cooperation for this study given by the local government officials in project
cities, the officials of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation in Seoul and Iksan, members of local
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, local industrialists, and researchers are gratefully acknowledged. In
particular, the staff of the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) interacted with the
study mission and provided invaluable information. The staff of the Korea Institute for Industrial
Economics and Trade (KIET) kindly provided regional data for key economic variables used in the study.
The study results were reviewed and discussed at an internal seminar held at the Kwangju-
Chonnam Development Institute, and also presented at a 1977 World Development Report workshop on the
"Role of the State in Development" in Tokyo in October 1996.
Basic Loan Data
Ln Number Project Name US$ million Approval Completion
Ln 1070 Secondary Cities Regional 15 1/75 12/80
Ln 1758 Second Gwangju Regional 65 9/79 6/85
Ln 2388 Jeonju Regional Development 60 3/84 6/90
(Amounts are as appraised.)
1. Henceforth these three projects will be referred to as Kwangju I (Loan 1070), Kwangju 11 (Loan 1758) and Chonju project (Loan
2388). Current English names of the cities are used in this report: Kwangju and Chonju instead of Gwangju and Jeonju.

5Evaluation Summary
"Nothing is lasting without institutions."
Jean Monnet
Background
1. Korea's "economic miracle" has diverted attention from a heavy regional bias in Korea's
development strategy stretching over three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s. The Cholla region lagged
behind the impressive economic development that was taking place in other parts of Korea. Any significant
infrastructure investment for industrial development did not come into South Cholla province until the early
1980s, 20 years behind the rival Kyungsang provinces (paras. 2.5-2.6). Today, Kwangju, the capital city of
South Cholla province, is the fastest growing city in Korea with its population increasing at a rate of 4.5
percent per year. Moreover, Kwangju is the only city, among the six largest cities in Korea, which is
gaining manufacturing employment (para. 3.21). This study attempts to document the process of
development of the region during the past two decades based on the experiences of World Bank financed
projects, identifying the elements of success, and drawing lessons to be learned.
2. That the Cholla region was not developing early on was not a manifestation of the traditional
characteristics of a "lagging region", a resource-poor region without any potentiaF for development.
Cholla's case was largely due to the policy bias of the national government in Korea's development. The
World Bank (1993) sponsored study on the East Asian Miracle documented that the Government played an
important role at the early stages of Korea's economic development. It created the necessary "rules of the
game", i.e., the institutional framework for the private sector to respond and grow, that is, it filled the
"institutional vacuum" created after the Korean war. But such vacuum continued to prevail in Cholla for a
long time, and the people of Cholla were excluded from participating in the process of development and
institutional learning. This study offered an opportunity to examine the nexus of the role of government,
institutions and development in Cholla as a specific case study, since, by default, Cholla can be viewed as a
"controlled area" in the Korean development "experiment".
The Projects
3. The main objectives of the three projects were to support the government's efforts to develop the
Cholla region and reduce inter-regional disparities. Kwangju I, the first World Bank financed regional
development project world-wide, actually initiated Korea's first regional investment program as a pilot
project. Kwangju II and the Chonju project explicitly aimed at industrial development through investment
in industrial estates and increasing employment and income of island population, while Kwangju I was
limited to improving urban infrastructure including housing and roads. Even though all three projects were
complex, together covering seven cities, five islands, and two provinces, and with a total of 22 project
components, most of the physical targets were met and institutional development .was substantial, one of the
areas covered in this study.
4. The main hypothesis tested in this study is that the. govemment-invited World Bank intervention
"triggered" the industrialization process in South Cholla (para 2.7) and that it brought the opportunity to
extend the "rules of the development game" to the region. This study shows that "setting institutions right"
was a condition perhaps more crucial for development than "setting the prices right".
5. The study confirms the Baumol and North's framework for "institutional analysis" that asserts:
6The rules of the game that specify the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities play a
key role in determining whether entrepreneurship will be allocated in productive or unproductive
directions and that this can significantly affect the vigor of the economy's growth (Baumol, 1990, p.
918).
In his Nobel Prize lecture, North stated that:
It is the interaction between institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution of
an economy. If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs are the
players.. .if the institutional framework rewards productive activities then organizations-firms-
will come into existence to engage in productive activities (North, 1994, p. 361).
Scope of the Study
6. The study assesses (i) "direct" project impacts on the beneficiaries as anticipated by the projects,
and (ii) long-term "side-effects" on the industrialization process and institutional learning. Part I of the
report covers "industrial development" and "institutional learning" using a case study approach (para. 1.18).
Part II which covers the impacts of bridges on the island economies, not only relies on historical data to
compare the before and after the project conditions, but also contrasts the "project" islands with other
islands.
Findings
7. In the case of industrial development and institutional learning (Part I), the key findings are as
follows (para. 2.13):
(i) Industrial infrastructure expanded more than five times the original investment of the Hanam
Industrial Estate component of Kwangju II. The Kwangju city government, without the I-elp of the
national government or the World Bank, replicated the Hanam component in a second and third
phases, and in a fourth phase at Pyung Dong during a ten-year period (paras. 3.2-3.6).
(ii) A solid industrial base has been established in Kwangju with backward and forward industrial
linkages (paras. 3.7-3.9). In 1995, 39 percent of manufacturing jobs in Kwangju were at Hanam,
and 44 percent of manufacturing output and 60 percent of exports were produced by firms in
Hanam (para. 3.29).
(iii) Local government management capacity reached the level of sophistication needed to support
a rapid industrialization process. The local govemment officials became "task-oriented" as the
partners of economic development of the region (paras. 3.10-3.11). The management capacity of
Kwangju city officials now equals that of other cities in Korea (paras. 3.14-3.15).
(iv) The "rules of the game" (government bureaucracy and regulations) became more conducive to
private investment and growth (paras. 3.16-3.17). They evolved from those of a national
government-directed to those of a local government- and market-based development with strong
private sector responses in the region. The diminishing role of the Hanam Management Office at
the site, which left most of its previous functions to the markets, is a strong indication of that
evolution over the decade (para. 3.20).
8. In the case of integrating the island economies into regional development (Part II), the major
findings are as follows:
7(i) By linking the Tolsan Island to Yeosu city, the bridge expanded the urban area of Yeosu, a
dynamic medium-sized city facing acute land constraints. The bridge helped transform Tolsan into
an urban community linked to Yeosu. Daily commuting from the island to the city became feasible
and efficient after the bridge (para. 6.3). Far from arresting out-migration, though, the bridge
appears to have accelerated it from Tolsan (para. 6. 7), but population decline, including debilitated
family structures following the departure of younger breadwinners, was more serious on other
islands still unconnected by bridges. After the bridge, Tolsan islanders enjoyed ease of access to
urban services that other islanders didn't have (paras. 6.10-6.13). There has been a real estate boom
on Tolsan (para. 6.14). Tourism flows have increased dramatically there as have services on the
island for visitors (paras. 6.16-6.17). Entirely new lines of business, such as floriculture, appeared
now that perishable products like fresh flowers can be reliably exported from the island (para.
620).
(ii) In the case of Chindo Island, an important side-effect of the bridge was to re-structure the
island economy giving it characteristics typical of a rural economy on the mainland. Labor
intensive subsistence farming was replaced by the more mechanized production of cash crops,
which could be reliably and more cheaply exported from the island (paras. 7.5-7.6). Land prices on
the island increased dramatically when compared with the sluggish real estate of other islands still
unconnected by bridges (para. 7.9). As happened in Tolsan, an indirect impact of the bridge to
Chindo was to accelerate out-migration (paras. 7.11-7.12). Tourism expanded dramatically with
the bridge, although with some negative environmental side effects (paras. 7.13-7.16). But on the
whole, the island population is better off today than before the bridge was opened.
Lessons
9. Centrality of Side-effects. This study shows the "centrality of side-effects" in the project-induced
development as noted by Hirschman. The project's success and its spillover effects over time was due to a
series of side-effects which contributed to the growth, expansion and sustainability of the project, which
included:
(i) Replicating Industrial Estates: The local authorities learned how to plan, finance, build and
operate large-scale industrial estates on the model of the Hanam Phase I and they executed
three more large-scale industrial estate projects (paras. 3.2-3.6).
(ii) Backward and Forward Industrial Linkages: Satellite industries have been established in
Hanam. With a strong locational advantage of being near the parent industry, they use as a
principal input an output of the parent industry or their principal outputs are used as an
input of the parent industry (paras. 3.7-3.9).
(iii) "Task-oriented" Bureaucratic Behavior: The extension of Hanam I to the second phase
without the help of MOC or the World Bank was a significant turning point for the city
government's institutional learning. Local governments' responsibilities grew rapidly as
promoters and partners of industrial development (paras. 3.10 -3.11).
(iv) Evolution of Local Government Organization and Capacity Building: City govemments
made many internal changes to their organizations to help change the rules and provide
more incentives for industrialists to invest (paras. 3.12-3.13). Moreover, through the
implementation of Bank-financed projects, local government officials improved the
capacity and quality of project management (paras. 3.14-3.15).
8(v) Private Sector Confidence and Public-Private Partnership: With a series of devolution
and deregulation, local governments assumed responsibilities as guarantors and managers
of "rules of the manufacturing game" for private industrial development (paras. 3.16-3.18).
Local governments' passion and commitment to industrial development in the region,
together with changing regulatory and institutional environment, enhanced the private
sector's confidence in the local governments and a strong public-private partnership
emerged (paras. 3.19-3.20).
10. Importance of the "Rules of the Game ". The new rules, through a series of devolution and
deregulation over time, changed the incentive structure to the benefit of the industrialists. They also
changed the behavior of the bureaucracy and led to the creation of an enabling environment where close
cooperation and coordination between the local government and the private sector materialized. These side-
effects were initially triggered by the Bank-financed projects. They became central to the economic
development in the Kwangju region. The project strengthened the growth- and task-oriented behavior of
government officials. The Bank's 57 missions over twenty years provided a sustained period of institutional
learning at all levels of government.
11. "Piloting" and "mainstreaming". The modestly sized Bank project for Hanam Phase I served as a
"pilot". It resulted in opportunities for the city government to pursue on its own the "mainstreaming" of
industrial development with its follow-up projects.
12. Shortcomings of Industrial Estate Development Strategy.
The Incubator Hypothesis. Small new firms with five to ten employees tend to locate in the central
area of cities to exploit all the benefits of externalities there (Lee, 1989). The project-financed
industrial estates are located outside the central city far away from the city center. They may not
help reducing site constraints for small firms.
Costs of Location Distortion. When the land market is functioning efficiently, infrastructure
investment tends to follow the market. When a large infrastructure project such as an industrial
estate is put in place by the public sector as is this case, the following negative impacts could occur:
(i) Lack of Complementary Investments: The main road connection to Hanam estate was not
expanded until 1992. Most establishments in the Hanam Industrial Estate operate a large fleet of
company buses for workers' commuting because of the lack of public transportation. When
complementary investments were not included in the project design, such unintended negative
impacts would result.
(ii) Negative Environmental Effects: Even though pollution control is strictly enforced, wind
blows toward the city center carrying smoke from the industrial areas.
(iii) Land Use Patterns: Because the cities grew and expanded rapidly, the industrial complexes
are now close to the newly developed expanding commercial centers preventing further expansion
of the cities outward.
13. Lessonsfrom Tolsan and Chindo Bridges. The lessons for integrating island economies as an
instrument of regional development policy are as follows:
9(i) Territorial incorporation by building bridges is easy to achieve, but it may require ingenious and
costly engineering solutions.
(ii) Despite identical engineering solutions, long-term side-effects in urban and rural areas are quite
different: urban areas offer better prospects for economic returns as expected, but the territorial
incorporation of rural islands could be justified as a national policy for equitable growth.
(iii) Public sector responses with investment in complementary infrastructure-access roads and
utilities in particular-should be swift to realize long-term side effects to the maximum extent.
(vi) Forward looking plans should be made from the project planning stage onward. Such an
exercise should include attempts to identify likely project impacts, opportunities for private
investment, and the needs for complementary infrastructure.
14. An important caveat of this case study is that it documents project impacts in a country with a
sustained economic growth. The same projects may fail to generate such impacts in a slow growing
economy. Also, other regions of Korea developed early on without a similar World Bank intervention. The
process of "learning by doing" in other regions provided lessons for the Cholla region. Using a case study
(historical) approach (para. 1.18) and the Hirschman-Baumol framework (paras. 2.8-2.10), however, this
study shows that the World Bank intervention acted as a catalyst in triggering the industrialization process
in the Cholla region which had been excluded from Korea's development process in the first two decades.
15. On transferability. This report supports the proposition that the patterns of behavioral responses of
individual actors to the rules of the game transcend time and places, i.e., regional or national boundaries.2
What varies across regions or countries is the quality of the rules of the game, for example, "the use of
incentives and organizational design within the public sector to enhance efficiency and to reduce the
likelihood of corruption" (Stiglitz, 1996, p. 174). Such an organizational design, however, can be learned
from experiences of other countries. The challenge is to find a mechanism, political or otherwise, to
"trigger" the process of such organizational learning. Wade (1993) suggests that "... from time to time
opportunities to make major organizational changes do occur in any society, and at that time it matters what
knowledge of alternative arrangements key policy makers have in their heads." But such opportunities were
created by policy makers themselves in Korea and other East Asian countries. They did not merely wait for
the opportunities to come.
2. Baumol (1990) shows historical evidence from Ancient Rome, Medieval China and through the Middle Ages.
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1. Introduction
Regional Bias in Korea's Development
1.1 Korea's "economic miracle" diverted attention from a heavy regional bias in Korea's
development strategy stretching over three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s. The regional imbalance
can be attributed to two factors: (i) comparative advantage, and (ii) regional rivalry. Historically,
Korea's industry and commerce developed along the Seoul-Pusan axis from the capital region in the
northwestern part of the peninsula to the Kyungsang provinces in the southeast. These regions offered
comparative advantages for industrial development, while the Cholla provinces in the southwestern part
of the country relied on a rich and productive agricultural tradition.
1.2 The regional rivalry, going back a thousand years, intensified once the late President Park, a
native of Kyungsang, came to power in 1961. His government ruled the country until 1979 and launched
almost all major industrial development projects in the Kyungsang region, including the Ulsan Industrial
Estate (in 1962) where the Hyundai automobile plant and shipyards were established, the Pohang Steel
Mills (in 1971), and the Seoul-Pusan Expressway, the first major highway in Korea, which was
completed in the early 1970s.
1.3 During the 1960s, industrial development began expanding from the capital region to the
Kyungsang region, while the southwestern region of Cholla provinces lagged. As the Korean economy
continued to expand at a real growth rate of nearly 10 percent per year, the regional income disparities,
especially between the Cholla region and the Seoul and Kyungsang regions widened, the regional rivalry
deepened, and regional equity emerged as an important political issue. In 1975; 73 percent of South
Cholla's employment was in agriculture and fishery, the largest proportion among the nine provinces.3
Only 6 percent was in manufacturing (Table A 1.1 )4
1.4. In parallel, popular anger and frustration rose in the Cholla provinces, especially in Kwangju, the
provincial capital of South Cholla. Distrust of local government and antagonism toward the national
government accentuated. Table A 1.2 shows a steady out-migration of population from the Cholla region.
Korea's Experience with Industrial Location Policy
1.5 Confronted with the increasing concentration of population and economic activity in the capital
region, the Korean Government, as was the case in many other developing countries in the 1970s,
implemented explicit spatial policies to decentralize population and employment to less developed
regions. A previous World Bank sponsored study (Lee, 1985a, and 1985b; Lee and Choe, 1990)
evaluated the effectiveness and impacts of such policies which were intended to influence the location
patterns of manufacturing industries by various financial schemes to relocate industries to outlying areas
or less developed regions.
1.6 The study found that the majority of relocating firms moved within the same region because
firms find it very costly to move long distances. The 1982 manufacturing survey showed that of those
3. In this study, 15 geographic regions are used for comparative analysis: six "Direct Administration Cities" (Jikhalsi)-Seoul,
Pusan, Taeku, Inchon, Kwangju, and Taechon-and nine provinces. The status of a Direct Administration City is equal to that
of a province.
4. Tables with an "A" in front of the number are in Annex 1.
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moved, only 6.5 percent did so influenced by government incentives like tax breaks.5 Most moved for
internal reasons such as the need for more plant space. The study concluded that government spatial
policies had a relatively minor impact on the location choices of manufacturing firms.
1.7 Since firms do not move long distances and relocation policies did not work, it was difficult for
the Kwangju region to attract industries from outside. The regional bias in infrastructure investment
mentioned above did not help attract industries to the Kwangju region. The establishment of the Hanam
Industrial Estate as part of the World Bank project became a turning point in "triggering" the process of
industrial development in the region, as documented below.
World Bank Projects Description
1.8 In 1972, the Korean government requested assistance from the World Bank in developing South
Cholla, then the poorest region in Korea, to attract employment generating industries. The Secondary
Cities Regional-Project (Loan 1070), approved in 1975, was followed by a Second Kwangju Regional
Project (Loan 1758) approved in 1979, also in South Cholla (Chonnam) Province. In 1984, World Bank
operations expanded to North Cholla (Chonbuk) Province with the Chonju Regional Development
Project (Loan 2388).
1.9 Objectives and Components. The main objectives of the above mentioned three projects were to
support the Government's efforts to develop the Cholla region and reduce inter-regional disparities.
Kwangju I with a loan amount of US$15 million, actually initiated Korea's first regional investment
program as part of the Third Five Year Economic Plan, 1972-76. While Kwangju I focused on
improving urban infrastructure, including housing sites and access roads, Kwangju II with a loan amount
of US$65 million, explicitly aimed at "promoting industrialization in the region's cities to expand
employment opportunities" and "increasing the income earning opportunities of the region's island
population" (PCR, p. v). It included the first phase of the Hanam Industrial Estate and the technically
complex Tolsan and Chindo bridges that were instruments of the Government's island development
policy, the two components chosen for this study. The third (Chonju) project with a loan amount of
US$60 million had similar objectives for developing North Cholla province with an investment package
similar to that of Kwangju II.
1.10 All three projects were complex, together covering seven cities and five islands in two provinces
and each project had a half dozen project components (displaying the "Christmas-tree" characteristics of
many Bank-financed urban projects). They included industrial estates, housing estates, tourism estates
(including national parks), market places, bridges connecting islands with the mainland, fishery
complexes, urban services components such as water supply and drainage systems, and both national and
urban road improvements (see Annex 2 for detailed project description).
1.11 Implementation and Performance. Most of the physical targets of all three projects were met.
Implementation of the physical components was in general satisfactory although Kwangju II took two
more years to complete than planned, mainly because of the technical complexity of the Tolsan and
Chindo bridges (para 5.3). According to the Kwangju II PCR, the project had "a positive effect in
strengthening the economic base of the region through industrial development in Kwangju" (p. 15). The
Chonju project PCR concluded that "the project was generally successful in promoting economic
development and creating employment opportunities in the Chonju region" (p. 6). Institutional
5. The relative efficiency of various location subsidy schemes in the form of credit, wage and land subsidies was simulated as
part of the World Bank study (Murray, 1988).
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development at all levels of government was significant. The Kwangju Regional Development Unit,
established by Presidential Decree in 1975 as the project management unit for Kwangju I (PCR, p. 41),
was the seed for institutional learning for regional development in Korea that occurred over the two
decades of World Bank-financed project implementation, another subject of this impact evaluation study.
1.12 Earlier the OED had rated the project (Kwang u II) outcome as satisfactory, its sustainability as
likely, but its institutional development was not rated. This impact evaluation study confirmed the first
two ratings and documented that institutional development was substantial. Furthermore, the study
demonstrated the importance of understanding Hirschman's concept of "centrality of side-effects" in
project work (see Chapter 3). For example, predicting such side-effects would make it possible to plan
complementary investments that would be required for a realization of fuller development impacts of a
project (para. 4.5).
Rationale and Objectives of the Study
1.13 Regional income disparities and inequities in resource allocation constitute a major challenge to
sustained development. Nevertheless, regional development projects are rare in the Bank urban lending
portfolio. The Bank-supported regional development program in Korea is unique: no such sustained
efforts extending over a period of two decades can be found elsewhere.
1.14 The main objectives of the study are two-fold: to assess (i) short-run "direct" project impacts on
the beneficiaries as anticipated by the projects, and (ii) long-run "side-effects"7 (indirect impacts) on the
industrialization process and institutional learning.
Scope of the Study and Two Distinct Approaches
I.15 The amount of Bank project financing was substantial in the region when the projects started in
the mid- 1 970s, but the amount was only a small portion of the total accumulated infrastructure
investment in the region during the two decades of project implementation. Therefore, the physical
impacts of these complex projects (total of 22 components) were negligibly small considering the fact
that the country's economy grew at such a high rate over a sustained period, accompanied by a rapid
growth of cities. During the study mission, many of the project components were not visible or
recognizable at the individual project sites because of the overall development that had taken place in the
surrounding areas, e.g., Ycosu's access roads to the business district are now part of the fully developed
city center. An impact evaluation of these types of project components would be impractical.
1.16 The study's coverage had to be very selective and focused. It concentrated on the Kwangju
region where the first two projects were located. The experiences of the third project in Chonju are
compared with those of the Kwangju projects as appropriate. The study focused on: (i) impacts of the
Hanam industrial estate on industrial development in the region; (ii) impacts on institutional
development at both national and local levels, and (iii) impacts of the Tolsan and Chindo bridges on
integrating the island economies into the regional development. These three investment components, a
total of $103 million, accounted for 48 percent of Kwangju II's total project costs of $216 million (PCR,
p. 22). Chapters 2 to 4 of the report present items (i) and (ii), and Chapters 5 to 8 present (iii).
6. The Project Performance Audit Report (No. 9610) was issued in May 1991 when OED's ratings were not included in the
Evaluative Memorandum. This rating information was obtained from the Bank's OED Data File.
7. Hirschman (1995). See the discussion in Chapter 3.
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1.17 Two Distinct Approaches. Even after decades of research on regional development, there is no
widely accepted analytical framework to assess project impacts. For the study of industrial development
and institutional learning in Part I, a case study approach is followed. It focuses on the catalytic role of
the World Bank projects in "triggering" the process of industrialization and sustained institutional
learning (see para. 1.18). In Part II, however, the approach comparing the conditions "before" and
"after" the bridges is complemented by a comparison of the project islands with the "other" islands
without bridge connections.
I.18 A Case Study Method: Historical Approach. The evaluation methodology used for institutional
development in this study is a case study method which is "for learning about a complex instance" (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1990, p. 14). "Case studies are frequently used in public policy analysis to
examine the effects of non-experimental events such as political decisions by cities and towns" (GAO,
1992, p. 48; Yin and Heald, 1975). Such studies heavily rely on qualitative (non-quantitative) and
historical information. Baumol's view on the historical approach is that: "it is surely a standard tenet of
scientific method that tentative confirmation of a hypothesis is provided by observation of phenomena
that the hypothesis helps to explain and that could not easily be accounted for if that hypothesis were
invalid" (Baumol, 1990, p. 895). Two principles to help establish validity and reliability in a case study
are: (i) use multiple sources of evidence, e.g., via triangulation of data; and (ii) maintain a chain of
evidence (GAO, 1991, p. 43).
Information and Data Collection
1.19 Data Needs. The design of the World Bank projects did not contain any data collection schemes
for evaluation such as baseline data and monitoring and evaluation. This study therefore resorts to
secondary data and the information collected during two study missions. A small survey of
manufacturing establishments was conducted for the firms located within and outside the industrial
estates (see Chapter 2 and Annexes 4 and 5). Wherever data would permit, quantitative analyses based
on the "before/after" and "with/without" methods were followed.
1.20 Sources of Information. The information collected during the two study missions included
secondary data and interview results. There were three groups of informants: (i) national government
officials (including a focus group meeting with Division Chiefs who had implemented the projects); (ii)
local government officials at both provincial and city governments; and (iii) private sector people
including manufacturers within and outside industrial estates, representatives of local Chambers of
Commerce and Industries, local university professors and researchers (see Annex 6 for a list of the
people interviewed). In addition, information was obtained by site visits and interviews with
beneficiaries at the project sites, and also from review of project documents and other related secondary
data.
8. To obtain and confirm corroborating evidence from multiple sources.
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PART I. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL
LEARNING
2. Direct Impacts: "Triggering" the Industrialization Process
Baseline Conditions in the 1970s
2.1 National Government-Directed Institutional Environment. The Korean Government's conscious
development effort started with the First Five-Year Economic Plan in 1962 immediately after the late
President Park took power through a military coup. The Plan was prepared and implemented by a small
group of American-educated technocrats in the national government under the direction of the "Blue
House" (the presidential mansion). The institutional environment for development was completely
dominated by a classic command system of decision making: almost 100 percent of the country's
loanable funds was allocated by the Blue House according to the investment priority set in the Economic
Plan (for materials on the modern history of Korean economic development, see Amsden, 1989; Song,
1990; Sakong, 1993; Cho, 1994; Kim and Leipziger, 1993).
2.2 Recovery from the complete destruction of Korea's socio-economic infrastructure during the
Korean war (which ended in 1953) was slow. With the country's annual per capita GNP of $87, Korea
was still dependent on foreign aid. The country completely lacked the basic "institutional" infrastructure,
i.e., the "rules of the game", by which different actors can play to achieve the goal of economic
development. The new set of "rules of the game" was quickly established by the Park government.
2.3 During the First Five Year Plan period, the government established a set of basic principles for
development policies, i.e., "rules of the game": (i) the government should determine the direction of
policies, and the goals of economic development should be achieved both by the price mechanism and
government investment and financing, but the government may employ other means than the price
mechanism for promoting priority industries; (ii) the government could complement and replace private
decisions in the case of major investments; (iii) for economic development, growth should have a higher
priority than redressing imbalances in income distribution and uneven industrial development across
geographical regions (Cho, 1994, pp. 31-32).
2.4 Exclusion of Cholla from Development Process. Not sharing the benefits of the national
government's industrialization strategy and infrastructure investment programs, the Cholla region was
left behind Korea's rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. Cholla was not a "lagging region" in
the traditional sense of lacking any development potential with no resources; rather it was "lagging"
because of the policy bias as much as from market failures (especially in utilizing the high quality labor
force). The rapidly changing incentive structure (i.e., the rules of the game) in Korea for business
operations did not reach entrepreneurs in Cholla whereas the economy was picking up speed along the
Seoul-Pusan axis.
2.5 Lack of Industrial Infrastructure. The manufacturing base in the city of Kwangju in the 1970s
was rather weak having only several large indigenous manufacturing establishments (e.g., Kumho Tire;
Kia Automobiles) and several industrial areas in the central city where small and medium scale firms
were concentrated. Table Al .3 shows that in 1978, the industrial area in the Cholla provinces was only a
quarter that of the Kyongsang provinces. In the 1975 Kwangju City Master Plan, the spatial planning
strategy for the future expansion of the city was outlined including the designation of the Hanam area as
an industrial area which was then outside the city boundary.
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2.6 Large scale industrial estates in Kwangju and the Cholla region came only in 1983 when the
Hanam Industrial Estate opened as part of the World Bank's second Kwangju project. In fact, this large
scale industrial estate development came to the Cholla region 20 years(!) after the establishment of the
Ulsan industrial complex in Kyungsang province in 1962 that was part of the First Five Year Economic
Plan (Choe and Song, 1984, p. 79).
Evaluation Framework
2.7 The hypotheses tested here relate to direct impacts (propositions I and 2) and long-term side-
effects (propositions 3 and 4):
Proposition 1: The Hanam Industrial Estate as a component of Kwangju II had the "triggering"
effect on the process of industrialization in the region.
Proposition 2: The World Bank projects offered both national and local government officials the
first opportunity of its kind for learning project preparation and implementation for industrial
development in the region.
Proposition 3: Hanam Phase I, as a component of Kwangju II, led to three additional phases of
industrial estate development (in a period of 10 years), and resulted in the ultimate impact of
establishing the region's industrial base with "backward and forward linkages".
Proposition 4: The "rules of the game" evolved from national government-directed institutional
environment for development to local government-based, enabling environment to which the
private sector actively responded in the region.
2.8 Hirschman's "Centrality of Side-Effects". According to Hirschman (1995, p. 161): "...some of
the so-called side-effects thus turn out, a bit surprisingly, to be inputs essential to the realization of the
project's principal effect and purpose." In other words, many unexpected side-effects of development
projects are central to the purpose of the project itself, sometimes even becoming inputs to the
sustainability of the project. Hirschman's concept of "backward and forward lifikages" is a good example
of the centrality of side-effects (Ibid, p. 165) and it provides an analytical framework for explaining the
success of the Hanam Industrial Estate and its expansion to the subsequent phases of development.
2.9 Baumol-North Framework. "Rules of the Game " and Entrepreneurship. The analysis of
institutional learning in this study corroborates the Baumol theory of entrepreneurial behavior which
states that "one of the prime determinants of entrepreneurial behavior at any particular time and place is
the prevailing 'rules of the game' that govern the payoff of one entrepreneurial activity relative to
another" (Baumol, 1990, p. 898). The resulting policy guidance is that:
"The rules of the game that specify the relative payoffs to different entrepreneurial activities play
a key role in determining whether entrepreneurship will be allocated in productive or
unproductive directions and that this can significantly affect the vigor of the economy's
productive growth" (Ibid., p. 918).9
2.10 In this study, "institution" is broadly defined as "rules of the game" which were changed over
time by the national and the local governments in such a way that the incentive systems improved and
9. Baumol (1986) showed that implicit incentive structures matter in explaining patterns of growth among countries. For a
recent study on manufacturers' responses to infrastructure deficiencies and regulatory constraints, see Lee, Anas and Oh (1996),
and Baumol and Lee (1991).
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the private sector responded in the productive direction. One of the key elements in this study is to
document the "process by which those rules 'were' modified" (Ibid., p. 916) over the study period and to
understand how private businesses responded to the changing rules. The theoretical foundation for
institutional analysis has been advanced by North' 0 (1990). In his Nobel Prize lecture, North stated that:
It is the interaction between institutions and organizations that shapes the institutional evolution
of an economy. If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations and their entrepreneurs
are the players...if the institutional framework rewards productive activities then organizations-
firms-will come into existence to engage in productive activities.. .the most fundamental long-
run source of change is learning by individuals and entrepreneurs of organizations (North, 1994,
p. 361).
2.11 Aoki's "Market Enhancing View" of the Role of Government. According to Aoki, "...the
government's role is to facilitate the development of private sector institutions that can overcome these
[market] failures..." (Aoki, 1995, p. 11). In other words, its "coordination" role enhances the functioning
of the market. This is what the governments did in the Cholla region, that is, induce the private sector to
participate in the industrialization process in that region. Aoki's proposition complements the Baumol-
North framework which is based on the behavior of individual actors and organizations.
2.12 The construction of the industrial estate in Hanam began in January 1981 and was completed in
December 1983. The time period set for the study of long-term impacts (mostly side-effects) is the ten-
year period after project completion, 1986-1995, as shown in Table 2.1.
2.13 The study documents the following four major outcomes: (1) industrial infrastructure expanded
more than five times the original investment of Hanam 1; (2) a solid industrial base has been established
with backward and forward linkages; (3) local government capacity reached the level of sophistication to
support a rapid industrialization process; and (4) the "rules of the game" (government, bureaucracy and
regulations) evolved to an incentive structure conducive to private investment. As shown in Table 2. 1,
direct impacts and longer-term side-effects are traced and analyzed to substantiate these outcomes. The
study of the "Direct Impacts" is presented in the sequel of Chapter 2 and its longer-term "Side-Effects"
(indirect impacts) in Chapter 3.
10. North (1973) refers to Baumol's Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State (1952), as part of the intellectual origin of
the theory in institutional analysis.
I1. Aoki's ongoing research with EDI (Aoki, 1995) is an attempt to extend the analysis of the role of government addressed in
The East Asian Miracle(World Bank, 1993). In his pioneering work, North (1973, pp. 1-8) showed that the role of governments
in establishing and enforcing property rights is the key to efficient economic organization and growth.
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Table 2.1: Evaluation Logic for Hanam Impacts
Direct Impacts Long-term Side-Effects
Time Period 1978-1985 1986-1995
Bank Intervention Kwangju II None in Kwangju
1) Industrial Infrastructure Hanam Industrial Estate Phase I Hanam Phase II, III and Pyung-
Dong Phase
2) Manufacturing Industries Large "anchor firms"; relocation Industrial linkages, expansion,
(Private sector responses) of small and medium size firms and diversification, including
exports
3) Institutional Environment National Government-led City government-led
development; mandates and development; responses to
orders markets
4) Institutional Learning a) Intergovernmental relations; a) Devolution and jurisdiction
b) Public-private sector b) Laws and regulations;
interaction; c) Organization and
c) Local government management responsibilities;
challenge d) Local government capacity
building;
e) Private sector confidence
Impact on Industrial Infrastructure: Hanam Phase I
2.14 The Hanam Industrial Estate Phase I, completed in 1983, was the largest project investment
component of Kwangju II in an amount of 20 billion won (US$41 million), which was about 20 percent
of the total project costs. This component alone constituted 15 percent of the total amount of capital
formation of 132 billion won (PCR, p. 19) for the city of Kwangju during the five-year period 1980-
1985. The land area of the estate was 460,000 pyongs (1.5 million square meters) which was about the
same as the sum of all industrial areas that existed in the city before the project (Table 2.2).
2.15 Recently completed World Bank studies show that when publicly provided infrastructure
services are deficient, manufacturers undertake significant expenditures to substitute or complement
these deficiencies, and smaller firms, and those in regional cities, sustain heavier burdens (Lee and Anas
1992; Anas, Lee and Murray, 1996). The low level of infrastructure investment in the Cholla
12. The actual amount disbursed was US$51.2 million after cancellation of US$13.8 million due to the cost savings from a
substantial devaluation. But the total project cost at completion was US$216 million, 40 percent larger than the appraisal
estimate of US$154 owing to additional investments by the borrower (PCR, p. 22).
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region in the 1960s and 1970s, especially the lack of industrial sites (Table A 1.3), was one of the major
constraints on the birth and growth of manufacturing in the region. The coming of the Hanam Industrial
Estate clearly marked the beginning of a new era for industrialists in the region.
Table 2.2: Expansion of Industrial Estates in Kwangju
Land Area Development Costs Construction
Completion Date
Industrial Estate 1,000 pyong percent billion won percent
Hanam I 460 12.5 25.5 7.5 Dec. 1983
Hanam II 617 16.8 39.7 11.7 Dec. 1988
Hanam III 727 19.8 91.4 26.9 Feb. 1991
Pyong-dong 820 22.3 156.0 45.8 Jun. 1995
Science Complex (1) 494 13.4 - - 2001
All Other Ind. Areas (2) 557 15.2 27.7 8.1 n.a.
Total 3,675 100.0| 340.3 100.01
(1) Total land area including R&D complex, university, and residential and commercial
areas will be 2,980,000 pyongs with total development cost of 727.7 billion won for
Phase I, to be completed in 2001.
(2) Includes Bonchon, Songnam, and Sochon industrial areas, but excludes Kumho Tire
and Asia Automobiles.
Sources: National Industrial Estate Status, Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industries,
June 10, 1994.
Regional Economic White Paper 1994, Kwangju City, December 1994.
Industrial Estate Status, Kwangju City, March 1995.
Impact on Manufacturing
2.16 As indicated above, firms do not move long distances because of high expected costs and
uncertainties at new location. Infrastructure and tax breaks alone are not sufficient to attract industries to
less developed remote areas. Therefore, the major challenge for the project's success was to induce
firms, especially several large-scale ones, to the newly developed industrial estates. The city and
provincial governments actively promoted the estate nationwide aiming at attracting several large scale
"anchor" firms, supported by the help of the central government's clout for moral suasion (including that
of the "Blue House"). The following contributed to the success of Hanam Phase I as critical factors.
2.17 "Anchor" Firms. Daewoo Electronics, LG (Goldstar) and three other firms came as the "anchor
firms". The availability of low price land and high quality labor and their marketing strategy influenced
their decisions to locate in the Hanam Industrial Estate, but the active promotion activities by local
government officials, and local business groups (Chamber of Commerce and Industries) and the pressure
from the national government (the Blue House) influenced their decisions.
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2.18 City Planning and Zoning as Instruments. Small and medium size firms relocated from the old
industrial areas in Kwangju's central city due to city planning and zoning changes. Their capital gains
from selling old factory sites were substantial enough for relocating to the Hanam Industrial Estate and
investing in new plant and equipment. The land price at Hanam was several times lower than their
previous locations at the central city.
2.19 Subcontracting Small and Medium Size Firms. A large number of subcontracting firms came
with Daewoo and LG. Backward and forward linkages were beginning to be established. In the case of
Daewoo, 35 small and medium size firms came with it to Hanam, 20 from Seoul. (See Chapter 3 on
linkage effects.)
2.20 On the whole, all of the new industrial sites in the Hanam Industrial Estate completed in
December 1983 were occupied quickly, due to the pent-up demand accumulated over the past two
decades. As the estate was being filled up in 1984, development of the second phase of Hanam was
proposed and its construction began in 1986 (see more details in chapter 3).
Manufacturing Establishment Survey Results
2.21 Sample Design and Sampling Strategy. A survey of manufacturing establishments was
conducted in Kwangju to learn about the characteristics of the firms in the Hanam Industrial Estate and
at other locations in the city. A stratified random sample of 80 manufacturing establishments was
selected using location and firm size as stratification variables: (i) 50 percent was selected from each
"within" the Hanam Industrial Estate, the project site, and from "outside", respectively; and (ii) large
firms were oversampled. In 1995, Kwangju had only 25 manufacturing establishments with more than
200 employees, 10 of them at Hanam. All 25 firms except two were included in the sample (Table
Al.5). There were a total of 1,945 manufacturing establishments in Kwangju in 1995, of which 395
were located in Hanam, 256 in other small industrial estates closer to the central city, and 1,294 outside
industrial estates. Of those outside, 975 (75 percent) were microenterprises with less than 5 employees
(Table 2.3). The sample was 10 percent of those with 5 or more employees. The survey outcome
produced 44 establishments located in Hanam and 36 "outside" (Table A1.6). More details of the survey
results appear in Annex 4.
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Table 2.3: Firm Size Distribution Within and Outside Hanam Industrial Estates, 1995
Firm Size
Large Medium Small Micro Number of
Industrial Estate (300 or more) (20-299) (6-19) (Less than 5) Total Workers
Hanaml 5 51 45 15 116 10,344
Hanam II 2 55 51 6 114 4,442
Hanam III - 65 84 16 165 3,607
Sub-total 7 171 180 37 39.5 18,393
Bonchon 2 38 45 7 92 3,888
Songnam - 28 35 4 67 2,410
Sochon IE _ 12 23 22 57 999
Sochon AIE - 26 13 1 40 1,583
Sub-total 2 104 116 34 256 8,880
Outside of IE 6 62 251 975 1,294 19,488
Total 1 337 547 1,0461 1,9451 46,761
Source: Kwangju Industrial Estate Status, 1995.
2.22 Survey Instruments. The survey questionnaire was designed using the questionnaires from two
previous World Bank studies on industrial location in Colombia and Korea (Lee, 1989; Lee and Choe,
1990). The underlying analytical framework was to relate manufacturing firm attributes with location
attributes. Government policies and infrastructure investment end to influence the location attributes to
which individual firms respond. The questionnaire is attached as Annex 5. The survey was conducted
by the study team at Kwangju-Chonnam Development Institute in the summer of 1995.
2.23 Firm attributes included employment size, industry type, age, and whether newly established or
moved from other locations. Location attributes included access to input and output markets, industrial
linkages, means of shipments of goods and commuting of employees, and quality of various
infrastructure services.
2.24 Survey Findings. The survey results are tabulated (i) for the sample as a whole, and (ii) by
location: Hanam I, Hanam II and III, and "outside". Some of the highlights of the survey results can be
summarized as follows. The majority (62.6 percent) of the sample firms were in the medium size
category of having 50 to 199 employees (Table A 1.5); 60 percent of the firms were founded since 1983
(when Hanam I was completed); 36 firms were newly established while 44 moved from other locations
(6 came from outside Cholla). Of the 44 firms in Hanam, 28 (63.6 percent) moved from other locations
(Table A1.6). New firms had more advanced technology than the relocated firms (Table A4.6). The
sample firms were concentrated in the fabricated metal industries (61 percent) indicating their links to
large firms as suppliers of intermediate products (Table A1.7). The extent of backward and forward
linkages was significant (Tables 3.1 and 3.2), which is discussed in Chapter 3.
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2.25 The quality of electricity supply was better in Hanam than "outside" (Table A4.12). The sample
firms reported that utility and other infrastructure services improved after relocation (Table A4. 15). The
firms in Hanam were "very satisfied" with road access, proximity to clients, and plant capacity, while
those "outside" were satisfied with the availability of workers (Table A4. 11), which reflects the central
location of those firms outside Hanam. Indeed, large firms moved long distances (Table A4.13) and the
shipping distances and the availability of workers became worse after relocation. Also, only a small
portion of relocated firms reported any improvements of commuting distances (Table A4. 15). About 80
percent of sample firms use trucks as the means of shipping outputs and receiving inputs (Table A4.8).
Only a small portion of their outputs was sold in Kwangju (i.e., manufacturing is an export sector in
Kwangju) and a small portion of inputs originates within the city (Table A4.8). We may conclude that
the quality of various infrastructure services improved with the establishment of the Hanam Industrial
Estate, but logistics costs, especially for shipping and commuting, increased because of the distance
factor. Possible location distortions resulting from the establishment of Hanam are discussed in
paragraph 4.5.
Impact on National-Local Government Relations and Management Capacity
2.26 One of the most significant direct impacts of World Bank intervention was to establish a new
working relationship between national and local governments. For mobilizing much needed resources
and symbolizing the long awaited government commitment to the region's development, the World Bank
projects were welcomed by the provincial and the city governments as much as the national government.
Nearly all principal project components came from proposals submitted by local governments, which
generated strong project ownership at the local level. For MOC, committed to regional development in
Korea since 1971, the projects were an opportunity to put into practice and implement the many plans
and study recommendations made over the years. For local governments, the projects not only provided
an opportunity to work closely with MOC as one team but also forged a new alliance with the private
sector for the benefit of the region's development, which neither provincial or local governments alone
could bring about by themselves.13
2.27 To implement the project, MOC set up a special project implementation unit called Kwangju
Regional Development Unit (para 1.11) which was relocated to Iri in 1981 as part of a government
reorganization in that year (Kwangju II PCR, para. 1.3). The Regional Development Bureau of MOC
still existing in Iri (now called Iksan) with a total of 200 employees, is a direct result of the Bank project.
Initially, this unit supervised the construction of all project facilities, giving instructions to local
authorities to carry out the details. As local governments acquired a stronger voice with subsequent
projects, the Regional Development Bureau provided an important channel of communication between
different levels and departments of governments and a source of advice. Indeed, it played the crucial
role of interagency coordination for the development efforts in the region. Most of the Bureau's advice
concerned the construction of industrial infrastructure, one of the main lines of business of MOC. For
the operation of the completed industrial estates, a different kind of interaction developed as the city
government became responsible for its management.
2.28 After the completion of the Hanam Industrial Estate, the city of Kwangju inherited the project
and had the mandate to manage it. The Hanam Industrial Estate Management Office was created to
operate the estate under the direction of the Industry Development Division of the city government. At
13. The sources of evidence in this and the following section and the two sections on the side-effects in Chapter 3 are based on
the triangulation of information from multiple sources (para. 1. 18). The list of people met in the national and local governments
and the private sector during the two study missions is attached in Annex 6.
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the outset, this office with a staff of 17 took care of all the details for the operations and maintenance of
the estate facilities in addition to its role of promotion and sale of the vacant lots. Over the 20 year
period which saw the expansion of the estate to the second and third phases, the size and the function of
this office have been reduced rather than increased, owing to (i) a series of regulatory reforms in the
areas of industrial and urban development which reduced the workload of this office; (ii) better access of
information to the local manufacturers; and (iii) their improved efficiency in business operations. This
diminishing role of the Hanam Industrial Estate Management Office illustrates the evolution of the "rules
of the game" from government-led to market-led institutional environment over the study period, which
is elaborated in Chapter 3 (see para. 3.20).
Impact on Public-Private Sector Interaction
2.29 For the private sector, the projects were the first strong signals coming from the Blue House
indicating that the "rules of the game" for industrial development in the region were about to change.
Private industrialists interviewed during the study mission always highlighted the World Bank's catalytic
role in initiating the industrial development process in the region and bringing the three stakeholders,
national and local governments and private sector, together through the projects.
2.30 The direct contact between local governments who operated the industrial estates, and private
manufacturers located in them, changed the nature of public-private sector interaction in the context of
the region's industrial development. New actors on the scene, the city government and private
entrepreneurs, meant that new relationships had to be forged. Different criteria for business decision
making meant that the "rules of the game" had to be changed to induce private entrepreneurs from within
and outside the region to invest in the expanding manufacturing activities there. This process of
institutional learning on both sides is documented further in Chapter 3 using Hirschman's concept of the
"centrality of side-effects" in impact evaluation.
2.31 In interviews with the impact evaluation study team, many businessmen in the region expressed
that local government officials became increasingly knowledgeable about industrial development. Local
governments indeed became partners in this process of industrialization for the first time, owing to the
exposure to private sector interests through World Bank project implementation. For example,
cooperation between the coalition of government agencies and the private sector itself took the forn of
joint local government/Chamber of Commerce and Industry delegations to lobby for the interests of the
region at government agencies (including the "Blue House") and "chaebols" (business conglomerates) in
Seoul.
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3. Side Effects and Spillovers
3.1 "Impacts on the ground" are often longer-term, indirect, and unintended. Using Hirschman's
conceptual framework of the "centrality of side-effects", this chapter will document three types of "side-
effects" observed from the World Bank projects: (i) establishing an industrial base through backward and
forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958); (ii) changing the "behavior of the bureaucracy" (Hirschman, 1995,
pp. 166-167) especially of the local governments and their institutional learning; and (iii) increasing
private sector confidence and participation in the development process in response to changing "rules of
the game". For the latter, Hirschman's conceptual framework is complemented by Baumol's paradigm on
the entrepreneurial responses to the "rules of the game" (Baumol, 1990).
Industrial Base and Linkages
Industrial Infrastructure: Hanam II, III, and Pyung Dong Follow-up Projects
3.2 One of the most significant-and yet unexpected-side effects of the Kwangju II project was for
the local authorities to learn how to plan, finance, build and operate large-scale'industrial estates on the
model of Hanam Phase I. Since they had to operate the project facilities and expand them urgently to
meet additional demand, the governments of Kwangju city and South Cholla province had to learn
quickly to put their newly acquired knowledge and skills into practice.
3.3 The World Bank's estimate of the future demand for industrial sites was below the Korean
projection. Korean officials wished to build a larger estate at Hanam. The final outcome, 66 percent of
all sites sold before completion and the rest quickly occupied, proved the bullish Korean estimate to be
closer to the mark. Had the World Bank agreed to build a much larger first phase estate at Hanam, the
Bank's decision would have deprived the local authorities of much of their rich learning experiences in
the planning and construction of large industrial estates. Hanam I turned out to be a "pilot" phase that
led to the "mainstreaming" phase of Hanam II, III, and Pyung-Dong, three more industrial estate projects
executed by the city alone in only a ten-year period (Picciotto and Weaving, 1994).
3.4 The institutional learning discussed earlier-including strong compact and coordination between
MOC and local governments, local government participation and ownership, private sector confidence
and participation, and local government capacity building-were "side-effects" from the initial phase of
the project which became, as Hirschman put it, "inputs essential to the realization of the project's
principal effects and purpose." "They increase[d] and spread with and through use so that the resulting
increment [could] then be channeled to new ventures" (Hirschman, 1995, p. 161)-in our case, the
follow-up projects of Hanam Phase II, III, and Pyung-Dong, the ultimate long-r.un side effects.
3.5 As Hanam Phase I was already fully occupied by 1984, and industrialists had expressed interest
in acquiring further land, the local authorities began work on the Hanam Phase II extension in 1986 and
completed in 1988, but this time without the help of MOC and World Bank involvement, only assisted
by the Korea Land Development Corporation (KLDC). To meet the increasing demand for sites, the
Kwangju city authorities launched Hanam Phase III in 1989 by the city alone without MOC, KLDC, or
the World Bank, and completed in 1991. When the study mission visited the site, 85 percent of the sites
were occupied. As the Phase III sites were sold out even before completion of the project, the city
continued expansion of industrial sites by the construction of Pyung-Dong Industrial Estate, an area
south of Hanam including an area for foreign direct investment that was completed in 1995 (Table 2.2).
The land area of Hanam II and III together is 1,344,000 pyongs (I pyong=3.3 square meters), three times
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larger than that of Hanam I (460,000 pyongs). In addition, the land area of Pyung-Dong is 820,000
pyongs (Table 2.2).
3.6 This sequence of massive industrial estate development during a little over ten years by the city
alone is a remarkable achievement for the city government of Kwangju. On the whole, developing
Hanam Phase II, a land area of 617,000 pyongs (2 million square meters), without the help of MOC, was
the most important benchmark in the local government's capacity building for managing a large
industrial development project.
Backward and Forward Industrial Linkages
3.7 Table 2.3 shows the size distribution of manufacturing firms located within and outside Hanam
Industrial Estates in 1995. It is striking to see that 81 percent of medium and large scale firms are
located in the industrial estates while only 23 percent of small firms (with less than 20 employees) are
located in the estates. This implies that the industrial estates provide both economies of scale and scope
of infrastructure and other services that are vital for medium and large scale operations. In terms of
employment, three Hanam estates offered 40 percent of Kwangju's total number of manufacturing jobs in
1995. It is clear that Hanam Industrial Estate had a significant impact on the city's employment growth.
3.8 One important contribution by Hirschman is the analytical framework of "backward and forward
linkages" in the industrial development process (Hirschman, 1958). This linkage effect is one of the key
examples of the "centrality of side-effects". According to Hirschman (1995, p. 165):
[backward and forward linkage effects] are not ordinarily required for the proper functioning of
the project as such. Forward linkages that increase the demand for the project's outputs will,
however, be very useful and in some cases essential for the future growth of the
project...Backward linkage effects have a similar function: they reduce the import-intensity of
the project whose future growth ...may well be conditioned on such a reduction; thus both linkage
effects may play an important role in enabling the project expand [and grow].
3.9 In this study, three of Hirschman's linkage effects are observed:
(i) "Satellite" Industry Effect on Establishing an Industrial Base. A satellite industry can be
established through backward or forward linkages. Such an industry enjoys a strong locational
advantage of being near the parent industry and it uses as a principal input an output of the parent
industry, or its principal output is used as an input of the parent industry (Hirschman 1958, p. 102). Our
establishment survey shows the following linkage effects: Table 3.1 shows that more than 60 percent of
the establishments at Hanam supply their outputs as intermediate inputs of other industries; 28 percent of
them send 100 percent of their outputs to other industries, a strong indication of forward linkages. Table
3.2 shows the extent of backward linkages: at Hanam nearly 80 percent of establishments receive
outputs of other industries as intermediate inputs, a strong indication of backward linkages.
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Table 3.1: Proportion of Outputs Used as Inputs to Other Industries: Forward Linkages
0 % | 1-20 % 1 21-40 %I 41-60 %| 61-80 %I 81-99 %I 100% n.a. I Total
Industrial Estate --------------- (percent of establishments) ---------------
Hanam 1 34.8 13.0 4.4 0.0 0.0 8.7 34.8 4.4 100.0
Hanam II & III 42.9 14.3 0.0 4.8 4.8 0.0 23.8 9.5 100.0
Outside 38.9 16.7 5.6 0.() 5.6 8.3 25.0 0.0 100.0
Total ] 38.8 15.0 3.81 1.31 3.8 6.31 27.51 3.8 100.0
Source: Impact Evaluation Establishment Survey, 1995.
Table 3.2: Proportion of Inputs from Outputs of Other Industries: Backward Linkages
0 % 1-20 % 21-40 % 41-60 % 61-80 % 81-99 % 100% n.a. Total
Industrial Estate --------------- (percent of establishments) ---------------
Hanam I 21.7 17.4 17.4 0.0 4.4 17.4 17.4 4.4 100.0
Hanam lI & III 14.3 23.8 9.5 14.3 14.3 9.5 4.8 9.5 100.0
Outside 25.0 16.7 5.6 16.7 5.6 11.! 16.7 0.0 100.0
Total 1 21.3] 18.8| 10.0[ 11.21 7.51 12.51 13.81 5¶°T 100.0
Source: Impact Evaluation Establishment Survey, 1995.
(ii) "Last stage" Industry Effect of the "Anchor" Firms. When an input-output matrix is
arranged in a triangular form, there is a "last" sector whose output goes entirely to final demand and
which takes in inputs from a number of other sectors (Ibid., p. 110). The backward linkage effects of
such "last stage" industries are of considerable importance for industrial development. The "anchor"
firms in the Hanam Industrial Estate (Phase I) produced such effects (although they were not "last" in a
literal sense since some of their outputs were inputs of other industries). For example, Daewoo
Electronics which produces household appliances for final demand such as refrigerators, microwave
ovens, color TVs, has established 1,200 subcontracting firms, of which 180 are located in Kwangju, 35 in
the Hanam Industrial Estate (para. 3.30). The firm's linkage effects on manufacturing employment and
income are remarkable considering that Daewoo's own plant has only 1,800 employees.
(iii) Multiple Linkage Effects on "Acceleration" of Industrial Growth. According to Hirschman
"the fact that the linkage effects of two industries viewed in combination are larger than the sum of the
linkage effects of each industry in isolation helps to account for the cumulative character of
development." (Ibid., p. 104) The data in Table 2.3 shows that only 7 out of 395 establishments located
at Hanam are large scale firms (having more than 300 employees). This may imply that more than half
of those small firms (assuming that each of the seven large firms have subcontracting arrangements with
about 20 to 30 small firms) came into existence as the result of "secondary linkage effects" with no direct
connections to the seven anchor firms. This experience in Kwangju tends to support Hirschman's
hypothesis on the "acceleration of industrial growth" at an early stage of development (Ibid., p. 104).
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Local Bureaucracy's Behavior and Capacity Building
3.10 "Task-oriented" Bureaucratic Behavior. Local governments began to replicate and expand the
project infrastructure on their own account, mobilizing their own financial resources, soon after the
World Bank funded projects were completed. Local governments' growing responsibilities, as the
guardians and managers of industrial development in the region, led them to assume ever greater
responsibilities over the projects and follow-on operations. In other words, local governments became
promoters and partners of industrial development.
3.11 Industrialists interviewed by the impact evaluation mission reported that in the 1960s and 1970s,
local governments were synonymous with red tape, for example, obtaining building permits and licenses
was a challenging if not impossible job. In the case of Kwangju, the implementation of the World Bank
project with Hanam I and its extension to the second phase without the help of MOC was the most
significant turning point for the city government's institutional learning. Hirschman characterizes such a
change (in this case very drastic) in the behavior and role of government bureaucracy as "a most
impressive side-effect of development projects in the public sector [as] a growth- and task-oriented
group of public officials [emerged]" (Hirschman, 1995, pp. 166-167).
3.12 Evolution in Local Government Organization, Functions, and Responsibilities. This study found
that city governments, especially, made many internal changes to their organizations to help change the
rules and provide more incentives for entrepreneurs to invest in industry in the Cholla region. The first
phase of the Hanam Industrial Estate was completed in 1983 and, up to that time, there was no specific
unit or department within the Kwangju city administration where interested entrepreneurs could direct
their inquiries about acquiring a plot and setting up a manufacturing establishment. Steps taken to fill
this gap included (see Annex 3):
1985 - the creation of a special Industrial Estates Planning Sub-Division within Kwangju city
government, to plan, finance and market the estates and staffed initially by five professionals.
1986 - Kwangju city status upgraded to that of autonomous Direct Administration City (a
national government decision that coincided with the project implementation).
1987 - the establishment of the Hanam Industrial Estate Management Office as a "one-stop shop"
at the site.
1987 - industrial development rises in the organizational hierarchy as the Industrial Development
Section was elevated to a full division.
3.13 Within the Kwangju city government, the Industrial Development Division is responsible for the
promotion and marketing of opportunities for private sector industrialists within the region. This
function did not even exist within the city government before the World Bank projects. During
interviews for this study, IDD officials explained that marketing of industrial estates is done on a bigger
scale today than ever before, using a whole range of methods from newspaper advertisements, flyers and
visits to interested firms. As the need arises, the Kwangju city mayor himself becomes directly involved
in promoting the sale of the sites. Administrative changes such as these were the result of side-effects of
the Kwangju II project especially.
3.14 More significant side-effects of the projects, however, are on the capacity and quality of project
management of the local government officials. According to the officials who actually implemented the
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Bank financed projects, they are now using the approaches and methods they learned from the Bank
projects in project preparation, appraisal, and implementation: taking the formal steps of feasibility
studies, engineering design and economic analysis is now the standard practice while this did not exist
before the Bank projects. With so many World Bank missions-57 in all, over a period of twenty
years-there was plenty of opportunity for interaction with Bank missions, exchanges of experience and
learning on both sides.
3.15 The city government of Kwangju not only successfully managed the first phase of the Hanam
Industrial Estate, it carried out the second and the third phase expansion of the Hanam estate without
MOC and Bank involvement and kept expanding to the Pyung-Dong Industrial Estate aimed at inducing
direct foreign investment. The level of managerial sophistication of the staff of the Kwangju city
govemment now appears equal to that of any city in Korea, catching up with the rest of the country in
only a ten year period.
"Rules of the Game", Private Sector Confidence, and Public-Private Partnership
3.16 Evolution of the "Rules of the Game". A series of devolution with changes in jurisdictional
boundaries and laws and regulations during the twenty year period (see Timelines in Annex 3) coincided
with the important benchmarks of the implementation of the Bank financed projects. Consequently,
local governments assumed responsibilities as guarantors and managers of "rules of the game" for private
industrial development, a responsibility that had formerly been the monopoly of the national
government. Kwangju city government, having to operate the industrial estate they inherited from the
World Bank financed project from the early 1980s, was obliged then for the first time to consider what
incentives industrial entrepreneurs might need in order to participate in the development of the region.
Thanks to the project experience, therefore, the city government embarked upon industrial development
as a means of making the "rules of the manufacturing game" more attractive for private investment. The
city government's promoting industrial development in the region discussed above was something that
they never did in the 1970s before the Bank-financed regional development projects were implemented.
3.17 As in most other countries, city governments in Korea are responsible for granting building
permits and licensing the use of the completed facilities. Industrialists interviewed by the impact
evaluation mission reported that obtaining building permits and licenses is much easier today than it was
before the Kwangju II project. City governments also became adept at re-assigning agricultural land on
the urban periphery for industrial use, especially after they were given the previous KLDC
responsibilities for land use regulation in 1990. In practice, there has been more conversion of
agricultural land for industrial use under these local autonomy arrangements. In 1994, Hanam Industrial
Estate Management Office functions were simplified to only register applications for industrial
development which are all automatically approved. The office no longer tries to assess the economic or
financial feasibility of the proposed operation. When it was established, the primary function of the
Hanam site office was to promote the sale of plots in the industrial estate and the "one-stop-shop"
function for industrialists mentioned above. Owing to a series of devolution and deregulations, its
administrative workload has decreased lately and its staffing was reduced from -I 7 in 1987 to only 9
today (paras. 2.28, 3.20).
3.18 For their part, private sector industrialists came to recognize local governments in the region as
guarantors and managers of the "rules of the game" and arbiters of the conditions of entrepreneurial
participation in industrial development in the region. Business managers interviewed for this study
confirmed that local officials' understanding of the needs of private sector industrial development had
improved significantly after the completion of the World Bank-financed projects. Similar reports were
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made about city governments in Iksan and Chonju cities, the Chonju Regional Development Project sites
in neighboring North Cholla province. Entrepreneurs also reported that they noted a reduction of city
government red-tape following the creation of the Industrial Development Division. Significant changes
in rules gave them new incentives to invest in Kwangju. Industries setting up within an industrial estate
were exempt from municipal taxes from two to five years. Perhaps just as important, these industries
could feel equally exempted from many of the tight land uses and building controls that effectively
suffocated industrial development in other parts of the urban areas. The project experience provided a
vital schooling for city governments that they should develop rules that allow private industrialists to
reap benefits from their investments without undue hindrance from regulations.
3.19 Private Sector Confidence and Public-Private Partnership. The local government's passion and
commitment to industrial development in the region, together with changing regulatory and institutional
environment, enhanced the private sector's confidence in the local governments and a strong public-
private partnership emerged-another significant side-effect of the projects (Hirschman, 1995, p. 166).
In the case of Kwangju, the city government is now able to maintain an "enabling environment" for the
private entrepreneurs to invest and grow, to the extent that the city is now actively promoting direct
foreign investment in newly opened Pyung-Dong Industrial Estate (the fourth phase after Hanam III).
Recently, Kwangju city's stature and reputation rose markedly when it won from a severe competition
among major cities a national government financed project to locate a Science Park with a hi-tech
complex in Kwangju (see Table 2.2), which is now under construction for completion in 2001. Private
cooperation has been forthcoming in big ways. For example, Kumho Tire Company, one of the largest
indigenous business conglomerates, sponsored the establishment of an engineering college in the Science
Park.
3.20 The overall picture emerging from the analysis is that over the twenty year study period, the
"rules of the game" evolved from those of national government-directed development to those of local
government- and market-based development with strong private sector responses in the region with their
confidence and cooperation. As indicated above (paras. 2.28 and 3.17), this process can be illustrated by
the diminishing role of the Hanam site office by leaving most of its previous functions to the markets.
This experience confirms Baumol's proposition that entrepreneurial responses are productive when the
"rules of the game" provide positive incentives (paras. 2. 9-2. 1 0). 4 What was observed in the Cholla
region through the Bank-financed projects tells such a story.
Ultimate Impact: Regional Growth
3.21 Kwang/u is Now the Fastest Growing City in Korea. Population grows at a rate of 4.5 percent
per year, which comes close to the growth rate of Seoul (5 percent) in the 1970s (see Table Al .2).15
According to the Industrial Census statistics, Kwangju was the only Direct Administration city where
manufacturing employment grew during 1988-1993 (Table Al.8). In the other five Direct
Administration cities, the level of manufacturing employment (in establishments with 5 or more
employees) during this period actually declined.'6 In terms of growth of both regional product and
14. This outcome could be interpreted as a case where the evolution of efficient institutions (rules of the game) led to the
reduction of transaction costs, which resulted in productive private sector responses (North, 1990 and 1994; Coase, 1960;
Williamson, 1995).
15. The population growth rates of the Direct Administration cities and provinces not appearing in Table 2.1 for the 1975-1990
period were: Inchon=1.96; Taechon=3.14; Kangwon=0.81; Chungbug=0.99; Chungnam=0.99; and Cheju=3.65.
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manufacturing output, South Cholla (including Kwangju) was second only to Kyonggi (Table A 1.9, and
Table Al.10). These two provinces were the only ones that gained the output share in the country during
that period (Table A 1.9).
3.22 Cholla Region is Still Far Behind. In Table 3.3, the 15 regions are ranked in descending order
according to each region's manufacturing share of its total regional product in 1992. South Cholla and
Kwangju ranked the 6th and 7th respectively with a little over a quarter of their output coming from
manufacturing. South Kyungsang where Pusan is located had the largest share of 54.4 percent. The
second column of Table 3.3 shows the per capita gross regional product (GRP) of each region. Its rank
correlation with manufacturing output share is almost perfect with the exception of Seoul and Taechon.
South Kyungsang had the largest per capita GRP. Cholla ranked the 7th and Kwangju the I 0th. Cholla's
per capita GRP was 95.3 percent of the country's average of 5.5 million won (about US$7,000) and
Kwangju's was only 81.9 percent, among the lowest (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Ranking of Regions by Share of Manufacturing Ouput
and Per Capita GRP, 1992
Manufacturing Share Per Capita GRP
Region Rank percent 1,000 won 1 percent
S. Kyongsang 54.4 7,894 143.6
Inchon 2 48.6 6,116 111.3
Kyonggi 3 45.6 5,740 104.4
N. Kyongsang 4 37.0 5,752 104.7
Chungbug 5 34.8 5,245 95.4
S. Cholla 6 28.1 5,235 95.
Kwangju 7 25.4 4,504 81.9
Pusan 8 25.3 4,457 81.1
N. Cholla 9 25.2 4,420 80.4
Taeku 10 24.7 4,180 76.1
Taehon I 11XX 24.4 5,151 93.7
Chungnam 12 22.4 4,605 83.8
Kangwon 13 22.2 4,444 80.9
Seoul 14 12.5 5,762 104.8
Cheju 185 42 3,553.8
Korea | 30.81 5,4961 100.0
Source: Gross Regional Product 1994, National Statistcal Office.
Korea Institute for Economics and Technology, 1995.
3.23 Table 3.3 shows that manufacturing is closely related to the level of income. Even though South
Cholla, especially Kwangju, showed an impressive growth of manufacturing (Tables A 1.8 and A 1.10),
16. The data in Table Al .8 shows that the number of manufacturing establishments increased in all I 5 regions during the same
period. This implies that the new establishments created in this period were relatively small and existing large establishments
went through "down-sizing" with technological changes. The average manufacturing firm size in the country declined from 52
in 1988 to 32 in 1993.
32
the Cholla region still has a lot of catching-up to do. Table A 1.1 shows that the agricultural share of
employment of South Cholla declined markedly from 73.1 percent in 1975 to 60.9 percent in 1990, but
this share is still the largest among the 15 regions in Korea.
3.24 During the impact evaluation study mission, many people in both governments and private sector
mentioned that the Seoul and the Pusan regions are now saturated and polluted with no more room for
development and that the era for "delayed industrialization" has come to Cholla with the opportunities
for developing with environmental conservation. The public officials and local entrepreneurs are
optimistic about the future prospects:
(i) The "western coast era" with increasing economic ties with China is just beginning (Lee and
Kim, 1995).
(ii) A half dozen foreign firms have already signed contracts to locate in the Pyung-Dong
Industrial Estate. Technology-intensive non-polluting industries are envisaged in the newly
developed, national government-financed Science Park with a hi-tech complex.
(iii) Cholla has the comparative advantage of high quality labor and the potential for "eco-
tourism" along the southern archipelago.
Necessary Conditions for Success
3.25 The successful implementation of Bank projects, especially the Hanam Industrial Estate
component, cannot be explained by the government efforts and operations of the local land market alone.
There were critical institutional elements that were exogenous to the region: Korea's civil service system
and education system which did not have regional bias.
3.26 Existing Government Bureaucracy and the System of Career Government Officials (Civil Service
System). Korea had a long tradition of a highly regarded public administration system going back to the
Yi dynasty, partly owing to the informal caste system which ranked "scholar/bureaucrats" at the top.
Even now, the entry level management positions are filled by taking the national "high civil service
examinations". Competition for passing these examinations always has been intense. Between 1963 and
1985, 157,000 persons took them and only 2,600 (1.7 percent) succeeded (Kim and Leipziger, 1993).
Because of this rigorous selection process, a high quality of government officials has been maintained.
3.27 Until the local elections in 1995 (the first since the late President Park abolished them in 1962)
the heads of local governments, including mayors and county executives, were on the payroll of the
Ministry of Interior and they were periodically rotated with those in the central offices in Seoul. The
legal and administrative systems were also well developed long before the World Bank project
intervention. Even though provincial and city government officials had no previous experiences of
implementing World Bank projects or managing a large scale industrial development project, their
learning was quick (as discussed in chapter 3).
3.28 Strong Education System and Educated Labor Force. Korea has had a long tradition of putting a
high priority on education. Korea's spending on public education in the 1980s was 3.4 percent of GNP,
comparable to other Asian countries, but Korea's spending on private education was 2.5 times more than
other countries. The country's total spending including private education was 10 percent of GNP in 1990
(Kim and Leipziger, 1993). Korea's high level of educational attainment did not have regional bias.
Cholla's education system, including national universities, was as good as anywhere in Korea. Hence,
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the region had highly educated manpower and provided a high quality trainable labor force.17
A Caveat on Attribution
3.29 Kwangju's strong economic growth cannot be attributed solely to the World Bank projects per
se, but the Hanam Industrial Estate played a major role in the region's industrialization process. Tables
2.3 and A1.4 show that 39.3 percent of manufacturing jobs in Kwangju were in Hanam (in 1995); 43.6
percent of manufacturing output and 60.7 percent of exports (to foreign countries) were produced by the
establishments located in Hanam (in 1994). Almost all of the exports (98 percent) were from Hanam
Phase 1, the World Bank financed project.
3.30 What actually happened on the ground can be seen by an example of Daewoo Electronics. Its
plant which was established at Hanam I in 1983, is now the largest in Korea with an annual sale of US$2
billion in 1995, of which 70 percent was exported worldwide (including refrigerators, microwave ovens,
color TVs, and other home appliances). The plant has 1,800 employees of whom 800 are women. (It
had 3,800 employees until 1990 when it was downsized with the adoption of new advanced technology.)
Within Korea, it has established 1,200 subcontracting firms of which 180 are located in Kwangju and 35
at Hanam. The rest are mostly in Seoul and Pusan. Recently, Daewoo Electronics established plants in
Mexico and China in addition to 22 factories overseas and 47 dealerships worldwide. Daewoo
Electronics became a world class establishment in merely a little over ten years! 18 A similar story can be
told about LG (Goldstar) and Samsung also located in the Hanam Industrial Estate. On the whole, the
project's impacts on the region's manufacturing base, employment and income generation, and general
living standard were highly significant. Indeed, this experience illustrates the "centrality of side-effects"
in project impact evaluation.
3.31 An important caveat of this case study is that it documents project impacts in a country with a
sustained economic growth. The same projects may fail to generate such impacts in a slow growing
economy. Also, other regions of Korea developed early on without a similar World Bank intervention.
The process of "learning by doing" in other regions provided lessons for the Cholla region. Using a case
study (historical) approach (para. 1.18) and the Hirschman-Baumol framework (paras. 2.8-2.10),
however, this study shows that the World Bank intervention acted as a catalyst in triggering the
industrialization process in the Cholla region which had been excluded from Korea's development
process in the first two decades.19
17. The World Bank's (1993) East Asian Miracle Study singled out education as one of the most important mechanisms for
achieving" shared growth". But it did not cover regional disparities in Korea even though the benefits were not "shared" by
Cholla.
18. Mr. Kyung Suk Seo, Manager, Daewoo Electronics Co., who participated in the construction of its plant at Hanam in 1983
kindly met with the impact evaluation mission twice and provided valuable information not only about his firm but also on the
estate development in general.
19. During the second impact study mission, a focus group meeting was held at the Ministry of Construction and Transportation
with the five Division Chiefs of MOCT who had implemented the three regional development projects. At the end of the
meeting after the four-hour session where the mission presented our findings and tentative conclusions, the following consensus
was reached: (i) the World Bank intervention had the "triggering" effect on the industrialization process in the Cholla region,
and (ii) the project implementation significantly contributed to institutional learning at both the national and the local levels, and
the lessons learned became the basis for preparing more World Bank projects in urban and infrastructure subsectors that
followed in subsequent years.
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4. Lessons from Industrial Development
Centrality of Side-Effects: the Hirschman Effect
4.1 This study shows the "centrality of side-effects" in projects. The World Bank-financed project in
Kwangju triggered the process of industrialization in the region. The project's success and its spillover
effects over time were due to a series of side-effects which contributed to the growth, expansion, and
sustainability of the project, which included:
(i) Replicating Industrial Estates: The local authorities learned how to plan, finance, build
and operate large-scale industrial estates on the model of the Hanam Phase I and executed
by the city alone three more large-scale industrial estate projects (paras. 3.2-3.6).
(ii) Backward and Forward Industrial Linkages: Satellite industries have been established in
Hanam. With a strong locational advantage of being near the parent industry, they use as a
principal input an output of the parent industry or their principal outputs are used as an
input of the parent industry (paras. 3. 7-3.9).
(iii) "Task-oriented" Bureaucratic Behavior: The extension of Hanam I to the second phase
without the help of MOC or the World Bank was a significant turning point for the city
government's institutional learning. Local governments' responsibilities grew rapidly as
promoters and partners of industrial development (paras. 3.10 -3.11).
(iv) Evolution of Local Government Organization and Capacity Building: City governments
made many internal changes to their organizations to help change the rules and provide
more incentives for industrialists to invest (paras. 3.12-3.13). Moreover, through the
implementation of Bank-financed projects, local government officials improved the
capacity and quality of project management (paras. 3.14-3.15).
(v) Private Sector Confidence and Public-Private Partnership: With a series of devolution
and deregulation, local governments assumed responsibilities as guarantors and managers
of "rules of the manufacturing game" for private industrial development (paras. 3.16-3.18).
Local governments' passion and commitment to industrial development in the region,
together with changing regulatory and institutional environment, enhanced the private
sector's confidence in the local governments and a strong public-private partnership
emerged (paras. 3.19-3.20).
"Rules of the Game" and Private Sector Responses: the Baumol Effect
4.2 The study shows that the private sector responded in a most productive way to the changing
"rules of the game" for industrial development in the region. Not only did the rules change the incentive
structure to the benefits of the industrialists such as a series of devolution and deregulation over time, but
they also changed the behavior of the bureaucracy that led to the creation of an enabling environment
where close cooperation and coordination between the local government and the private sector were
materialized. Our analysis shows that these side-effects were initially triggered by the World Bank-
financed project which offered such an opportunity to occur. The World Bank-financed project
strengthened the growth- and task-oriented behavior of government officials. The Bank's 57 missions
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over twenty years provided a sustained period of institutional learning at all levels of government to the
point of creating an enabling environment for the private sector in the region.
"Piloting" and "Mainstreaming"
4.3 The risk minimizing project size (Hanam Phase I) turned into a "pilot" and created opportunities
for the city government (without MOC or the World Bank) "mainstream" industrial development with its
own follow-up projects. This experience illustrates how a "new project cycle" (Picciotto and Weaving,
1994) can achieve the twin objectives of (i) reducing the project risk and lowering the Bank project
failure rate, and (ii) providing opportunities for institutional learning on the borrower side.
Shortcomings of Industrial Estate Development Strategy
4.4 The Incubator Hypothesis. Previous Bank studies on the "incubator hypothesis" (Lee, 1985a,
1985b, and 1989) showed that small new firms with five to ten employees tend to locate in the central
areas of cities to get all the benefits of externalities there. As they grow and need to expand, they tend to
move to outer areas but moving a short distance at a time. The project-financed industrial estates are
located outside the central city far away from the city center where small new firms cannot afford to
locate. Possible site constraints for small and micro-enterprises and the project's possible negative
impacts on the growth patterns of small firms are not covered in this study because of the limited scope
and budget.
4.5 Costs of Location Distortions. Previous Bank studies found that in counties like Colombia (Lee,
1989) and Thailand (Lee, 1992) where the land market is functioning efficiently, infrastructure
investment tends to follow the market (Hirschman, 1958, Chapter 5). In the case of the Hanam Industrial
Estate, the Bank-financed project "triggered" the development process stimulating the idle market. As
mentioned earlier, this role of the public sector could be supported by Aoki's (1995) "market enhancing
view" and also by North and Thomas' (1973) earlier view of institutional requirements for markets to
function. Nevertheless, the following negative impacts were observed during the impact evaluation
mission:
(i) Lack of Complementary Investments: The main road connection to the Hanam estate was not
expanded until 1992. This was also true in Chonju. Residential and commercial development in
the Hanam industrial area which is only 9.5 kilometers from the city center started only recently.
Consequently, most establishments in the Hanam Industrial Estate operate a large fleet of
company buses for workers' commuting because of the lack of public transportation. Some large
firms have fifty to a hundred buses. This is a good example of shortcomings of infrastructure
projects where complementary investments were not included in the project design or their
probable negative side-effects ignored.
(ii) Negative Environmental Effects: Even though pollution control is strictly enforced, wind
blows toward the city center carrying smoke from the industrial areas in both Kwangju and
Chonju.
(iii) Land use Patterns: Ten years ago, the location of industrial estates was outside of the city
in both Kwangju and Chonju. Because the cities grew and expanded rapidly, the industrial
complexes are now close to the newly developed expanding commercial centers. Such location
distortions may have serious negative impacts in the long run preventing further expansion of the
cities outward.
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Transferability
4.6 On transferability. This report supports the proposition that the patterns of behavioral responses of
individual actors to the rules of the game transcend time and places. i.e. regional or national boundaries.20
What varies across regions or countries is the quality of the rules of the game, for example, "the use of
incentives and organizational design within the public sector to enhance efficiency and to reduce the
likelihood of corruption" (Stiglitz, 1996, p. 174). Such an organizational design, however, can be learned
from experiences of other countries. The challenge is to find a mechanism, political or otherwise, to
"trigger" the process of such organizational learning. Wade (1993) suggests that "... from time to time
opportunities to make major organizational changes do occur in any society, and at that time it matters what
knowledge of alternative arrangements key policy makers have in their heads." But such opportunities were
created by policy makers themselves in Korea and other East Asian countries. They did not merely wait for
the opportunities to come.
20. Baumol (1990) shows historical evidence from Ancient Rome, Medieval China and through the Middle Ages.
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PART II. INTEGRATING ISLAND ECONOMIES INTO REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
5. Project Rationale for Improved Transport Linkages
Island Development: The Baseline
5.1 The Kwangju II project bridges supported the then Ministry of Construction's (MOC) national
policy of island development in a country which has over three thousand islands altogether. The
objective of this policy is to physically integrate island territory with the mainland through permanent
road bridge connections, where technically feasible, and to extend the development process to the
islands. This was the case of coastal islands such as Tolsan and Chindo. The policy also aims to link
together groups of islands that are too far offshore to be connected to the mainland.
5.2 South Cholla Province (SCP) was an appropriate place to implement MOC's policy. Nearly two-
thirds of Korea's islands are situated along the irregular coastline of the province. Increasing the income-
earning opportunities of the region's island population was an explicit objective of the Kwangju II project
when appraised in 1979 (Kwangju II SAR para. 2.01). At that time, 459,773 people, some 11.5 percent
of SCP's population, lived on 318 of the province's 1,921 islands. Physically isolated from economic
development on the mainland, SCP island people were an appropriate poverty target group for the
project. In 1979, their average income was less than half the national average.
5.3 Chindo and Tolsan (the third and the seventh largest islands in Korea) were priority locations for
MOC to build access bridges. Through building bridges to Tolsan and Chindo, the largest and most
populous coastal islands still without permanent access to the mainland at that time, the Kwangju II
project aimed to benefit some 25 percent of this target group. Both bridges used an identical cable stay
suspension design, the first time such technology had been used in Korea.21 There were long
implementation delays and considerable cost overruns, largely because of the lack of experience in
building this kind of bridge in Korea.22 Both bridges were open to traffic at the beginning of 1985, about
two years behind schedule. Each having a single cable span of nearly 400 meters, the bridges were
noteworthy engineering achievements.
5.4 Baseline Situation for Tolsan. Tolsan, the seventh largest among Korea's many offshore islands,
is separated from Yeosu city on the mainland only by a narrow sea channel four hundred meters wide.
Despite its closeness to Yeosu, a major fishing port and third most populous urban center in the South
Cholla region, Tolsan Island was not fully part of the dynamic urban development of the neighboring city
before the bridge. The lack of a permanent access to the mainland city meant that Tolsan did not provide
a suitable location for Yeosu workers to live, even though these people were hard put to find affordable
housing within the city of Yeosu itself. Yeosu's rapid population growth and the constraints to
topography of the site imposed upon urban development placed a premium upon urban land there.
21. A cable stay suspension design for the Tolsan Bridge replaced the Kwangju 11 project's original design for a less expensive
girder box design. Site conditions and heavy marine traffic along the sea channel precluded the construction of supporting
pillars midstream that a girder bridge would have required (Kwangju 11 PCR para. 4.5). The cable stay suspension technology
transfer was effectively replicated in Korea with the construction of the Olympic Bridge over the Han River in Seoul.
22. According to the PCR, causes of implementation delays included: (i) Bank suspension of disbursements on the Tolsan
bridge until qualified supervisory consultants were appointed (Kwangju 11 PCR para. 4.7); (ii) interruption of Chindo bridge
construction in September 1981 because of lack of government counterpart funds (Kwangju 11 PCR para. 4.7); and (iii)
disagreements between the Korean contractors and the bridge supervisory consultants (Kwangju 11 PCR para. 4.14).
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Before the bridge, Tolsan residents had only a short ferry boat crossing, but normal delays in embarking
and disembarking precluded efficient commuting from Tolsan as an acceptable urban way of life for
many. Tolsan Island was, nevertheless, the last major area close to Yeosu that was ripe for urban
development; all that was needed to trigger urban occupation was a permanent link to the mainland that
a bridge was to provide. Before such a link, traditional agricultural and fishing activities-always with
an eye to the neighboring, if somewhat inaccessible urban market-figured strongly in the island's
economy. Through its proximity to Yeosu, though, Tolsan's rural economy was different from that found
on more remote islands elsewhere in Korea. Tolsan farmers already produced cash crops on a small
scale, in contrast to the subsistence farming for local consumption typically found in isolated island
communities.
5.5 Baseline Situation for Chindo. Chindo is the third largest among Korea's many coastal islands.
Although like Tolsan, it is separated from the mainland only by a narrow marine channel, Chindo Island
is more remote than Tolsan for two reasons. First, there is no major urban center adjacent to Chindo on
the mainland itself. Second, abruptly shifting tides in the area can make shipping along the channel
difficult and the ferry crossing unreliable if not dangerous at times. Chondo's isolation ensured that the
island economy before the bridge was different from that found in rural areas on the mainland. Thus,
Chindo's population was mostly engaged in agricultural production destined for the local island market,
sustained by a population twice as large as found today on the island. Before the bridge, this was not a
growing economy, however. The island population was falling as younger people, especially, sought
more rewarding opportunities for employment in mainland cities. With falling local demand, Chindo
farmers had to retrench. Before the bridge, they could not supply mainland markets, as access using the
ferry boats was unreliable and costly.
Evaluation Framework
5.6 The direct impacts are limited to territorial incorporation by connecting the islands to the
mainland and subsequent improvements of transport access. The study focuses on the impacts of the
bridges upon regional development. By highlighting income creation among l6w-income islanders, the
Kwangju II project itself was pointing towards poverty reduction as an important example of a possible
"side-effect" of the bridges. As in the case of industrial development, "impacts on the ground" are long-
term, indirect, and often unintended. Indirect "side-effects" of the bridges on the islands' socio-economic
conditions are documented in Chapters 6 and 7. Times series data allow us to compare the before project
and after project situations. Cross-sectional data describe with project and without project situations
since other islands adjacent to Tolsan and Chindo that were still unconnected by bridges can be used for
the comparison group. The underlying analytical framework in Part II is also that of Hirschman's
"centrality of side effects" as described in Part I (para. 2.8).
5.7 Thanks to the bridges, 65,757 people now living on Tolsan and Chindo Islands have permanent
links to mainland Korea and ready access to the opportunities of Korea's rapidly developing economy.
Identical engineering solutions for the bridges were used to end the isolation of each island, but the
impacts were quite different in each case. The Tolsan bridge opened up a new threshold for the
expansion of neighboring Yeosu city, made it possible for the island to become part of that city's larger
urban area, and helped an urban community to develop on the island itself. For Chindo, the bridge
allowed the island's economy and community to develop in much the same way as those in rural areas of
mainland Korea did. Chindo residents before the bridge had felt truly isolated. Thus, the bridge's direct
impacts succeeded in incorporating both these islands' territories and their indirect impacts led to
changes over time in the way they developed. The different ways in which this happened, however, call
for a separate treatment of each.
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5.8 Bridges were not a sufficient condition for growth to occur. Tolsan's prosperity over the past
decade would not have occurred without the rapid growth of the Yeosu urban economy and that of Korea
as a whole. Similarly, Chindo's transformation would not have taken place without the rapid industrial
development and urbanization that has continued in Korea since the bridge opened ten years ago.
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6. Tolsan Island: A New Threshold for Urban Development
A Solution to Yeosu City's Acute Shortage of Urban Land
6.1 Tolsan Island lies just offshore from the port city of Yeosu on the southern coast of SCP, some
110 kilometers to the south-east of Kwangju city. With a current population of some 190,000, Yeosu is
the third largest city in the region. It has one of SCP's most dynamic urban economies that benefits from
the city's strategic location near to the Kwangyang steel plant, one of the country's most modem, and the
Yeochon chemical complex, one of the largest. As an important fishing port, 117,000 tons total catch in
1994, or 3.4 percent of the nation's total, the city's fisheries sector is a key provider of employment to
local people. Recognizing the importance of this sector, the Kwangju I project invested US$8.4 million
in the city's fisheries complex to extend harbor quays and piers to allow larger vessels to berth there.
6.2 Yeosu's population was growing rapidly, at about 3.2 percent per annum during the 1970s when
the Kwangju II project was being prepared (Kwangju II SAR para. 1.07). To help the city cope with its
growing population, the Kwangju II project included components to improve: (i) the city's water
supply-US$4.6 million; (ii) low-income housing-US$1.0 million; and (iii) the main city commercial
road-US$1.5 million. While these and other investments provided urban services and infrastructure for
the people of Yeosu, they did not address the basic problem of land shortage facing the city. The uneven
topography of Yeosu's site imposed severe physical constraints upon a city needing to open a new
threshold for expansion. This was not only to accommodate its growing population, but also to enhance
the quality of the urban environment by avoiding excessive densities and the overcrowding that these
imply.
6.3 Tolsan Island, just 400 meters across a maritime strait from the city, was a new threshold for the
urban expansion of Yeosu. In spite of its large unoccupied space,23 Yeosu city could not spill over on to
Tolsan Island for the lack of permanent access to the area. When it opened to traffic at the beginning of
1985, the Tolsan Bridge provided the necessary link. Now located right within the urban area of Yeosu,
just five minutes by car from the city center, the bridge allowed Tolsan Island to become a part of the
urban agglomeration of Yeosu. After the bridge, residents of Tolsan had ready access to Yeosu's urban
services and to the opportunities of its urban economy. Tolsan began to transform itself into an urban
community, with all the advantages, and some of the disadvantages, that this implied. These
transformations could not take place before the bridge. Despite close physical proximity, the limited
capacity of the ferry service prevented effective integration of the island into Yeosu's urban
development. A car journey from Tolsan to Yeosu involving a ferry crossing would take 20-30 minutes
before the bridge. The same trip after the bridge would take only 5 minutes. At its peak traffic in 1984,
the ferries carried only 1,300 vehicles per day, barely 10 percent of the daily trips made across the Tolsan
Bridge today.
Transforming Tolsan's Population into an Urban Community
6.4 Although the Tolsan Bridge is now part of the urban transport network of Yeosu City, the
indirect impacts of this bridge upon the population of Tolsan Island itself are more readily discernible.
This is because of the different scale of the communities on either side of the bridge. Yeosu's population
is more than ten times larger than Tolsan's. Moreover, Yeosu is a complex medium-sized urban center in
which the impacts of a single project component like the bridge would be difficult to separate from the
23. Tolsan island-the seventh largest in Korea-has an area of 71.6 square kilometers, 59 percent larger than the built up area of
Yeosu City. In 1974, it had a population of 24,015, eight times less than Yeosu's at that time.
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many other factors at work within the city's economy and community. Tolsan, on the other hand, had a
relatively small community of 21,922 people who suddenly found the opportunities and challenges of
Yeosu literally at their doorstep uniquely because of the bridge.
6.5 After the bridge, most of Tolsan Island came within a 20-30 minute car commuting radius of
Yeosu. Currently the bridge carries some 12,841 vehicles per day, mostly daily commuters. The island's
empty spaces, especially where the bridge makes landfall, can develop as over-spill suburban residential
areas for the first time. On the island's east coast, attractive beach areas have the potential to become
residential neighborhoods for higher income commuters. Of course, by itself, the bridge investment was
not a sufficient condition to transform Tolsan into an urban community. Complementary infrastructure
investment was also necessary. This included the widening and paving National Highway 17 across the
island during 1984-88 and extending water supply services throughout the island by 1985. These
complementary investments were not financed through the Kwangju 11 project although the appraisal
document recognized that they would become necessary (Kwangju II SAR para. 7.02 and 7.06).
6.6 Today, some ten years after the bridge was opened, Tolsan population indicators reveal some of
the indirect impacts of the bridge. Table Al. .11 summarizes key population data for Yeochon County,
which includes Tolsan Island, before and after the bridge. Tolsan indicators are compared and contrasted
with those of the County's Other Islands 4 which remain without bridge connections to the mainland, and
whose situation describes what we call a "without-project" scenario.
6.7 After the bridge, Tolsan's population continued to fall. MOC had hoped that its island
development policy might arrest local population decline, but this was not achieved in the case of
Tolsan.25 Out-migration from Tolsan continued at a even higher rate after the bridge than before. Out-
migration from Other Islands not connected by bridges-the without-project scenario-was twice as
high as Tolsan's during 1984-1994. But, before the Tolsan bridge, these Other Islands' rate of out-
migration during 1974-1984 was already very high, nearly four times Tolsan's. -Thus out-migration from
Tolsan accelerated more rapidly than from Other Islands after the Tolsan bridge opened. These findings
show us that, contrary to arresting population decline, a bridge such as Tolsan's actually stimulates it.
Timely complementary investments such as housing infrastructure could have reversed this trend,
however (see para. 6.23).
6.8 While the total population on Tolsan fell, the number of households actually increased after the
bridge, reversing a decline that had set in before the bridge (Table Al .11). Such a result would be
consistent with new, smaller urban families moving onto the island. Average household size on Tolsan
did indeed fall from 6.4 persons per household in 1974 before the bridge to 4.0 persons per household
after the bridge in 1994. The shrinkage of household size on the other Islands was even faster, however,
from 6.4 to 3.4 persons per household over the same period. A household size of only 3.4 persons is
similar to that found in the predominantly rural Chindo island group (Table Al .14), where there is
evidence of families debilitated by the out-migration of their younger working members. Since the
average Tolsan Island household is significantly larger, with 4.0 members today, we may conclude that
urban settlement made possible by the bridge helped stall households' aging and weakening characteristic
of rural islands in Korea. By incorporating the territory of Tolsan into Yeosu's functional urban area, the
Tolsan bridge helped give a significantly urban look to one aspect of the island's demographics.
24. These islands belong mostly to the Kumogundo group and Kaedo island adjacent o Tolsan. .
25. Continued population loss seems to be a key feature of islands in the South Cholla province still. The SCP island
population had fallen from 459,773 in 1979 to 159,411 in 1994. SCP had 318 inhabited islands in 1979, down to 273 in 1994.
In 1979, 11.5 percent of the SCP population lived on the islands; in 1994, only 7.0 percent did.
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New Patterns of Urban Living on Tolsan Island
6.9 Officially, most of the population of Tolsan is now classified as urban. In 1994, 22.4 percent of
the economically active population of Tolsan worked in the industrial and service sectors, economic
activities typical of an urban economy. Before the bridge, such urban employment was negligible among
the Tolsan population. Agriculture, which employed nearly all of Tolsan's economically active
population before the bridge, now employs 77.5 percent.
6.10 Access. Daily commuting by Tolsan residents in urban employment in Yeosu's industries and
services became a common pattern after the bridge. Most manufacturing and service industry employees
who live on Tolsan go to work every day in Yeosu city. Before the bridge, the ferryboat service could
not support such a commuting pattern efficiently. Today's pattern of journeys to work is typical of any
mature urban economy and was made possible through the Tolsan Bridge and its complementary
transport infrastructure (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Tolsan Island Road and Traffic Indicators, 1974-1993
Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
INDICATORS 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993
Road network (length in kms.) 23.7 23.7 54.8 58.3 58.3
Registered vehicles (number) 1 19 68 271 1,674
Traffic flows (vehicles per annum) 10,000 476,000 1,498,000 4,687,000
Notes: Traffic data refer to 1974, 79, 84, 90, and 94. 1979 figures are KCDI estimates.
Source: Yeochon Statistical Yearbooks.
6.11 Due to this complementary investment-made to coincide with the opening of the bridge, but not
financed through the Kwangju II project-the Tolsan Island road network is now twice as long as it was
before the bridge. Meantime, the Other Islands in Yeochon County, the without project scenario,
continue to have no paved roads outside the main villages. The number of registered vehicles also
increased dramatically on Tolsan, but much of the growth may be due simply to the transfer of
registration procedures from the mainland to the island. Traffic flows on Tolsan island are nevertheless
ten times higher today than they were before the bridge. Although precise data does not exist, traffic
flows on the Other Islands continue to be negligible.
6.12 On weekdays, 12,841 vehicles per day now use the Tolsan bridge. Owing to daily commuting
trips that it encourages, traffic flows peak during the two to three hour rush in both the morning and
evening to some 2,200 vehicles per hour, exceeding the design capacity of the bridge's two-lane roadway
of 2,000 vehicles per hour. Only ten years after its opening and with a long useful life ahead of it, the
26. For being part of the urban road network of Yeosu, the carrying capacity of the Tolsan bridge is evidently affected by the
capacity of related links elsewhere in the network. Our study did not review the efficiency of the Yeosu network as a whole.
We assumed that access to the bridge was unimpeded at all times and that there were no bottlenecks in other parts of the network
that could lead to traffic congestion to "tail back" on to the bridge itself. Under these assumptions, a 2,000 vehicle per hour
capacity flow of mixed mode urban traffic on one lane and in one direction alternating between the morning and then evening
commute would be possible. Six hours of peak traffic per day (three in the morning and three in the afternoon) could carry
12,000 vehicles (6 x 2,000), accounting for 93.5 percent of the daily traffic count reported. Of course, this would mean
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Tolsan Bridge has itself become a bottleneck. Traffic congestion and tailbacks delay bridge crossings
today at peak hours. Some Korean officials wanted a four-lane bridge built at the time of appraisal, but
Bank missions were not convinced that the growth in traffic would be as fast as projected. A second
bridge was, however, approved by MOC in 1996 and needs to be completed soon to allow commuting to
continue to expand and Tolsan's newly formed urban community to consolidate.
6.13 Urban Services. Better access after the bridge also meant that Tolsan residents could make daily
use of Yeosu City's urban services, particularly for health and education, just as easily as people living in
Yeosu city itself. Yeosu City authorities reported to the impact evaluation mission, however, that actual
use of these services by Tolsan residents did not increase dramatically after the bridge. The fact that the
Tolsan community now has better services of its own on the island itself may explain this apparent lack
of growth. After the bridge opened, three new schools and 3 new health clinics opened on Tolsan, for
instance. With a smaller population, urban service per family living on Tolsan has increased
significantly. Meantime, there has been no significant improvement in the provision of these services on
the Other Islands that, without bridge connections, remain in a situation of rural isolation. That Tolsan
residents could readily use Yeosu's services may be very important to them in a psychological sense,
even if they do not fully avail themselves of their new opportunities. Thanks to the bridge, people in
Tolsan can now reliably use emergency services available in Yeosu twenty four hours per day, should the
need arise. Those living on other Coastal Islands without a permanent link to the mainland still have to
face a sea crossing which, however short, still poses a major barrier to access to such services, especially
at night.
6.14 Land Prices. Another important indicator of an urban community in the making is the buoyant
demand for urban homes on Tolsan. In real terms, residential land values on Tolsan increased at an
annual rate of 10.6 percent during the 1974-94 period, somewhat less than the 11.7 percent annual rate
for Yeosu City itself (Table 6.2). There was such a strong demand for the residential land on Tolsan that
its price increased more than seven-fold in real terms during 1979-1984, a period of only five years.
Unfortunately, data was not available to illustrate comparative trends for the without project scenario
since the Other Islands in this area had practically no market in urban real estate to speak of during this
period. Yeosu city itself still remains the preferred residential location for urban living in this area. The
value of land for residential development in the city was nearly three times higher than equivalent land
on Tolsan in 1994. This helps to make Tolsan housing less expensive than Yeosu's, so that Tolsan is a
place where younger families-including those from Yeosu itself-can more easily acquire their first
urban home. Furthermore, with its attractive natural environment of beaches and open space, Tolsan
could become one of Yeosu's prime residential areas in the future. These natural assets were always
there, but they only became accessible after the bridge. The Tolsan Woodoo housing scheme, once the
KLDC sewerage impasse is resolved, should give a great boost to residential development. Built next to
the Yeochon County office and near the Tolsan Bridge, the development covers 96 hectares. When
completed, it will provide 4,602 houses for 18,000 people, practically doubling the island population.
negligible traffic flows outside the peak hours. Visits of the impact evaluation mission to the Tolsan took place at an off-peak
time, when there was little traffic using the bridge.
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Table 6.2: Tolsan Island and Yeosu City:Average Urban Land Prices, 1974-1994
Constant 1994 won per pyong
Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
TOLSAN ISLAND 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Serviced housing land 19,690 12,227 87,924 116,524* 128,000
Serviced commercial land 131,269 61,135 106,8888 110,909 149,000
YEOSU CITY 19741 1979 1984 1989 1994
Serviced housing land 45,944 183,404 149,988 210,586 373,000
Serviced commercial and 328,173 305,674 508,580 477,329 998,000
Notes: CPI to convert from current to constant prices: 1974=19.7; 1979=42.3;
1984=75.0; 1989=92.1; 1994=129.3; 1 pyong =3.3058 square meters.
Source: Yeochon County Office.
6.15 The value of commercial land on Tolsan, on the other hand, barely rose at all-only 0.6 percent
per annum during 1974-1994. Yeosu city's commercial land value, by contrast, grew at a steady 5.7
percent per annum over the same period. The relatively slack demand for this kind of land on Tolsan
reflects the still embryonic stage of the urban economy there. An urban community is indeed in the
process of formation, but it is still a predominantly suburban residential one at the present stage.
Increased Tourism
6.16 There are many tourist attractions on Tolsan Island, including extensive beaches and a number of
historical sites. These places existed before the Tolsan bridge was opened, but they were inaccessible to
all but a few, more adventurous tourists or sailors. Tourists visiting Tolsan before the bridge were so few
that statistics were only kept from 1984 onwards (Table 6.3). In that last year prior to the bridge
opening, only 84,000 tourists came to Tolsan. Since then, growth has been dramatic, reaching 1.6
million visitors in 1993. Since the bridge, tourism to Tolsan increased ten times faster than in Korea as a
whole.27 Most of the visitors to Tolsan make day trips. Despite their short stay, tourists on Tolsan help
inject some 2.5 billion won (US$3.1 million)28 into the island economy each year, according to the
Yeochon County Yearbook. The sharp increase in the number of restaurants operating on the Island
after the bridge, and the lack of new hotels is evidence of the kind of day-trip excursion the tourists
make. More than one third of these visitors, 590,000 each year, make a trip to the nationally famous
Hangilam site. The Pangjukpo beach area is also popular with visitors.
27. Between 1989 (343.2) and 1996 (449.8), the number of tourists in Korea will grow at a annual rate of 3.9 percent, according
to the Korean Transport Institute's Medium and Long Term Plan for Tourism, dated 1995.
28. Throughout this report, we convert 1994 and more recent won to US dollars using an exchange rate of 800:1.
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Table 6.3: Tolsan Island Tourism Indicators, 1974-1993
Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
1974 1979 1984 1989 1993
INDICATORS number number number number number
Tourists - 84,000 1,182,000 (1) 1,585,000 (2)
Hotels/inns in operation I 1 2 2 2
Restaurants in operation 15 15 33 60 121
Restaurants planned (3) - I 1 3 16
Other facilities planned (3) 9 20 4 25 18
Notes: (1) 1990 data; (2) 1994 data; (3) Construction permits awarded.
Source: Yeochon Statistical Yearbooks.
6.17 Private investors, perceiving the potential for further expansion of tourism on Tolsan, have
begun to invest in the sector on the island. Of particular note is the Musulmok Resort Development Plan
in the south-east of Tolsan, planned to open in the year 2000. To support this development, the Yeochon
County government plans to invest 10.2 billion won (US$12.8 million) in infrastructure (access roads
and parking lots) over the next four years. This project, with a total government expenditure of US$18
million is expected to trigger US$147 million of private investment-eight times the initial public sector
outlay-in the form of the construction of tourism facilities. The Kwangju II project itself made no
direct investment in tourism in Tolsan, but none of the tourism development we have discussed would
have been feasible without the Tolsan bridge provided through the project, a significant side-effect.
Bridge Impact Upon Activities in Rural Areas
6.18 Fisheries: Before the bridge, Tolsan Island was a traditional fishing and farming community.
By improving access to markets on the mainland and beyond, the bridge helped the local fisheries
industry develop by allowing it to supply distant urban markets more easily. Output increased
substantially after the bridge opened. In 1994, 15,908 tons of fish products were shipped out of Tolsan,
nearly twice the last before bridge shipment of 8,750 tons in 1984. The 10.9 percent annual growth of
Tolsan's catch is considerably higher than the average of 2.7 percent per annum for the country as a
whole. In order to further stimulate the local fishery industry, the provincial government is planning to
invest 3,900 million won (US$4.9 million) to build a Comprehensive Fishery Exhibition Center.
6.19 Not only did the bridge make the shipment of perishable products-such as fresh fish-more
reliable, it also led to a reduction of transport costs from Tolsan by an average of some 40 percent,
according to the Yeochon County authority. New high value products, such as clams, lobsters and crabs
now account for 6.9 percent of the volume of fishing products shipped. Some even make their way
through Yeosu to Seoul and even to export markets, especially in Japan. At the same time, these
products are appreciated by tourists to the island, who can savor them at one of the many new restaurants
that have recently opened there.
6.20 Floriculture: Within the agricultural sector, the opening of the Tolsan bridge allowed an entirely
new agricultural activity to prosper, namely the production of cut flowers. Tolsan's farmers were always
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able to ship vegetable products to Yeosu before the bridge, using the available ferry service. After the
bridge, though, they were able to ship higher value perishable products, like cut flowers, more reliably
and cheaply. Floriculture thus became firmly established on the island after the opening of the Tolsan
Bridge (Table 6.4). Before the bridge, there were practically no commercial shipments of flowers to the
mainland. Activities began to pick up in 1984, in anticipation of the bridge opening. After the bridge,
output in 1994 had risen to 6.3 million stems, generating annual sales of 2.1 billion won (US$2.7
million). In the years before the bridge, there had been no flower producers on Tolsan. By 1994, 74
establishments were engaged in the business, cultivating an area of 33.6 hectares. From the evidence of
this case, we can see how the bridge was able to provide conditions for an entirely new economic activity
to develop.
Table 6.4: Tolsan Island Production of Cut Flowers, 1974-1993
Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
INDICATORS 1974 1979 1984 1989 1993
Producers (number) - - 3 37 74
Cultivated area (hectares) - - I 18 34
Output (thousands of stems) - - 151 5,492 6,349
Total income (thousands of - 33,527 1,344,102 2,142,957
constant 1994 won) 3 1 0 2,142,957
Notes: CPI series used to convert from current to constant prices: 1984=75.0; 1989=92.1;
1993 = 121.7; 1994=129.3.
Source: Yeochon County Office.
Environmental Impacts
6.21 So many changes in Tolsan's economy and the consolidation of an urba n life style are bound to
affect the island's environment. Evidence of serious island environmental degradation after the opening
of the Tolsan Bridge is scarce, however. Pressure upon the land from residential development is still
relatively small on an island whose population density is still only 238 persons per square kilometer.
Even so, reports of environmental violations became much more common after the Tolsan Bridge (Table
A1.12). Before the bridge, there were no such reports at all. From the limited data available, though, we
cannot be sure whether increased environmental violations are due to more rigorous enforcement of
environmental standards in recent years or whether they are due to a real deterioration of the Tolsan
environment.
Impacts Upon Local Government
6.22 After the Tolsan Bridge opened in 1985, Yeochon County's administrative capacity strengthened
as its responsibilities and workload grew. Before the bridge in 1984, the County employed only 35
engineers to supervise urban development projects. Today, the County employs 60. Now, the County is
very active in reviewing and approving applications for urban development, a function that was
practically non-existent before the bridge. In 1993, the County received 183 applications to approve
projects for residential and commercial development. In the meantime, local administration on the Other
Islands not connected by bridges has remained weak and unchanged over the years. From this
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evidence, we may conclude that an important side effect of the Tolsan Bridge was to hasten changes in
local government on the island in preparation of the challenge of managing urban development.
Need for Complementary Infrastructure
6.23 Much additional investment, in access roads, utilities and community equipment, was necessary
for the bridge impacts to be felt on the island. With its strong ownership of the Kwangju II project,
central government made funds readily available to finance infrastructure not formally within the scope
of the project itself. Thus, for the most part, the central government and local authorities recognized that
the Tolsan Bridge was a necessary condition for island development but not a sufficient one. An
important exception was the delayed implementation by KLDC of the sewerage system for the Woodoo
residential development on Tolsan island. Although all other infrastructure and utilities were
implemented at the site, occupation certificates could still not be awarded to the site owners at Woodoo
because of the lack of sewerage to the area. As a result, a major investment project remains tied up at the
time of writing without delivering any real services to its potential beneficiaries. The opportunity cost of
such an idle investment is considerable, with annual benefits foregone of the order of US$ 6.9 million.29
A clear lesson of the project experience is that complementary public investment must be provided in a
timely fashion if project impacts are to be fully realized.
Economic Rate of Return
6.24 The PCR lower re-estimate of the Tolsan Bridge of 11.5 percent, compared with the appraisal's
29.0 percent, indicated that this was, nevertheless, still a worthwhile investment from an economic point
of view (Kwangju II PCR p. 32). This was in spite of the seven-fold increase in the cost of the bridge,
resulting from the replacement of the cheaper girder box design by the much more expensive cable stay
structure and the higher than expected costs of materials. The PCR treated benefits as consisting of
vehicle operating cost savings (about 70 percent of total) and time savings (about 30 percent of the total).
The continuing economic feasibility of this investment in adverse cost conditions probably derives from:
(i) higher unit value of benefits in line with the trend of rising costs in the Korean economy; (ii)
importance of time savings through the improvement to an essential intra-urban link used primarily for
commercial and journey-to-work purposes; and (iii) heavier than expected traffic flows leading the
Tolsan Bridge to reach design capacity sooner than expected. Thus, traditional cost-benefit analysis on
its own regards the Tolsan Bridge as a worthwhile investment, even if the many beneficial side-effects
identified by our impact evaluation study were not taken into consideration.
29. A very conservative estimate based upon 4,602 deposits of 10 million won (for 100 square meter units) yielding an annual
interest of 12 percent. The estimated value of the deposit is only one quarter of what is required for a similar dwelling in
Kwangju city, for instance. At the same time, it must be recognized that the Tolsan bridge's traffic capacity for commuters is
saturated and it would not be able to handle the doubling of commuting flows that the full occupation of the Woodoo site would
imply (details: para. 6.12).
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7. Chindo Island: Incorporating as Part of the Mainland
Chindo: No Longer an Island
7.1 Chindo Island is located at the south-western tip of the Korean peninsula. The nearest important
city is Mokpo (231,519 population in 1994), now some 90 kilometers by road. Kwangju City (1,273,854
population in 1994) is 132 kilometers away. Dependence upon coastal shipping before the bridge made
Chindo look to Mokpo as the principal external focus of its economy. After the bridge, with the road
journey taking less than two-and-a half hours, Kwangju took on this role.
7.2 With an area of 427 square kilometers, Chindo is Korea's third largest island. At the time of the
Kwangju II project appraisal, it was the largest coastal island in Korea still without a bridge connection
to the mainland.30 Being rich in natural resources and with fertile agricultural land covering 29.7 percent
of its area, Chindo was easily self-sufficient in local agricultural produce. Only a narrow sea channel
separates Chindo from the mainland, but strong maritime currents along that channel made ferry
crossings dangerous under certain tide conditions, fostering the sense of isolation of the island
community.3 1 This led many Chindo islanders to seek opportunities on the mainland. Out-migration, of
younger people in particular, ensured the steady decline of the island population since its peak of
110,351 inhabitants in 1968-69.
7.3 Before the bridge, Chindo's isolation gave the island economy a different structure from that
found in rural areas on the mainland. Whereas mainland rural areas in Korea began to supply rapidly
growing urban markets with cash crops, vegetables and fruits in the 1960s and 1970s, inaccessibility cut
Chindo off from these markets. Before the bridge, therefore, little agricultural produce was sent off the
island and similarly, few processed goods were imported from the mainland. The Chindo bridge
changed all that and in 1985 provided a permanent link between the island and the mainland for the first
time, effectively ending Chindo's isolation. After Chindo's bridge access to Korea's main urban centers,
the island's economy and community took on similar characteristics to those rural areas on the mainland
that were equally distant from main urban markets. Chindo's farm and fishery products, for instance,
gained access to these rapidly expanding markets on the same terms as those produced on the mainland.
Shipping times from Chindo to main urban centers such as Kwangju and Mokpo were halved. Costs
were reduced. In addition, regular bus services, for example, now ply between Chindo and Kwangju
City three times an hour every day of the week, just as they do between cities and towns on the mainland.
Before the bridge, even a simple public transport service such as this was not possible.
Restructuring Chindo's Rural Economy
7.4 In allowing trade in agricultural products to take place between Chindo island and the mainland
on a large scale for the first time, an important side effect of the bridge was to encourage a shift of island
agricultural production in favor of higher value cash crops for sale to urban markets. Labor intensive
subsistence farming almost vanished. As a result, a smaller share of the population was engaged in
agriculture after the bridge. Even so, output increased significantly. Cash cropping was much more
productive and mechanized, as can be seen from the sharp increase of agricultural machinery on Chindo
after the bridge (Table Al.13).
30. Large islands off Korea's southern coast that already had bridge connections were Koje and Namhae. A bridge connection
to Korea's largest island. Cheju is not feasible, however. Cheju lies some 70 kilometers offthe southern tip of the peninsula.
31. It was in this sea channel that Korean admiral Soon Shin Lee inflicted a celebrated defeat upon Japanese naval forces at the
Battle of Ul Tol Mok in 1597.
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7.5 Before the bridge in 1974, only 14.8 percent of Chindo's farm output was cash crops, fruit and
vegetables, for shipment to the mainland. At the same time, 85.2 percent of agricultural output was
made up of traditional crops, such as rice and barley, mostly for consumption on the island itself. By
1994, ten years after the bridge opened, the proportions of cash and traditional crops in the total were
inverted: 60.3 percent cash crops and 39.7 percent for local consumption. The growing demand from
the mainland was not for Chindo's traditional crops, such as rice and barley. It was for peppers, garlic,
onions, Chinese lemons and fruits of the Chinese matrimony vine, all of them products that Chindo could
supply on a large scale. Another factor that encouraged the shift into cash crops was export. Chindo's
declining population (Table Al .14) meant that the island's own market for food products was itself
shrinking. There were simply fewer people to feed.
7.6 Total agricultural output on Chindo almost doubled between 1974 and 1994, from 50,325 tons to
99,828 tons (Table Al.13). During that period the total cultivated area barely increased at all and the
number of people engaged in agriculture fell significantly, both trends indicating productivity gains. The
changes were most rapid from 1984 onwards, after the bridge was opened. We may conclude therefore,
that an important side-effect of the bridge was to accelerate the modernization and restructuring of
agriculture on the island.
Impact Upon Islanders' Standard of Living
7.7 Expanding more productive agriculture, the mainstay of the Chindo economy should translate
into higher absolute levels of income per capita for the population that remains on the island. Since
1980, when data first became available, the gross regional product (GRP) of Chindo has grown very little
in real terms, however (Table 7.1). There was a rise of GRP per capita after the bridge opened, but this
increase was largely due to the decline of Chindo's population. Chindo's increase in GRP per capita was
also much slower that than for Korea as a whole over the same period, meaning that, in relative terms,
incomes have declined on Chindo. Before the bridge in 1980, Chindo's GRP per capita was 48.6 percent
of the national average. By 1992, after the bridge, it was only 32.8 percent of the national average.
Chindo's income per head had risen with the bridge but not as fast as in the country as a whole. The
bridge brought only modest prosperity to Chindo, not as much as developed on the increasingly
urbanized mainland. As it intended, therefore, the Kwangju II project did succeed in increasing the
income earning opportunities of the islanders but did not prevent income disparities with the mainland
from widening even further. The urban/industrial economy of the mainland was simply moving ahead
too fast for that to happen.
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Table 7.1: Chindo Island Gross Regional Product, 1974-1992
(constant 1994 won)
Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
CHINDO ISLAND 1974 1980 1984 1991 1992
Population (number) 104,031 83,423 75,389 56,975 52,890
GRP (millions of won) n.a. 96,062 119,732 115,677 106,249
GRP per capita (thousands of won) n.a. 1,152 1,588 2,030 2,009
KOREA 1974 1980 1984 1991 1992
Population (thousands) 34,692 38,124 40,513 43,268 43,663
GDP (billions of won) 50,335 90,251 125,238 255,210 267,723
GDP per capita (thousands of won) 1,451 2,367 3,091 5,898 6,132
Notes: CPI series used to convert from current to constant prices: 1974= 19.7; 1980=54.5;
1984=75.0; 1991=109.3; 1992= 116.1; 1994=129.3.
Sources: Korea Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical Office.
Chindo Comprehensive Plan. 1994-2002, Chindo County Office, 1994.
7.8 An additional factor that helped improve the standard of living of island residents after the
bridge is the generally lower level of consumer prices, according to Chindo County officials. Detailed
historical data for Chindo price levels is not available, but it is reasonable to expect that, after the bridge,
prices would approach those of the mainland, following integration of mainland and island wholesale and
retail markets and the reduction of transport costs. As well as allowing Chindo's produce to be exported
more reliably and cheaply, the bridge permitted industrialized goods from the mainland and further afield
to be imported to the island more efficiently. The impact evaluation mission's inquiries confirmed that
the prices of many consumer goods in Chindo were similar to those prevailing in nearby urban markets
on the mainland. Chindo County officials reported that island prices had been higher than those on the
mainland before the bridge.
7.9 The impact of the Chindo Bridge upon land prices is worthy of attention in view of the dramatic
changes that occurred on the island. Serviced residential land on Chindo in 1994 was worth, in real
terms, one hundred times its value in 1974. The value of commercial land increased even more rapidly,
multiplying more than two hundred times between 1974 and 1994 (Table 7.2). Although actual price
levels in Chindo are still much below land values in cities throughout the region, the bridge did bring
Chindo territory within the scope of the modem real estate market in Korea. By contrast, the very
modest price increases of real estate on the Other Islands in the Chindo area highlights the sluggishness
of still isolated markets in inaccessible places. In 1974 before the bridge, Chindo residential land was
worth two-and-a-half times similar land on the Other Islands. By 1994 after the bridge, Chindo land was
worth fifteen times as much. With more buoyant agriculture on the island, the demand for rural land on
Chindo led to an increase in agricultural land prices, which are now at a similar level to those found in
rural areas throughout mainland Korea. Without bridge access, the price of island fanning land grows
only very slowly, as the data for the other Islands in the Chindo area show (Table 7.2).
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Table 7.2: Chindo Island and Other Islands: Average Urban and Rural Land Prices, 1974-1994
Constant 1994 won per pyong
With-project Scenario Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
CHFTrDO ISLAND 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Serviced housing land 177 86 11,316 - 181,500
Serviced cormmercial land 249 134 40,209 - 547,525
Agricultural and 72 37 116 - 34,485
Without-project Scenario Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
OTHER ISLANDS (1) (without bridges) 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Serviced housing land 66 34 222 - 1,189
Serviced commercial and 85 40 222 1,225
Agriculturallanid~ -53 24 55 _750-
Notes: (1) Shin Nan County covering a neighboring island group. CPI series used to convert from
currentto constant prices: 1974=19.7; 1979=42.3; 1984=75.0; 1989=92.1; 1994=129.3.
1 pyong = 3.3058 square meters.
Source: Yeochon County Office.
Modest Urban Development Impacts
7.10 Chindo is still predominantly a rural economy, and the bridge stimulated only modest urban
development. The County capital, Chindo Town, administered as a district ('myon') council under
Korea's local government arrangements, has nevertheless become a key service center for the island
economy. Although its population has fallen, Chindo Town remains the largest urban center on the
island, with a population of 12,159 in 1994 (Table Al.14). The rate of decline of the town's population
has been much less than that of the population of the island as a whole. Before the bridge in 1974, it was
where 15.7 percent of the island residents lived. After the bridge in 1994, Chindo Town accounted for
24.0 percent of the total island population. Chindo Town today provides important communications and
financial services for an island economy firmly integrated into mainland markets. It is also the principal
service center for the population as a whole. In 1994, Chindo had eleven hospitals and clinics, more than
twice the number it had in 1974 when the island population was twice as large.
Accelerated Out-Migration
7.11 By ending the isolation of Chindo and helping to incorporate the island economy into that of the
mainland, the bridge had a major indirect impact upon the people living there. Contrary to stalling the
departure of residents from Chindo, the bridge seems to have helped accelerate out-migration modestly.
Island residents continued to search for even better economic opportunities on the mainland (Table
A1.14). In the decade after the bridge was completed (1984-94), Chindo's population fell at a annual
rate of 0.9 percent. During the decade before the bridge (1974-84) the rate of decline was slower, 0.5
percent per annum. Chindo had 50,659 inhabitants in 1994, barely half the 1979 population of 92,168
when the Kwangju II project was appraised. On the other hand, declining population is a characteristic
of rural Korea in general.32 Despite its acceleration immediately after the bridge, the decline of the
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Chindo population has been slower than the rural average for Korea and for the Other Islands still
unconnected by bridges.
7.12 Since younger breadwinners are the ones most likely to migrate, they leave behind them smaller
households and an aging population. In 1974, the average Chindo household had 5.8 members; the
equivalent figure for 1994 is only 3.3 persons. Chindo's household shrinkage occurred more rapidly thani
it did in rural Korea as a whole (5.7 persons in 1974; 3.4 persons in 1993), but the present household size
on Chindo is now close to the national average for rural areas. At 14.7 percent of the total in 1993, the
share of people over 60 years old in the population in Chindo is nearly twice as large as in Korea as a
whole, which was only 7.7 percent in 1990. One Chindo resident told the impact evaluation mission that
"a 50 year old is considered to be a young man here". A businessman running a small construction firnn
reported that it was difficult to keep younger workers who were "always attracted to the bright city
lights" on the mainland. An indirect indicator of the aging of Chindo's population has been the drop in
the number of primary schools from 41 in 1974 to only 27 in 1994. Examples of trends such as these
from Chindo may be found in many rural areas on the Korean peninsular.
Impact on Tourism
7.13 Tourism to Chindo benefited enormously with the advent of the bridge. Chindo island has rmany
tourist attractions, the most important of which is the tidal phenomenon known in Korea as the "miracle
of Moses". At certain times of the year, strong neap tides expose a causeway, allowing visitors to walk
two kilometers "through the sea" from Chindo to a small adjacent island. On peak days, traffic jams of
visitors to this phenomenon tail back 2 kilometers from the site, where the county authorities have built
an enormous car park, with unfortunately adverse environmental impacts through the sheer volume of
visitors that it allows. In 1994, 1.5 million visitors came to Chindo, an annual increase of 4.6 percent
since the bridge opened (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Chindo Island Tourism Indicators, 1974-1994
Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
INDICATORS number number number number number
Tourists 39,000 (1) 942,650 890,312 (2) 1,476,471 (3)
Hotels/inns in operation 7 9 19 29 29
Tea houses in operation 14 7 42 59 58
Bars in operation - 2 16 17
Kestaurants/eateries 306 248 222 246 442
authorized 248_222 246 442
Notes: (1) data for 1982; (2) data for 1990; (3 ) data for 1993.
Sources: Chindo County June 1995 Mission Briefing Note.
32. In 1974, Korea had a rural population of 13, 459,000 (2,381,000 households). In 1993, it was only 5.407,000 (1,592,000
households). During 1972-76, agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for 24,7 percent of GDP. During 1987-91, this scctuo
accounted for only 9.4 percent.
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7.14 Facilities for tourists have increased substantially (Table 7.3). Before the bridge in 1974, Chindo
had only 7 hotels/inns and 14 tea-houses. In 1994, ten years after the bridge opening, there were 29 and
58 respectively. A better road system after the bridge opening helped tourism considerably. Before the
bridge in 1974, only 3.4 kilometers of the island's 168 kilometer road network was paved. By 1994, 55
kilometers out of a 199.8 kilometer network were. Current tourism projects under way include two
national resorts, at Hae-Dong and Nokjin, covering a total area of 195 hectares (590,000 pyongs).
Altogether, it is expected that these will involve public investments to the value of US$ 2.6 million on
top of the US$2.2 million already invested so far. The bridge and its complementary infrastructure made
it possible to exploit Chindo's natural beauty for the purposes of tourism on a large scale.
Environmental and Social Vulnerability
7.15 As a result of the large influx of tourists to Chindo made possible by the bridge, the natural
environment of some coastal areas has suffered from heavy vehicular traffic especially. Although air
pollution from vehicle emissions has not proved yet to be a serious problem, irregular parking of private
vehicles has damaged the natural vegetation cover and accelerated the erosion of the sea-front and beach
areas in many places. After the bridge, there have been a number of reported violations of air and water
pollution norms. Before the bridge, there were none at all (Table A 1 .15). With respect to the
environment, the bridge ended Chindo's isolation, bringing the island face to face with kind of challenge
confronted by rural areas that have a tourism vocation throughout mainland Korea.
7.16 County officials also report higher crime rates on Chindo since the opening of the bridge.
Clearly, many unoccupied houses still containing household possessions are attractive and easy prey for
burglars. Also, alcoholism may be a factor in crime on an island that now has 17 bars, when before the
bridge it had at most only two. From the data available, crime rates on Chindo were higher after the
bridge than before (Table A 1.1 5). At the same time, it should be acknowledged that crime is only a
minor problem on Chindo compared with that of mainland cities. Traffic accidents increased together
with traffic flows, but again at much lower levels than on the mainland.
Impacts Upon Local Government
7.17 Despite the dramatic impacts of the bridge on Chindo Island, and the growing revenues of the
Chindo County authority, the formal administrative organization of local government on the island has
remained unchanged for more than two decades. Responsibilities and workloads nevertheless increased
after the bridge. Before the bridge and shortly after its completion, the Chindo County authority was
only an observer, albeit an astute one, of events unfolding on the island. Major public investments on
Chindo after the bridge, such as the paving of the national highway across the island, were made by the
national government. Recently, the County Government has developed a more forward looking planning
function through the preparation of the 1994-2002 Chindo Comprehensive Plan. In hindsight, a more
active stance by local authorities could have been achieved earlier if an operation like the Kwangju II
project had provided greater technical assistance support for local government. This would have helped
them anticipate unintended side-effects and formulate and implement plans to curtail unsatisfactory
impacts and ensure that the satisfactory ones are sustained.
Is Chindo Better or Worse-Off?
7.18 Having identified the many impacts of the bridge upon the island economy and community, an
important question that remains unanswered is whether the Chindo people are better off-in a broad
sense-today than they were without the bridge. We can begin to answer this question if two issues are
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initially clarified. First of all, we must recognize that, in addition to affecting those people who still live
on Chindo today, the bridge's impacts also affected the lives of a large number of former residents who
are now living somewhere else in Korea. In assessing the overall impact of the bridge, we should ideally
want to learn how well off both groups are. Today's residents, in terms of income, are somewhat better
off than they were before the bridge, although their incomes have increased more slowly than for
Koreans as a whole over the 1974-1994 period. As for former residents of Chindo now departed from
the island, we unfortunately do not have any data on their present economic and social status on the
mainland.
7.19 Secondly, we have to make a judgment upon the quality of rural life in modern Korea today. For
those who believe the quality of rural life has improved, the impact of the bridge would thus have made
Chindo people better off, since the islanders now live and work in similar ways to those living in other
rural parts of Korea. There can be no doubt that the impact of the bridge has severely disrupted the
traditional way of life of Chindo Island, though. Many Chindo people have gone away, houses are left
empty and a huge influx of tourists places parts of the island under severe environmental and social
stress. On the other hand, as incomes on the island are higher than before the bridge, the remaining
population has more opportunities to earn a decent living today and enjoys greater access to goods and
services in today's urban centered economic development of Korea. The bridge allowed these
developments to take place and bring Chindo into the mainstream of modern rural development, even
though improvements on the island still come more slowly than in urban areas on the mainland. On
balance, we conclude that the islanders are better off thanks to the territorial incorporation made possible
by the bridge.
Economic Rate of Return
7.20 According to the PCR re-estimate of the ERR of the Chindo Bridge of 18.3 percent, compared
with the appraisal's 16.0 percent, this was a worthwhile investment from an economic point of view
(Kwangju 11 PCR p. 32). That the PCR found a higher ERR than at appraisal, in spite of cost overruns of
263 percent due to increased materials costs, is surprising. For the PCR estimate, benefits consisted of
vehicle operating costs savings (about 8 percent of total) and time savings (about 92 percent of the total).
As in the case of the Tolsan Bridge, benefits were valued more highly in the PCR estimate in line with
generally rising cost levels in Korea. Traffic flows on Chindo are, however, less than half Tolsan's.
Since the majority of Chindo's traffic is for tourism purposes only, the time saved by these visitors to the
island has little economic value for two reasons: (i) tourists would not have visited Chindo without the
bridge, preferring to visit more accessible areas on the mainland and, therefore, do not save any time in a
meaningful sense; and (ii) whatever time loss there may be has little opportunity cost. If time savings
were removed from the benefit equation, the ERR for the Chindo Bridge falls to only 0.03 percent as the
present value of the benefits barely exceeds the present value of the costs. 3 3 Clearly, a traditional cost-
benefit analysis would not recommend the Chindo Bridge as a worthwhile investment without heavily
factoring in supposed time savings. A positive assessment of the many side-effects that our study has
identified would nevertheless support investment in the Chindo Bridge. There can also be no doubt that
the bridge fully and immediately achieved its intended direct impact of physically incorporating new
territory.
33. By contrast, the ERR of the Tolsan Bridge would fall to only 8.3 percent if time saving benefits were excluded from the
benefit stream on that case.

CZA
59
8. Lessons from Integrating Island Economics
8.1 Territorial Incorporation Itself is Immediate. By permanently linking these islands to the
mainland, both bridges succeeded in incorporating new territory on which the urban and industrial-based
process of economic development in Korea could eventually be played out. Physical isolation
immediately ceased, especially on Chindo, where people suddenly found themselves within the
mainstream of Korean development for the first time. The experience of implementing these bridges and
the awareness of their impacts gave governments at all levels increasing confidence to incorporate more
territory through bridge construction among the many coastal islands still isolated from the mainland and
from each other.
8.2 Impacts in Urban and Rural Areas are Different. Tolsan Island was very close to the important
urban area of Yeosu city. Chindo was remote from urban centers. The impacts of the bridges were quite
distinct in each case. Contiguous with the Yeosu City urban area after the bridge was built, Tolsan
Island became part of it. The Chindo Bridge's main impact was to allow the transformation of a rural
subsistence economy into an export-based agriculture producing cash crops for urban markets on the
mainland. After the Chindo bridge, the island economy became much like the local economies of
mainland rural areas in Korea.
8.3 Profound Structural Change can be an Important Side-Effect. After the bridges the isolation of
the residents of the islands ended. In an economic and social sense, they ceased to be "islanders".
Psychologically, the horizons of both the Tolsan and Chindo communities were broadened. Chindo
islanders especially broke with the stigma of feeling cut off from the mainstream of contemporary
Korean society and modem economic development. While many residents left the islands altogether to
seek better economic opportunities on the mainland, those who remained could enjoy a somewhat higher
standard of living through new economic opportunities on the islands themselves. For Tolsan islanders,
this involved daily commuting to Yeosu that the bridge made possible up to the point that its capacity
became saturated. In the case of Chindo, it involved working in a modernized agricultural sector or in
the rapidly growing tourism business on the island. The structural changes in the respective island
economies also brought some social disruption and pose environmental challenges to them. These
negative impacts are but one more indicator, albeit an undesirable one, of the incorporation of the islands
into the mainstream of Korea's rapid economic development.
8.4 Anticipating Opportunities for the Private Sector. Private sector agents seized new economic
opportunities that the bridge impacts provided. In Tolsan, major private investment is under way in real
estate development of urban housing after the bridge. Significant private sector ventures are also being
launched in the tourism sector of both islands. Farmers on both Tolsan and Chindo have made
significant investments in machinery to increase output. For territorial incorporation to succeed in
helping economic development, it is essential that opportunities for profitable private sector investment
be unleashed. Reviewing the likelihood of such opportunities arising should be part of the planning and
appraisal exercise of such projects. This exercise would be one of trying to identify ex ante some of the
possible indirect impacts, which most development projects tend to omit.
8.5 Forward Looking Plans with Complementary Infrastructure. New prospects can induce speed of
change that exceeds the public sector's ability to respond. The bridges fulfill a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the beneficial impacts discussed in this report to occur. It is essential for
complementary infrastructure investment to be made in access roads and utilities, for instance. From the
evidence gathered by our study, the indirect impacts of the bridges were many and varied. While the
actual form that these impacts take cannot always be foreseen accurately, scenarios should be drawn at
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least of their likely thrust and general direction. The experience of these two bridges shows that forward
looking impact plans should be part of design of projects aimed at territorial integration. As a minimum,
these plans should indicate: (i) necessary complementary investment project by the public sector; and
(ii) identification of opportunities for private sector investment. The lack of a plan for the "day after"
from the Kwangju 1I project may have prevented some of the projects' positive indirect impacts from
being fully realized, particularly in the case of the residential development in Tolsan noted above (para.
6.23). Technical assistance to prepare and monitor a forward looking impact plan ought to be a standard
feature of projects of this kind in the future.
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Annex 1. Statistical Tables

Table Al .1: Sectoral Composition of Employment, 1975 and 1990
1975 1990
Agriculture Agriculture
Region and Fishery Manufacturing Services and Fishery ManufactLiring Services
Korea 48.9 18.2 32.9 20.8 27.8 51.4
Seoul 2.0 34.4 63.6 0.5 30.0 69.5
Pusan 3.1 41.2 55.7 2.6 40.1 57.3
Taeku - - 2.2 37.7 60.1
Inchoni 2.1 45.3 52.6
Kwan vi gj4l - 8.3 20.9 70.8 
Taechon 3.8 24.6 71.6
Kyonggi 44.8 22.5 32.7 13.9 38.2 47.9
Kangwo-n 61.1 12.1 26.7 532.6 15.7 1 .7
Chungbuig 72.0 7.5 20.5 39.7 18.1 42.2
Chungnani 68.7 10.4 20.9 55.0 12.3 32.7
N. Cholla 70.6 8.2 21.2 2 48.8 1 .7_ _ 38.5
S. Cholia 73.1 6.2 20.7 60.9 9.7 29.4
N. Kyongsang 55.3- - I7 .. 0- - - -- 27.7 -- 46.7 19.9 33.4
S. Kyongsang 65.9 13.5 20.6 29.7 3 1.5 38.8
Cheju 68.1 4.5 27.4 41.7 3.7 54.6
Source: Population Census, 1975, 1 990, National Statistical Office.
Table Al .2: Population Changes in Project Regions and Other Comparator Regions, 1975-1990
1975 1980 1985 1990 Annual Growth Rate
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Region persons % persons % persons % persons % 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1975-1990 (1)
Korea 34,679 100.0 37,449 100.0 40,448 100.0 43,411 100.0 1.55 1.55 1.42 1.51
Seoul 6,542 18.9 8,367 22.3 9,639 23.8 10,613 24.4 5.04 2.87 1.94 3.28
S. Cholla 3,983 11.5 3,779 10.1 3,748 9.3 2,507 5.8 -1.05 -0.16 -7.73 -3.04
Kwangju 589 1.7 728 1.9 906 2.2 1,139 2.6 4.33 4.47 4.68 4.49
Mokpo 195 0.66 222 0.6 236 0.6 243 0.6 2.63 1.23 0.59 1.48
Yeosu 128 0.4 161 0.4 172 0.4 173 0.4 -469 1.33 0.12 2.03
Yeochon - _ 102 0.3 87 0.2 64 0.1 na. -3.13 -5.96 -4.55
ChI83 80- -77.3 •0.2 73 -5.51 -- -4.03
N. Cholla 2,455 7.1 2,288 6.1 2,202 5.4 2,070 4.8 -1.40 -0.76 -1.23 -1.13
Clhonjiu- 303 0.9 337 0.9 - 426 1.1 517 1.2 2.15 -4.80 3.95 - 3.63
i i112 0.3 145 0.4 192 0.5 -203 0.5 - 5.30 5.78 4.04
Iksan __ - - 156 0.4 128 0.3 106 0.2 n.a. -3.88 -3.70 -3.79
Kyonggi 4,035 11.6 4,930 13.2 4,793 11.8 6,154 14.2 4.09 -0.56 5.13 2.85
N. Kyongsang 4,856 14.0 3,379 g9.0 3,010 7A 2,860 - 6.6 -7.00 -2.29- -1.02 -3.47
Taeku 1,266 3.7 1,573 4.2 2,028 5.0 2,228 5.1 4.44 5.21 i[90 3.84
S. Kyongsang 3,279 9.5 3,321 8.9 3,515 8.7 3,672 8.5 - 0.25 - f1.14 0.88  0.76
Pusan 2,306 6.6 3,157 8.4 3,512 8.7 3,796 8.7 6.48 2.15 1.57 3.38
(1) For Yeochon, Chindo, and lksan, the annual growth rate is for 1980-1990.
Source: Korea Statistical Yearbook 1980-1992, National Statistical Office.
Table Al.3: Land for Industrial Use, 1978-1991
Region 1978 1986 1991
Korea 100.0 100.0 100.0
Seoul 9.5 5.2 4.2
Pusan 6.8 4._ 5X_ . 4.1
Kyonggi 28.4 27.0 25.5
Kangwon 2.3 2.3 2.4
Chungbug - - 3.6 -- - 2.8 _30 
Chuignam 4.9 4.7 5.0
N. Cholla 3.3 3.4 4.9
S. Cholla 5.5 7.0 9.9
N. Kyongsang 17.4 19.1 18.1
S. Kyongsang -- 18.1 23.6 22.6
Cheju 0.3 0.31 0.2
Source: Mining and Manufacturing Survey 1978-1991. National Statistical
Office.
Table Al.4: Manufacturing Production and Exports in Kwangju, 1990-1994
Production Exports
(billion won) (million US dollars)
Industrial Estate 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Hanam I 891.3 837.8 882.4 1,317.4 1,276.1 508.3 499.1 438.7 654.9 879.7
Hanam II 132.8 135.1 203.6 392.3 362.9 22.2 7.2 18.8 31.1 17.3
Hanani. IlI - - - 567.7 663.4 - - - 7.4 2.7
Sub-total 1,024.1 972.9 1,086.0 2,277.4 2,302.4 530.5 506.3 457.5 693.4 899.7
Bonchon 221.9 323.2 316.9 603.4 773.8 37.0 29.7 29.8 50.8 44.7
Songnam 58.3 85.9 130.0 200.0 199.6 5.4 2.8 - -
Sochon IE 24.5 31.6 21.5 60.0 76.2 2.5 2.0 3.2 60.0 8.9
Sochon AIE 46.5 54.9 54.6 150.0 167.9 2.9 2.5 4.7 10.0 10.1
Sub-total 351.2 495.6 523.0 1,013.4 1,217.5 47.8 37.0 37.7 120.8 63.7
Outside of IE 1,629.6 2,173.3 2,506.0 1,250.2 1,756.7 356.6 548.5 657.5 529.0 519.1
Total 1 3,004 3,641.8[ 4,115.0| 4,541.01 5,276.61 934.91 1,091.81 1,152.7[ 1,343.21 1,482.5
Source: Kwangju Industrial Estate Status, 199 1-1995.
Table Al .5: Sample Establishments by Location and Employmenlt Size
(percent)
Number of Employees
3000 or
Indusirial Eska(c 5-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000-2999 more Total
Il an]m 1 4.4 17.4 13.0 30.4 13.0 8.7 13.0 0.0 1)0.0
lIlana II & 111 19.1 14.3 28.6 23.8 9.5 4.8 0.0 0.0 100.0
Ouitsidle 5.6 16.7 22.2 22.2 ').2 2.X 1- 5.6 2.8 n0o.()
Iota.l 8.81 16.31 21.3f 25.01 16.31 5.0 6.31 1.31 100.0
Number of 7 J3 17 20 1
Establishments 7 13 17 2 13 4 ___ 80
Source: Impact Evaluation Establishmenit Survey, 1995.
Table A 1.6: Sample Establishments by Location and Type
Moved from
Newly Moved from Other
lindsti-ial Estate Establishe(d S. Cholla Regions Total
_. Number 12 l l 0 23
Row percentage 52.-7 47.83 0.00 100.00
I lanam I Colmin percentage 33 33 - . 0.00 - 28.75
Number 4 13 4 21
Row percenitage 19.05 61.90 19.05 100.00
Ilanam ll & IIl Columini percentage 1 34.21 66.67 26.25
Nutimber 20 14 2 36
Row percenitage 55.56 38.89 5.56 100.00
Oui.,ide Column percentage 55.56 36.84 33.33 45.00
Number 36 3 6 80
Row percenitage 45.00 47.50 7.50 100.00
Total Co iimn`percentage 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Impact Evaluation Establishment Survey, 1995.
Table Al.7: Sample Establishments by Location and Industry
Industry
Industrial Estate 31 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 Total
Number I I 0 4 1 0 16 0 23
Row percentage 4.35 4.35 0.00 17.39 4.35 0.00 69.57 0.00 100.00
Hanam I Column percentage 10.00 16.67 0.00 40.00 100.00 0.00 32.65 0.00 28.75
Number 0 1 1 2 0 1 15 1 21
Row percentage 0.00 4.76 4.76 9.52 0.00 4.76 71.43 4.76 100.00
Hanam 11 & III Column percentage 0.00 16.67 100.00 20.00 0.00 100.00 30.61 50.00 26.25
Number 9 4 0.00 4 0 0 18 1 36
Row percentage 25.00 11.11 0.00 11.11 0.00 0.00 50.00 2.78 100.00
Outside Column percentage 90.00 66.67 0.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 36.73 50.00 45.00
Number 10 6 1 10 I 1 49 2 80
Row percentage 12.50 7.50 1.25 12.50 1.25 1.25 61.25 2.50 100.00
Total Column percentage 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: 3 1=food and beverage; 32=textile; 33=wood products; 34=paper; 35=chemicals;
36=mineral products; 37=basic metal; 38=fabricated metal; 39=other.
Source: Impact Evaluation Establishment Survey, 1995.
Table AI.8: Changes in Manufactuing Establishments and Employment, 1988-1993
Establishments Employment (1,000 persons)
1988 1993 Annual Growth 1988 1993 Annual Growth
Rate Rate
Region numbers percent numbers percent 1988-1993 numbers percent numbers percent 1988-1993
Korea 61,723 100.0 90,506 100.0 7.96 3,208 100.0 2,931 100.0 -1.79
Seoul 17,130 27.8 20,532 22.7 3.69 553 17.2 414 14.1 -5.63
Pusan 6,554 10.6 9,262 10.2 7.16 413 12.9 266 9.1 -8.42
Taeku 4,542 7.4 6,089 6.7 6.04 184 5.7 152 5.2 -3.75
Inchon - 3,586 5.8 6,403 7_. 12.29 240 7.5 226 7.7 -1.19
Kwangju 693 1,103 1.2 9.74 42 1.3 47 1.6 2.28
Taechon 950 1.5 1,342 1.5 7.15 56 1.7 46 1.6 -3.86
Kyonggi 14,363 23.3 22,914 25.3 9.79 726 22.6 729 24.9 0.08
Kangwon 1,201 1.9 1,476 4.21 76 2.4 58 2.0 -5.26
Chulngbug 931 1.5 - 1,827 2.0 14.43 77 2.4 98 3.3 4.94
Chungnam 1,508 2.4 - 2,601 2.9 11.52 7 1 2.2 100 3.4 7.09
N. Cholla 1,724 2.8 2,252 2.5 5.49 2.5 76 2.6 -1.27
S. Cholla 2,347 3.8 3,113 3.4 5.81 70 2.2 79 2.7 2.45
N. Kyongsang 2,552 4.1 4,965 5.5 14.24 211 6.6 224 7.6 1.20
S. Kyongsang 3,4491 5.6 6,334 7.0 12.93 403 12.6 41-1 14.0 0.39
Cheju 193 0.3 293 0.3 8.71 4 0.1 5 0.2 4.56
Note: Establishment with 5 or more employees.
Source: Korea Industrial Census,1993, National Statistical Office.
Table A 1.9: Gross Regional Product, 1985-1991
(current price )
1985 1991 Annual Growth
Rate
Region billion woI1 percent billion won percent 1985-1991
Korea 78,235 100.0 207,398 100.0 17.64
Seoul 19,424 24.8 51,102 24.6 17.49
Pusan 6,317 8.1 15,762 7.6 16.46
Taeku 3,157 4.0 8,490 4.1 17.92
Kwangju - - 4,860 2.3 n.a.
Kyonggi 10,261 13.1 33,697 16.2 21.92
N. Cholla 3,173 4.1 7,713 3.7 15.96
S. Cholla 5,778 7.4 15,679 7.6 18.10
N. Kyongsang 6,057 7.7 14,594 7.0 15.79
S. Kyongsang 9,369 12.0 23,009 11.1 16.15
Note: (1) S. CholIa includes Kwangju.
(2) Price deflator for 1991 was 141.6 when 1985=100 for Korea.
Source: Gross Provincial Domestic Product,1993, National Statistical Office.
Table Al .10: Gross Regional Product Originating from Manufacturing, 1985-1991
(current price)
1985 1991 Annual Growth
Rate
Region billion won percent billion won percent 1985-1991
Korea 25,485 100.0 69,977 100.0 18.33
Seoul 3,699 14.5 7,361 10.5 12.15
Pusan -s 2,064 8.1 4,683 6.7 14.63
Taeku 1,120 4-4.4 2,822 4.0 -1T6.65
Kwangju - 1,578 2.3 n.a.
Kyonggi 5,065 19.9 17,894 25.6 23.41
N. Cholla 720 2.8 2,086 _3.0 19.40
S. Cholia 1,523 6.0 4,616 6.6 20.30
N. Kyongsang 2,170 8.5 5,955 8.5 18.32
S. Kyongsang 4,851 19.0 11,995 17.1 16.29
Note: (1) S. Cholla includes Kwangju.
(2) Price deflator for 1991 was 141.6 when 1985=100 fo,- Korea.
Source: Gross Provincial Domestic Product,1993, National Stati'tical Office.
Table Al .11: Tolsan Island and Other Islands: Population Indicators, 1974-1994
With-project Scenario Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
TOLSAN ISLAND 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Households (number) 3,740 - 4,034 - 4,280
Population (number) 24,015 - 21,922 - 17,073
VIouselhold size (number of persons per household) 6.4 - 5.4 - 4.0
Net out-migration (number during previous decade) n.a. n.a. -2,093 n.a. -4,849
Net out-migration (% of population for a decade) n.a. n.a. -8.7% n.a. -22.1%
Without-project Scenario Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
OTHER ISLANDS (1) (no bridge connection) 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Households (number) 6,322 - 5,583 4,628
Population (number) 40,154 - 26,880 - 15,677
Househoid size (number of persons per household) ----- -6.4 - -- 4.8 -- -3.4
Net out-migration (number during previous decade) n.a. n.a. -13,274 n.a. -11,203
Net out-migration (% of population for a decade) n.a. n.a. -33.1% n.a. -41.7%
Notes: (1) Nine neighboring inhabited islands within village (myun) jurisdictions of Nam, Wha Jung
and Sam San.
Sources: Yeochon County Statistical Yearbooks; July 1995 mission briefing.
Table Al.12: Tolsan Island Environmental Violations Reported, 1974-1994
Number of cases per I 10,000 people
Before Tolsan Bridge After Tolsan Bridge
1974 1979 1984 1989(1) 1994(2)
Air pollution 2 54
Water pollution - 13 25
Deforestation (hectares) - . 16 4 13
Note: (1) 1990 data; (2) 1993 data.
Source: Yeochon Statistical Yearbook.
Table A1.13: Chindo Island Rural Sector Indicators, 1974-1994
Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
POPULATION
Agricultural households (number) 15,518 14,594 n.a. 11,251(2) 10,612
As share of all households (%) 85.9% 82.6% n.a. 68.3% 68.2%
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY (number)
Motor vehicles 236 1,477 ( 2, 425 4,196
Tractors 1 3 (1) 2 121 32
Rice planting machines 31 (1) (I 580 I 0T6
Combine harvesters - 71 (1) 44 217 346
Irrigation pumps 367 12421) -- i-6--1,8---- 02 -2,132
Dryers 3 4 (1) 9 311 839
FOTAL CU LTIVAFED AREA (h-ctares 14,425 11,406 11,356 3,023 12,300 -
Rice 44,98 4 984 5,141 __ 270 6,355
jiBaley -- -_ -_ ___ - -8,542- 5,550 ~ 4,033 4,711 --3,45-2
lriit -2-- 79 794- 325 --- 634
Vegetables |_ 8_97_1_ 793 2,088 1,717 1,819
TOTAL OUTPUT (tonnes): 50,325 46,010 88,425 42,9392
Rice 19,319 26,789 27,525 
Barley 23,534 17,038 11,454 14,932 10,455
Friuit -- _- 58 _ 1,094 482 4,917
Vegetables 7,453 2,125 5W09 Q1877) 55,287
Notes: (1) 1981 data; (2) 1990 data; (3) KCDI team estimate based upon land area and 1994
level of productivity per hectare.
Sources: Chindo Statistical Yearbooks, Chindo County. Data on agricultural machinery taken from
Chindo County June 95 briefing note.
Table AI.14: Chindo Island and Other Islands Population Indicators, 1974-1994
With-project Scenario Before Chindo bridge After Chindo Bridge
CHINDO ISLAND (Kun or County) 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Households (number) 18,056 17,666 17,192 16,957 15,570
Population (number) 104,031 92,168 75,398 70,582 50,659
Household size (number of persons per household) 5.8 5.2 4.4 4.2 3.3
Population in 0-19 yr. cohort (number) 46,501 - 34,598 27,035 16,567
Population in 0-19yr. cohort (% of total population) 44.7% - 45.9% 38.3% 32.7%
Net out-migration (number in previous decade) n.a. n.a. -28,633 -21,586 -24,739
Net out-migration (% of population for a decade) n.a. n.a. -27.5% -23.4% -32.8%
CHINDO TOWN (myun or village) 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Populationl (number) 16,358 15,042 14,459 15,383 12,159
Town's share of Island population (%) 15.7% 16.3% 19.2%° 2 1.8% 24.0%
Without-project Scenario Before Chindo bridge After Chindo Bridge
OTHER ISLANDS (1) (without bridges) 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
Households (number) 27,776 27,303 24,773 23,702 21,508
Population (number) 163,626 151,515 115,413 109,223 71,175
Household size (number of persons per household) 5.9 5.5 4.6 4.6 3.3
Population in 0-19 yr. cohort (number) 86,282 - - 42,168 22,487
Population in 0- I9yr. cohort (% of total population) 52.7% . - 38.6% 31.6%
Net out-migration (number in previous decade) n.a. n.a. -48,213 -42,292 -44,238
Net out-migration (% of population for a decade) ii.a. n.a. -29.5% -27.9% -38.3%
Note: (1) Jursidiction of Shin Nan County covering a neighboring island group.
Sources: Gross Regional Product Yearbook, Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Chindo Comprehensive Plan, 1994-2002, Chindo County Office, 1994.
Shin Nan County Statistical Yearbook.
Table Al.15: Chindo Island Environmental and Social Order Violations Reported
1974-1994
Number of cases per 10,000 people
Before Chindo Bridge After Chindo Bridge
ENVIRONMENTAL 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
VIOLATIONS
Air pollution 1 23 (1)
Water pollution . .4 5 25 (1) co
Deforestation (hectares) 108 _ 1 63 -
SOCIAL ORDER 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994
VIOLATIONS
Reported crimes - 513 574 1,014
Traffic accidents 42 130 243
Note: (1) Data for 1993.
Source: Chindo County Statistical Yearbook.
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Annex 2
Project Description and Timelines
Korea: Secondary Cities Regional Project (Loan 1070-KO)
"Kwangju I Project"
Objective/costs: Components:
Assist the Borrower in Part A
establishing a regional (i) Preparation of housing sites with services in Gwangju city covering a total area of
development program about 37 ha and providing about 1370 lots of 35 py about 350 lots of 50 py and
in Gwangju region about 180 lots of py (US$4.5 million - 18.0% of total)
(ii) Construction of a fishery harbor complex in the Gukdong area of Yeosu including:
the construction of about 829m of landing and berthing quays, and about 240m
of piers and abutments; the construction of fishery harbor buildings and
infrastructure for the harbor complex: the development of industrial sites with
services for the establishment of fish processing plants for the fishing industry;
and the procurement and installation of handling equipment and navigational
aids (US$ 8.5 million -34.0% of total)
(iii) Construction of a city market in Suncheon covering an area of about 3.3 ha with a
building space providing for retail stalls, a sheltered area for fresh produce and
additional unpaved surface for the market held every fifth day (US$0.8 million
- 3.2% of total)
(iv) Construction and improvement of about 6.6 km of access roads (including five
bridges) in Yeosu and Mogpo to connect the housing sites to industrial or
commercial sites and to other centers of activity of the two cities (US$2.8
million - 11.2% of total)
Estimated total cost: Part B. Provision of Consultants' services
US$25.0m. (inc. (i) to assist GRDU' Project Manager in the formulation and implementation of the work
US$4.6m. price and program referred to in Section 3.02 of this Agreement (US$0.3 million - 1.2%
US$2.Im physical of total)
contingencies) (ii) to assist MOC in the review of regional development policies at the national level of
Bank Loan: US$15m. Government, the evaluation of the housing sites and services experience, the
formulation of a housing policy and training of MOC's regional planning staff
(US$0.5 million - 2.0% of total);
(iii) to assist the Borrower's Office of Fisheries in the management and operation of the
Yeosu fishery harbor complex, including the assessment of costs and charges,
the preparation of a financial plan and of a planning program for future
expansion of the harbor complex (US$0.5 million - 2.0% of total);
(iv) for the preparation of a program to improve the operation and management of water
supply systems in Gwangju City, Mogpo, Yeosu and Suncheon, including
short-term improvements to be financed by available resources under the
budgets of GCG, MCG, YCG and SCG respectively; and:
(v) to carry out feasibility studies and the preparation of selected projects to be identified
under regional physical planning studies which are being carried out by the
United Nations Development Program and MOC, including, inter alia, the
preparation of plans for sewerage and night soil disposal in Gwangju City and
Mogpo (US$0.5 million -2.0% of total)
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Korea: Second Gwangju Regional Project (Loan 1758-KO)
"Kwangju II Project"
Objective/costs: Components:
To further enhance a. Housing: nearly 3,950 serviced residential plots in Gwangju, Mogpo and
the development of Yeosu with expandable core-houses designed mostly for low-income
the Gwangju Region families ($44.6 million - 28.8% of total))
b. Industrial Estates: about 200 ha of serviced industrial land in Gwangju and
Mogpo to accommodate 16,000-20,000 employees (cost: $64.7 million
- 41.8% of total)
c. Water Supplv: improvements to water supply systems in Mogpo, Yeosu and
Narudo including transmission, treatment, distribution and operations
(cost: $13.4 million - 8.7% of total)
d. Transportation: construction of two bridges to link Dolsan and Jindo islands
to the mainland and improvements to a 1.9 km commercial road in
Yeosu and ferry service between Narodo and mainland ($19.5 million -
12.6% of total)
e. Fisheries: an aquaculture development program aimed at enhancing
fishermen's incomes and a storage facility at Imja Island for tiny salted
shrimp to prepare Kimche (national dish) ($7.0 million - 4.5% of total)
Estimated total cost: f. Technical Assistance in the areas of regional planning, including an island
US$ 154.8 m. development study, aquaculture development, water supply system
Bank Loan US$65 operation and management, and preparation of a third regional project
million ($5.6 million - 3.6% of total)
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Korea: Jeonju Regional Development Project (Loan 2388-KO)
"Chonju Project"
Objectives/costs: Components:
To assist in Party A: Housing Estate (US$9.1 million - 6.4% of total)
promoting economic (1) preparation of a housing site in Iri City covering an estate of about 60,000 py
development and consisting of low-income, middle-income and commercial plots and
creating complete with public facilities including water, sewerage, power,
employment telephones and streets.
opportunities in the (2) Provision of loan facilities for purchase of, and construction on, low income
Jeonju Region, plots.
particularly through
the improvement of Part B: Industrial Estates (US$18.3 million - 12.8% of total)
infrastructure and Preparation of industrial sites complete with public facilities including water,
living conditions in sewerage, power, telephones and streets in (a) Iri City covering an estate
major urban centers of about 140,000 py consisting of plots ranging in area from 400 py to
and the promotion 10,000 py each, and (b) Jeonju City covering an estate of about 200,000
of economic py consisting of plots ranging in area from 400 py to 10,000 py each.
development in the
poorer mountain Part C: Water Supply (US$14.6 million - 10.2% of total)
areas and islands Upgrading of the water supply system of Jeonju City through the construction of
the service reservoir of 7,000 cu.m capacity and about 21 km of
distribution pipelines.
Part D: Drainage Improvement and Flood Control (included in water supply
above)
Construction of a retention basin and a network of interceptor and drainage
channels and provision of additional lift pumps to control flood waters
from the Mangyeong River flowing south of Iri City
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Part E: Tourism Development (US$ 36.0 million - 25.1% of total)
(1) Development of the Mt. Jiri National Park tourist resort area through: (a)
preparation of a tourist site and construction of an access road in
Namweon City to accommodate construction of about 700 rooms for
lodging including basic infrastructure such as water, sewerage, power,
streets, parking and landscaping and supporting tourist facilities; and (b)
construction of mountain tourist roads from Yugmojeong to Deogdong
(about 19 km) and from Banseon to Cheonunsa (about 25 km).
(2) Development of the Mt. Naejang National Park tourist resort area through
construction of a tourist access road between Naejangsa and
Baegyangsa (consisting of upgrading of about 10 km of existing road &
construction of about 6 km of new road).
(3) Development of the Seonyu Island tourist resort area through the
construction of two foot bridges linking Seonyu Island with the
neighboring two islands in the Seonyu Island group and extension of the
existing landing jetties on the three islands
Estimated total cost:
US$ 143.3m. (inc. Part F: Transportation Development (US$26.6 million - 18.6% of total)
US$27.m. price and (1) Construction of a bridge, approximately 350m. long and lOm wide, to
US$8.5 m. physical connect sections of National Road No. 27 at Woonam, inc. about 3 km
contingencies) of approach roads.
Bank Loan: (2) Upgrading of about 32 km of National Road No. 19 between Namweon and
US$60m Gurye in Jeon Nam Province.
(3) Construction of a road of about 11 km long and lOm wide to provide a link
between the proposed industrial estate in Iri City and National Road No.
26.
Part G. Technical Assistance (US$2.2 million - 1.5% of total)
Carrying out of a preparation study and training for future regional and urban
development projects
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Project Timelines
Kwangju-I (Loan 1070-KO)
Date: Process: Missions: Disbursements: Works ending: Comments
1972 (06) ident. I
(11) ident. ll
1973 ____ __(02) prep. I ___________ _____
(05) prep. ll
(07) pre-app.
(11) appraisal
1974 (10) negotiations (03) post-app.l
(07) post-app.ll
1975 (01) loan approval (01) spn I 0.1
(08) effectiveness (06) spn 11
(11) spn III
71976 ___________ (03) spn IV 2.1 --------------------
(1) spn V
1977 _______--- (03) spn VI 5.5 ___________ ___________
(06) spn VII
(10) spn VIII
_1978 ______ (03)_spn IX_ _ _2.0_ ____________
1979 (07) spn X 2.1
(10) spn XI
1980 (12) loan closing (05) pcr 3.2
____~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -_____ ---------_____ __ _ ______
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Kwangju-il (Loan 1758-KO)
Date: Process: Missions: Disbursements: Works ending: Comments
1976 ____ __(12) identif. _____ _____
1978 (10) appraisal (03) prep.
(07) pre-app.
(10) appraisal
1979 (06) negotiations (02) post app.
(09) loan approval (I1)spn I
1980 (02) effectiveness (05) spn II 1.4
(08) spn III
1981 (04) spn IV 6.6 (09) Narodo tourism
(09) spn V (12) Mokpo water
(12) Yeosu water
( 12) Narodo water
1982 (01) spn VI 10.2 (08) shrimp storage
(05) spn VII
(I11) spn VIII
1983 (10) spn IX 23.1 (02) Yeosu com. road
(05) Yeoso housing
(07) Mokpo housing
(10) Hanam IE
1984 ___________ (07) spn X 9.0_____ | (05) Mokpo drainage
(11) spn XI (07) Kwangju hsing
(10) Chindo bridge
1985 (06) loan closing (04) spn XI 0.9 (03) Tolsan bridge
- -_ -_-________ - - - - - - - - - - ---------------
(IO)Juksan. l__ 10  nand readj ___________
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Chonju-I (Loan 2388-KO)
Date: Processs: Missions: sburent Works ending: Comments
1979 - (10) ident. -- _____-- -- - ---------
1980 (05) prep. I
(09) prep. __
1981 (04) prep. III
(06) prep. IV
(09) prep. V
(1 1) prep. VI
l 1982 (05) pre-app.
1983 (03) appraisal (03) appraisal
1984 (01) negotiation (07) spn I 0.2
(03) loan approval (10) spn II
(07) effectiveness
1985 (04) spn III 3.6
1986 __________ (03) spn IV 13.2 (12) Seonyu Is. dev. ___________
(11) spn V (12) Chonju water
1987 (04) spn VI 10.9 (04) Narmweon access
(06) Iri IE
(07) Chonju IE
(08) Iri IE access rd.
(10) Namweon TE
1988 (06) spn VII 12.0 (05) Iri drainage
(08) Yukmo J. road
(08) Naejangsa road
(12) Benseon road
1989 (07) spn VIII 3.0 (06) Woonarn road
(08) Namnweon roa
(09) Woonan bridge
(11) Iri IE int'change
1990 (06) loan closing (06) spn IX
(07) spn X
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Institutional Development Timelines
1. Devolution
Date: Event:
1972 - First IE at Iri was built by Ministry of Industry
1973 - National government designates five special metropolitan areas in Korea, including Kwangju.
- Tolsan Is. administered from Yeosu city.
1975 - MOC Kwangju RDD opened with staff of 25.
-----------------------------------------------------------1976 - MOC Kwangju RDD absorbed in Chonnam provincial Land Management Office (CLMO).
- Yeochon jurisdiction upgraded by incorporating two more districts ("dongs').
1977 -MOC policy of more active involvement in provision of infrastructure in Chonbuk.
-----------------------------------------------------------
1979 - CLMO changed its name to K(wangju)LMO
- Chindo jurisdiction upgraded from village to district adminstration ("myun" to "eup").
1980 - General Chun seizes power in military coup. Kwangju riots begin.
- Yolsan jurisdiction upgraded from village to district administration (-myun- to "cup").
1981 - KLMO closed and absorbed into MOC lri Land Dev. Office (ILDO)
- Namwon was upgraded as a city ("shi") administration of Chonbuk province.
. 1986 - Kwangju city jurisdiction upgraded to become a 'direct adminstration' city (jickhamsir), with greater autonomy
from central government, and city area extended to absorb four neighboring counties ("ku').
- Yeochon jurisdiction upgraded to a city ("shi")
I 1987 - MOC Iri ILDO coordination dept. abolished.
- Students riots nationwide.
- Democratization with election of Pres. Roh.
l 1988 - Kwangau city absorbed one more county (Kwangsan Ku)
- Mokpo City jurisdiction upgraded through addition of one more county
1992 - MOC Iri ILDO became a Regional Development Division (RDD)
1994 - MOC Iri RDD down-sized to 2 depts/19 staff.
- Yeochon County office relocated to Tolsan Is.
1995 - Dismemberment of Seo county in KwangJu creating Namgoo as Kwangju city's sixth.
-----------------------------------------------------------
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2. Laws and Regulations affecting Industrial Development
lDate: Event:
1971 - First National Land Development Plan (1972-1981) formulated.
1973 - National "Land and zoning arrangement' law determined urban land zoning by local govt.
- Designation of green belt around Kwangju City.
1974 - Central govt. designates six industrial bases nationwide (Song 1990 p. xvi)
1975 - Kwangju City Master Plan prepared and approved by MOC.
1977 - Chonju City Master Plan prepared and approved by MOC. Indicated land for industrial use.
1978 - Hanamr area zoned for industrial use.
1981 - Set of national laws supporting: (i) private sector development; (ii) private funding; (iii) balanced regional
development; (iv) small and medium-sized businesses; and (v) industrial location.
- Chonnam Province development plan was prepared for the first time.
1982 - Second National Land Development Plan (1982-1991) formulated.
1985 - .twangju City zoned more industrial land.
1987 - New Chonju Master Plan.
1990 - National law completely delegated land use planning and zoning responsibilities from KLDC to local governments.
1991 - Kwangju City zoned land for Hi-tech IE for industrial use.
- Construction Technology Quality Control Law.
- Industrial Location and Development Law.
1992 - President Kim announces new policy of de-regulation for industrial development.
- Kwangju City zoned land for Pyung Dong IE for industrial use.
1993 - Kwangju City zoned some 25% of former agricultural land for industrial use.
- De-regulation: old law allowing only one LPG supplier per district was revoked.
1994 - Regionally Balanced Development and Small/Medium-sized Industry Development Law
1995 - Kwangju's "direct administration" status consolidated under national Autonomy Law.
- Establishment and Management of Regional Development Fund Law.
Kwangju city increased the "set-back" on lEs, allowing plot coverage by building to increase from 60% to 80%.
- National Environment Law (enacting provisions of Rio Earth Summit of 1992).
- Attempts to update Chonju' s Master Plan.
_ _ _  . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --__ _
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3. Reorganization within Local Government
l Date: Event:
1980 - MOC minister came from Kwangju.
l 1981 - Public sector development group set up within Chonnam province to promote infrastructure
development in the region.
1985 - Kwangju City established a special Industrial Estate Planning Division with a staff of five.
l1986 - Kwangju City issued bonds to vale of US$49.6 million (39.7 billion won) to help finance new Pyong
Dong E.
1987 - Hanam E Site Office opened as a "one-stop shop" with a staff of 17.
1994 - Chonbuk Province established an International Trade Office in order to attract FDI.
1995 - Chonbuk Province established Chonbuk Development Corporation.
- Chonju City set up a Finance and Economic Bureau (FBB) for industrial and small business
promotion.
- Iksan City set up a similar FBB.
- Hanam IE Site Office staffing down to 9.
_~~~ -_. -____ -
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4. Strengthening Capabilities of Local Government
Date: Event:
1979 - Saemael education and training program for administrators and engineers in Chonnam province.
1980 - "Developmental administration" given for the first time to 120 local government employees.
- Chonnam Province computer section opened.
1981 - Governor of Chonnam Province (until 1984) was an entrepreneur for the first time.
- Chonnam Province computer room facility completed.
- Kwangju City acquired its first main-ftame IBM computer.
1983 - Staffing of Kwangju City Industrial Development Division (IDD) began to decline.
- Chonnam Province office room of computerization personnel opened and promoted.
1985 - Local government raining course for junior high level staff given.
1987 - Local government training course for high level staff in charge of regional economic given.
______.--__________________________________________________
1988 - Local government training course for "local administration in autonomy" given.
- Kwangju City collects taxes from most of Hanam IE phase I occupants as five year tax holiday ends.
1990 - Local government training courses in (i) local legislation; (ii) local economy; and (iii) foreign
languages given.
1992 - Office automation and computers course given to local government officials for the first time.
- Chonju City began selling plots in Chonju-III IE.
______.--__________________________________________________
1995 - Local government elections held for the first time.
1996 - Final repayment of IBRD loan for Kwangju-I1 due.
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Table A4.1 Number and Percentage of Establishments in the gample by Zone
and Type
Movers Movers
Zone New within from Total
Kwangju Outside
Hanam 1
Number 12 11 0 23
Percentage of row total 52.2 47.8 0.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 33.3 28.9 0.0 28.8
Hanam 2
Number 2 8 4 14
Percentage of row total 14.3 57.1 28.6 100.0
Percentage of column total 5.6 21.1 66.7 17.5
Hanam 3
Number 2 5 0 7
Percentage of row total 28.6 71.4 0.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 5.6 13.2 0.0 8.8
Bonchon
Number 5 4 1 10
Percentage of row total 50.0 40.0 10.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 13.9 10.5 16.7 12.5
Sochon
Number 4 5 1 10
Percentage of row total 40.0 50.0 10.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 11.1 13.2 16.7 12.5
Songam
Number 1 3 0 4
Percentage of row total 25.0 3.75 0.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 2.8 7.9 0.0 5.0
Other
Number 10 2 0 12
Percentage of row total 83.3 16.7 0.0 100.0
Percentage of column total 27.8 5.3 0.0 15.0
All zones
Number 36 38 6 80
Percentage of row total 45.0 47.5 7.5 100.0
Percentage of column total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.2 Number and Percentage of Establishments in the Sample by Type
and Industry
Tex- Chem- Non- Basic Fab.
Type of firm Food tile Wood icals Metal Metal Metal Other Total
New
Number 7 4 1 3 0 1 20 0 36
% of row total 19 11 3 8 0 3 56 0 100
e of col total 70 67 100 30 0 100 41 0 45
Movers within Kwangju/Jeonnam
Number 2 2 0 6 1 0 *26 1 38
t of row total 5 5 0 16 3 0 68 3 100
% of col total 20 33 0 60 100 0 53 50 48
Movers from outside
Number 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 6
e of row total 17 0 0 17 0 0 50 17 100
e of col total 10 0 0 10 0 0 6 50 8
Total
Number 10 6 1 10 1 1 49 2 80
% of row total 13 8 1 13 1 1 61 3 100
e of col total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.3 Number and Percentage of Establishments in the Sample by Zone
and Industry
Tex- Chem- Non- Basic Fab.
Zone Food tile Wood icals Metal Metal Metal Other Total
Hanam 1
Number 1 1 0 4 1 0 16 0 23
W of row total 4 4 0 17 4 0 70 0 100
% of col total 10 17 0 40 100 0 33 0 29
Hanam 2
Number 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 1 14
% of row total 0 0 0 7 0 0 86 7 100
% of col total 0 0 0 10 0 0 24 50 18
Hanam 3
Number 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 0 7
e of row total 0 14 14 14 0 14 43 0 100
e of col total 0 17 100 10 0 100 6 0 9
Bonchon
Number 5 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 10
% of row total 50 10 0 0 0 0 40 0 100
e of col total 50 17 0 0 0 0 .8 0 13
Sochon
Number 0 0 0 2 0 0 7 1 10
eof row total 0 0 0 20 0 0 70 10 100
eof col total 0 0 0 20 0 0 14 50 13
Songam
Number 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 4
% of row total 25 0 0 25 0 0 50 0 100
% of col total 10 0 0 10 0 0 4 0 5
Other
Number 3 3 0 1 0 0 5 0 12
% of row total 25 25 0 8 0 0 42 0 100
t of col total 30 50 0 10 0 0 10 0 15
Total
Number 10 6 1 10 1 1 49 2 80
% of row total 12 8 1 12 1 1 61 3 100
e of col total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.4 Number and Percentage of Establishments in the Sample by Type and
Size
Size(number of employees)
Type of firm 1-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-499 500+ Total
New
Number 7 8 6 6 1 8 36
% of row total 19 22 17 17 3 22 100
% of col total 35 47 30 75 33 67 45
Average size 34 73 135 268 344 1775 494
Movers within Kwangju/Jeonnam
Number 13 8 12 2 0 3 38
% of row total 34 21 32 5 0 8 100
% of col total 65 47 60 25 0 25 47
Average size 25 81 142 261 0 1266 184
Movers from Outside
Number 0 1 2 0 2 1 6
% of row total 0 17 33 0 33 17 100
% of col total 0 6 10 0 67 8 8
Average size 0 60 125 0 439 869 343
All Types
Number 20 17 20 8 3 12 80
i of row total 25 21 25 10 4 15 100
% of col total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average Size 28 76 138 266 407 1572 335
Note: The Average size represents the average number of employees of firms in
each cell.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.5 Number and percentage of Establishment in the Sample
by Zone and Size
Size(number of employees)
Zone 1-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-499 500+ Total
Hanam 1
Number 5 3 7 2 1 5 23
e of row total 22 13 30 9 4 22 100
% of col total 25 18 35 25 33 42 29
Average size 31 80 156 259 344 1198 362
Hanam 2
Number 3 5 4 0 1 1 14
% of row total 21 36 29 0 7 7 100
% of col total 15 29 20 0 33 8 18
Average size 19 83 136 0 385 869 162
Hanam 3
Number 4 1 1 1 0 0 7
% of row total 57 14 14 14 0 0 100
% of col total 20 6 5 13 0 0 9
Average size 25 60 160 271 0 0 84
Bochon
Number 1 2 2 2 1 2 10
% of row total 10 20 20 20 10 20 100
% of col total 5 12 10 25 33 17 13
Average size 43 87 123 284 492 589 270
Sochon
Number 1 2 6 0 0 1 10
% of row total 10 20 60 0 0 10 100
% of col total 5 12 30 0 0 8 13
Average size 44 68 121 0 0 2704 361
Songam
Number 2 2 0 0 0 0 4
% of row total 50 50 0 0 0 0 100
% of col total 10 12 0 0 0 0 5
Average size 19 61 0 0 0 0 40
Other
Number 4 2 0 3 0 3 12
% of row total 33 17 0 25 0 25 100
% of col total 20 12 0 38 0 25 15
Average size 33 74 0 259 0 2708 765
Total
Number 20 17 20 8 3 12 80
% of row total 25 21 25 10 4 15 100
% of col total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average size 28 76 138 266 407 1572 335
Note: The average size represents the average number of employees of firms in
each cell.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.6 Plant Characteristics by Type of Firm
(percentage of total in each category)
Movers within Movers from
Plant characteristics New Kwangju/Jeonnam Outside All
Land for expansion
Yes 56 53 83 56
No 44 45 17 43
No answer 0 3 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of eight-hour shifts
one 44 76 67 61
two 36 19 17 26
three 20 5 3,7 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Average number of employees 494 184 343 335
Number of establishments 36 38 6 80
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.7 Plant Characteristics by Zone
(percentage of total in each category)
Plant Char Hanam 1 Hanam 2 Hanam 3 Bonchon Sochon Songam Other All
Land for expansion
Yes 57 71 57 30 80 50 42 56
No 39 29 43 70 20 50 58 43
No answer 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of eight-hour shifts
One 52 79 71 80 50 100 33 61
Two 39 21 14 0 40 0 33 26
Three 9 0 14 20 10 0 33 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Ave # empl 362 162 84 270 361 40 765 335
# establ 23 14 7 10 10 4 12 80
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.8 Shipments of Output and Inputs by Type of Firm
(percentage of total in each category)
Movers Movers
Shipments New within from
Kwangju Outside All
Output shipped by truck
Less than 50 percent 8 18 17 14
50-94 percent 6 11 0 7
95-100 percent 86 71 83 79
Total 100 100 100 100
Average 92 81 86 86
Inputs shipped by truck
Less than 50 percent 11 8 17 10
50-94 percent 11 10 0 10
95-100 percent 78 82 83 80
Total 100 100 100 100
Average 87 90 84 89
output sold in Kwangju
Less than 25 percent 50 50 83 52
25-49 percent 11 5 0 8
50-74 percent 6 8 0 6
75-100 percent 25 34 17 29
No answer 8 3 0 5
Total 100 100 100 100
Average 38 43 22 39
Inputs bought in Kwangju
Less than 25 percent 69 47 50 58
25-49 percent 6 11 50 11
50-74 percent 17 18 0 16
75-100 percent 8 21 0 14
No answer 0 3 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100
Average 25 40 23 32
Number of establishments 36 38 6 80
Note: The average represents the average percentage of the value of output or
inputs for each type of firm.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.9 Shipments of Output and Inputs by Type of Firm
(percentage of total in each category)
Shipments Hanam Hanam Hanam Bochon Sochon Songam Other Total
1 2 3
Output shipped by truck
< 50 percent 4 7 43 20 10 0 25 14
50-94 percent 22 0 0 0 0 0 8 8
95-100 percent 74 93 57 80 90 100 67 79
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 93 93 57 86 91 100 74 86
Inputs shipped by truck
< 50 percent 13 0 14 0 10 0 25 10
50-94 percent 13 14 14 10 0 0 8 10
95-100 percent 74 86 71 90 90 100 67 80
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 85 97 84 98 91 100 74 89
Output sold in Kwangju
< 25 percent 57 50 57 60 40 50 50 53
25-49 percent 0 0 29 20 0 0 17 8
50-74 percent 13 0 14 0 0 25 0 6
75-100 percent 22 50 0 10 60 25 25 29
No answer 9 0 0 10 0 0 8 5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 34 50 23 23 59 48 36 39
Inputs bought in Kwangju
< 25 percent 70 43 57 80 50 50 42 58
25-49 percent 0 21 29 0 20 0 17 11
50-74 percent 17 21 0 0 10 50 25 16
75-100 percent 9 14 14 20 20 0 17 14
No answer 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 25 40 24 25 34 38 40 32
# establishments 23 14 7 10 10 4 12 80
Note: The average represents the average percentage of the value of output or
inputs for each type of firm.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.10 Firms Very Satisfied with Present Location by Type of Firm
(percentage of total in each category)
Movers within Movers
Attribute of present location New Kwangju/Jeonnam from outside All
Plant capacity 6 3 0 4
Cost of land for expansion 0 0 0 0
Availability of skilled workers 0 3 0 1
Availabliity of unskilled workers 0 3 0 1
Quality of public utilities 0 3 0 1
Quality of municipal services 0 0 0 0
Road access 14 37 50 28
Proximity to clients 8 5 17 8
Proximity to suppliers 0 0 0 0
Amenities of zone 0 0 0 0
Number of establishments 36 38 6 80
Note: (1) Public utilities include electricity and water supply.
(2) Municipal services include police and fire protection.
(3) Amenities include parks, recreation facilities, and air quality.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
107
Annex 4
Table A4.11 Firms Very Satisfied with Precent Location by Zone
(percentage of total in each category)
Att of present location Hanam Hanam Hanam Bonchon Sochon Songam Other All
1 2 3
Plant capacity 4 7 0 10 0 0 0 4
Cost of land for expansion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Avail of skilled workers 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 1
Avail of unskilled workers 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 1
Quality of public utilities 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 1
Qual of municipal services 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Road access 30 43 43 30 10 25 8 28
Proximity to clients 13 21 0 0 0 0 0 8
Proximity to suppliers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Amenities of zone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of establishments 23 14 7 10 10 4 12 80
Note: (1) Public utilities include electricity and water supply.
(2) Municipal services include police and fire protection.
(3) Amenities include parks, recreation facilities, and air quality.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.12 Quality of Public Service by Zone
(percentage of total in each zone)
Quality of Hanam 1 Hanam 2 Hanam 3 Bonchon Sochon Songam Other All
public service
Electricity 83 100 71 90 70 100 50 80
never interrupted
Excellent fire 9 21 14 20 0 50 8 14
protection
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.13 Characteristics of Movers by Industry
(percentage of total in each category)
Non- Fabricated
Type of firm Food Textile Chemicals Metallic Metal Other Total
Condition of previous
plant
Good but cramped 0 0 14 100 24 100 25
Good but obsolete 0 50 29 0 14 0 16
Still serviceable 33 0 0 0 0 o 2
Worn out 33 0 14 0 24 0 20
No answer 33 50 43 0 38 0 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of workers
stayed after move
< 50 percent 33 50 14 100 14 50 20
50-99 percent 33 0 43 0 41 0 36
lOo percent 0 0 0 0 7 50 7
No answer 33 50 43 0 38 0 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 60 30 61 25 73 55 65
# of establishments 3 2 7 1 29 2 44
Size(number of employees)
Less than 25 25-99 100 or move All
Distance of move
1-2 kilometers 0 6 5 5
3-5 kilometers 17 6 5 7
6-10 kilometers 17 31 14 20
11-20 kilometers 17 6 32 20
More than 20 kilometers 0 13 23 16
No answer SO 38 23 32
Total 100 100 100 100
Average kilometers 11 55 106 80
Number of establishmetns 6 16 22 44
Note: The average represents the average percentage of the number of workers
who stayed after move.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.14 Characteristics of Movers by Zone
(percentage of total in each category)
Hanam 1 Hanam 2 Hanam 3 Bonchon Sochon Songam other Total
Condition of previous plant
Good but cramped 27 33 20 0 33 0 50 25
Good but obsolete 27 17 20 20 0 0 0 16
Still serviceable 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Worn out 18 25 40 20 17 0 0 20
No answer 18 25 20 60 50 100 S0 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentage of workers
stayed after move
< 50 percent 36 8 0 40 33 0 0 20
50-99 percent 45 50 60 0 0 0 100 36
100 percent 0 8 20 0 17 0 0 7
No answer 18 33 20 60 50 0 0 36
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Average 57 79 93 30 43 65 65
# of establishments 11 12 5 5 6 3 2 44
Size(number of employees)
Less than 25 25-99 100 or more All
Distance of move
1-2 kilometers 0 6 5 5
3-5 kilometers 17 6 5 7
6-10 kilometers 17 31 14 20
11-20 kilometers 17 6 32 20
More than 20 kilome 0 13 23 16
No answer 50 38 23 32
Total 100 100 100 100
Average kilometers 11 55 106 80
Number of establishments 6 16 22 44
Note: "Average" refers to the average percentage of the number of workers who
stayed after the move.
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
ill
Annex 4
A4.1S Experience after Relocation
Percentage of movers'
AftercBefore After-Before After>Before No answer
Production 5 0 64 32
Plant space 0 2 66 32
Land space 2 2 64 32
Number of skilled workers 14 7 48 32
Wage of skilled workers 0 5 61 34
Number of unskilled workers 16 5 41 39
Wage of unskilled workers 2 5 52 41
Distance to work by managers 5 21 41 34
Distance to work by workers 7 21 39 34
Distance of product shipment 14 30 23 34
Distance of input delivery 14 30 23 34
Profits 14 2 48 36
Local tax payments 2 11 48 39
Cost of public services 7 7 48 39
xThere were 44 movers in the sample. The inequality sign indicates "better' or
"worse".
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.16 Changes in Quality of Public Services after Relocation
(percentage of movers)
Substantially Somewhat Became
improved improved Unchanged Worse No answer Total
Electricity 21 39 11 0 30 100
Water 21 32 14 2 32 100
Telephone 16 39 16 0 30 100
Telegraph 11 43 16 0 30 100
Police service 2 39 30 0 30 100
Waste removal 5 34 25 7 30 100
Road maintenance 5 34 30 2 30 100
Fire protection 5 so 16 0 30 100
Sewerage 7 50 11 2 30 100
Bank 7 43 16 5 30 100
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.17 Expansion and Relocation Plans by Type and Size of Firm
(percentage of total)
Movers within Movers form
Plan New Kwangju/Jeonnam outside All
Plan to expand in next 5 years
No 53 50 67 53
Yes 36 42 33 39
No answer 11 8 0 9
Total 100 100 100 100
Plan to relocate in next 5 years
No 64 74 100 71
Yes 19 16 0 16
No answer 17 10 0 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Number of establishments 36 38 6 80
Size(number of employees)
Less than 25 25-99 100 or move All
Plan to expand in next 5 years
No 63 59 47 53
Yes 37 38 39 39
No answer 0 3 14 9
Total 100 100 100 100
Plan to relocate in next 5 years
No 63 83 65 71
Yes 25 10 19 16
No answer 12 7 16 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Average number of employees 16 60 581 335
Number of establishments 8 29 43 80
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Table A4.18 Expansion and Relocation Plans by Zone and Size of Firm
(percentage of total)
Hanam 1 Hanam 2 Hanam 3 Bonchon Sochon Songam Other Total
Plan to expand
in next 5 years
No 57 50 43 50 60 75 42 53
Yes 35 43 57 30 40 25 42 39
No answer 9 7 0 20 0 0 17 9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Plan to relocate
in next 5 years
No 70 86 71 70 90 75 42 71
Yes 13 7 29 10 10 25 33 16
No answer 17 7 0 20 0 0 25 13
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
# of establishments 23 14 7 10 10 4 12 80
Size(number of employees)
Less than 25 25-99 100 or move All
Plan to expand in next 5 years
No 63 59 47 53
Yes 37 38 39 39
No answer 0 3 .14 9
Total 100 100 100 100
Plan to relocate in next 5 years
No 63 83 65 71
Yes 25 10 19 16
No answer 12 7 16 13
Total 100 100 100 100
Average number of employees 16 60 581 335
Number of establishments 8 29 43 80
Source: Impact Evaluation establishment survey, 1995.
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Study Questionnaire
Survey Number_
Interviewer
Date of Interview-
SIC/Firm Type/Size / /
EMPLOYMENT LOCATION SURVEY
FOR KOREA IMPACT EVALUATION STUDY
Name of person responding to survey:
Position:
ESTABLISHMENT CHARACTERISTICS
1. Name of Establishment
Telephone Number
2. Address of Establishment Si (Gun!, Gu.
Dong (Eup, Myeon!
3. This establishment is:
(1) a single-establishment operation. [Go to question 7]
(2) headquarters of a multi-establishment operation.
(3) a branch of a multi-establishment operation.
If (3), answer question 4. If (2) answer 5 and 6.
4. Name of parent company:
Location:
(1) within this city
(2) within this province
(3) outside this province ( si or gun)
5. How many establishments does your firm operate?
6. Where are they located? How many?
(1) within this city
(2) within this province
(3) outside this province ( si or gun)
7. When was this establishment founded? 19_ year.
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8. When did this establishment first operate at this location? 19_ year.
9. Which of the following three categories describes your establishment's location history?
(1) was newly founded at this location.
(2) was relocated from another location within this province.
(3) was relocated from another location outside this province.
If (1), do not answer questions (53) through (64).
[All questions from here on are with respect to the establishment located at the address as specified
in Question (2) above.]
PLANT CHARACTERISTICS
10. What are the major products manufactured at this establishment? List up to three in order of
importance (For example, women's clothes, leather shoes, automobile parts, etc.).
(1)-
(2)
(3)
11. Roughly, how many pyeongs is the land area of the plant site?
(I) Rent. . pyeong
(2) Own _ _ pyeong
12. Roughly, how many pyeongs of total floor space does your plant have?
(1) rent _ _ pyeong
(2) own _ _ pyeong
13. How much is (was) the value of your lot per pyeong?
(1) now _ _ won
(2) when moved here _ _ won
14. Do you have some land space reserved for plant extension?
At present plant site:
(1) substantial (2) adequate (3) not much (4) none
Next to the present plant site: -
(1) substantial (2) adequate (3) not much (4) none
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EMPLOYMENI
15. How many full-time employees at this establishment? (persons)
male female
(1) management
(2) skilled workers
(3) unskilled workers
(4) total
16. How many full-time employees did you have when you first started operation here?
persons.
17. Roughly, what will be the maximum number of employees in case of full-capacity operation
(including part-time workers)? persons.
18. Roughly, what are the average monthly wage rates (including bonus payment)?
(1) skilled workers (won)
(2) unskilled workers (won)
19. On the average, how many (8-hour) shifts are run at the plant?
(1) one shift (2) two shifts (3) three shifts
20. Where do most of your employees live? Please give rough percentage estimates to the
following categories:
(I) dormitory at plant site %
(2) immediate neighborhood (Dong) %
(3) within this Gu or Gun (Si) °
(4) adjacent Gu or Gun (Si) %
(5) other Gu or Gun (Si) %
Total 100%
21. What proportion of your employees travel to work by:
(1) dormitory or plant site %
(2) foot %
(3) bicycle (or motorcycle) %
(4) commercial bus %
(5) company bus %
(6) car %
Total 100%
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SHIPMENT OF OUTPUTS AND INPUTS
22. Roughly, what percentage of the value of output shipped within Korea by:
(1) truck only %
(2) rail only %
(3) truck-rail combination %
(4) truck-water combination %
(5) air (during any part of the trip) %
(6) other, please specify %
Total 100%
23. Roughly, the percent of the value of raw material inputs shipped within Korea by:
(1) truck only %
(2) rail only %
(3) truck-rail combination %
(4) truck-water combination %
(5) air (during any part of the trip) %
(6) other, please specify %
Total 100%
24. What percent of your products are sold in the following areas?
(1) within this city %
(2) within this province %
(3) outside this province, but within Korea %
(4) internationally %
Total 1 00%
25. Roughly, what proportion of your products is used mainly as inputs of other industries?
(1) 0% (2) 1-20% (3) 21-40% (4) 41-60% (5) 61-80% (5) 81-99%
(6) 100%
26. What percent of your raw materials and/or input components are bought in the following areas?
(1) within this city %
(2) within this province %
(3) outside this province but within Korea %
(4) intemnationally %
Total 100%/o
27. Roughly, what proportion of your inputs is outputs of other industries?
(1) 0% (2) 1-20% (3) 21-40% (4) 41-60% (5) 61-80% (6) 81-99% (7) 100%
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28. Do your employees have problems with commuting to this location? (Choose three in order
of importance) 1. 2. 3.
(1) There is no bus or subway route.
(2) There is a route, but needs a long wait.
(3) The fair is too high.
(4) Too crowded.
(5) Takes too much time.
(6) No problems.
(7) Other, please specify
PUBLIC SERVICE AND GOVERNMENT INCENTIVE SCHEMES
29. How much public service does vour plant require?
substantial= I modest=2 little=3 almost none=4
(1) electricity
(2) water
(3) telephone
(4) police protection
(5) fire protection
(6) banking
30. On the average, how frequently are public utility services interrupted?
almost none= I once a month=2 once a week=3 twice a week=4
more than twice a week=5
(1) electricity
(2) water
31. Do you supply electricity or water with your own facilities?
Yes=l No=2
(1) electricity
(2) water
32. What do you think of the following public service in this area?
excellent = I good enough = 2 not enough = 3 very poor = 4
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(1) electricity
(2) water
(3) telephone
(4) police protection
(5) fire protection
(6) banking
33. Who removes and treats the waste? Please estimate the percentage of waste treated by the
following:
(I) your firm %
(2) local authority %
(3) private contractor %
(4) others %
Total 100%
34. In case the local authority removes the waste, what do you think of their service?
(1) excellent (2) good enough (3) not enough (4) very poor
35. How is the waste water treated? Please estimate the percentage of waste-water treated by the
following:
(1) self-treatment at the plant %
(2) collective-treatment facility in the area %
(3) local authority (Si, Gun) %
(4) combination of self-treatment and local %
authority
(5) other, please specify %
Total I 00%
36. What types of pollution are generated by your plant operation?
(1) air (2) water (3) noise (4) odor (5) soil
(6) other, please specify
37. If your plant generates pollution, how good are your pollution control facilities?
(1) complete (2) not enough (3) none
38. Did you receive any instruction from the government because of the pollution control
problem?
Yesl No=2
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39. If yes, which of the following applies to your case?
(1) to change the production process
(2) to install pollution-control facilities
(3) to relocate to other location
(4) to pay a fine
(5) other, please specify
40. What taxes that you pay affect your business operation most seriously? List in order of
importance.
(1)
(2)
(3)
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PRESENT LOCATION
41. Please evaluate how you feel about your present location by the factors listed below:
very satisfactory: I satisfactory: 2 not satisfactory: 3 (enter in first column)
very important: I important: 2 not important: 3 (enter in second column)
(1) land area:
(2) building space:
(3) rent payment (including building land):
(4) availability of skilled workers:
(5) wage of skilled workers:
(6) availability of unskilled workers:
(7) wage of unskilled workers:
(8) cost of public utilities (electricity,water, etc):
(9) quality of public utility services:
(10) proximity to suppliers:
(I 1) proximity to customers:
(12) proximity to competitors:
(13) highway access:
(14) railroad access:
(15) availability of nearby land for plant expansion:
(16) cost of nearby land for plant expansion:
(17) proximity to related services: repair, main-
tenance, banks, and other business services:
(18) property tax burden:
(19) local government services (fire protection,
road maintenance, etc.):
(20) cost of local government services:
(21) security (crimes, etc.):
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(22) pleasant surroundings:
(23) recreational facilities:
(24) local community attitudes towards this
establishment:
PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
42. What has been the average growth rate of your establishment in terms of output (or sales) over the
past 5 years?
(1) declined: % per year
(2) no growth:
(3) increased: °'o per year
43. What was the value of sales in 1994? (million won)
(1) domestic:
(2) export:
(3) total:
44. How much do you anticipate your establishment will grow in the next five years?
(1) grow quite substantially
(2) grow substantially
(3) grow slightly
(4) remain the same
(5) decrease
(6) not sure
PLANS FOR CAPACITY EXPANSION OR RELOCATION
45. Do you have any plans for expanding within the next five years?
Yes= I No=2 [Go to 49]
46. If yes: is this expansion likely to take place:
(1) here at this location:
(2) another location in this city: Gu or Dong
(3) another location in this province: Si (Gun), Gu
(4) another location outside this province: Si (Gun) Gu
47. Roughly, how many workers will you hire as a result of this expansion?
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48. How much additional floor space will you require? pyeong
49. Do you have any plans for relocating the entire operation from the present site to another location in
the next five years?
Yes= I No=2
50. If yes, is the new location likely to be:
(1) in this city: Gu or Dong
(2) in this province: Si (Gun), Gu
(3) outside this province: Si (Gun), Gu
51. Roughly, hiow would y our labor force change?
(I) will increase by persons.
(2) will decrease by persons.
52. How much additional floor space will you require?
pyeong.
COMPARISONS WITH PREVIOUS LOCATION
[Note: answer only if answered (2) or (3) in question 9.]
53. Previous location:
(I) in this city
(2) in this province
(3) outside this province (Si or Gun)
54. Roughly, what is the distance between the present and previous location? Km
55. How would you best describe the condition of your previous plant just prior to your move from it?
(1) in good condition, but cramped
(2) in good condition, but obsolete
(3) still serviceable
(4) wom out
56. Compare the situation at the present location as of one year after the move with those at the
previous location for the following items:
no change=O increase=I decrease=2
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(1) production (or sales)
(2) land area
(3) building space
(4) rent payment per pyeong
(5) number of skilled workers
(6) monthly wages of skilled workers
(7) number of unskilled workers
(8) monthly wages of unskilled workers
(9) commuting distance for managers
(10) commuting distance for workers
(I 1) output delivery distance
( 12) input delivery service
( 13) local tax payment
(14) profits
(15) public utility costs
57. Any changes in the quality of the following public services afier the relocation?
Substantially improved= somewhat improved=2 unchanged=3 became worse=4
(I) electricity
(2) water
(3) telephone
(4) telegraph
(5) police service
(6) waste removal
(7) road maintenance
(8) fire protection
(9) sewerage
(10) banking
58. What was the main reason for your relocation?
(I) received a government relocation order
(2) to receive the benefits from government incentive schemes
(3) land price
(4) factors related to plant operations
59. Was your relocation forced because of public action? Choose three in order of importance.
1. 2. 3.
(1) highway construction expansion
(2) urban renewal project
(3) relocation order because of pollution
(4) zoning regulation
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(5) other, please specify
(6) not applicable
60. List three location characteristics that you considered to be most important (excluding
government incentive schemes such as credit subsidies or tax exemption) when you chose the
present location. (List in order of importance. If needed, the interviewer should assist the
respondent by referring to question 41.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
61. Did you consider the alternative sites before you made the decision to choose the present
location?
yes= I no=0
62. If considered, where were the locations?
(I) in this city
(2) in this province
(3) outside this province (Si or Gun)
63. Roughly, what percent of your labor force stayed with you when your firm moved to the new
location (as of about one year after the move)?
64. Did you receive credit subsidy or tax exemption for plant expansion because you moved from
previous location?
yes= I no=0
INT1ERVlEWER!S REMARKS
Immediately after the interview, write your opinions about the reliability of responses, the extent of
cooperation, names and titles of other people who were present at the interview and their influences, the
parts which were the most difficult to answer, and the parts with unclear answers.
If the interview was rejected, or was impossible to carry out, explain why (for example, busy; too many
questions; such a firm does not exist, etc.)
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LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
The list contains the persons interviewed during the two impact evaluation missions in June 1995
and February 1996. The list does not include all of the staff members of the respective agencies and firms
who were present at the meetings. (The persons marked with asterisk were visited during both missions.)
LOCAL STUDY TEAM IN KWANGJU:
Kwangju-Chonnam Development Institute. Kwangju
Dr. Chang-Soo Moon, President*
Dr. Jong-Pyung Jeon, Senior Researcher*
Honam University. Kwangju
Prof. Jae-Oh Kim, Department of Business Administration*
Prof. Sangho Kim, Department of Economics*
LOCAL STUDY TEAM IN IKSAN:
Wonkwang University. Iksan (formerly Iri)
Prof. Yang-Jae Lee, Department of Urban Planning
Prof. Dong Ho Shin, Department of Urban Engineering*
SOUTH CHOLLA PROVINCE:
Provincial Govemment
Mr. Jae Goo Song, Vice Governor*; Vice Mayor of Kwangju City since 1996
Mr. Ki Seung Nam, Director, Bureau of Construction*
Kwangju City
Mr. Wun-Tae Kang, Mayor
Mr. Young Shik Jeong, Vice Mayor
Mr. Young Rok Oh, Director, Industry Division*
Mr. Yong-Bong Chung, Director, Regional Economic Development
Mr. Jae Sook Ro, Director, Budget Office
Mr. Young Ju Shon, Director, City Planning Division
Mogpo City
Mr. Jae Ho Ahn, Mayor
Mr. Kyung Ju Koh, Vice Mayor
Mr. Sang-Chea Seo, Director, Construction Bureau
Yeosu City
Mr. Deok-Hyoung Moon, Mayor
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Yeocheon County (Gun)
Mr. Sang Ok Lee, County Executive
Mr. Dai Won Cho, Director, Regional Economic Development
Jindo County (Gun)
Mr. Pyung Eun Lee, County Executive
Hanam Industrial Estate. Kwanugu
Mr. Seung Yong Lee, Director of Administration*
Chonnam National University. Kwangju
Prof. In-Sang Song, Department of Urban and Regional Planning
Kwangju Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mr. Hong-Soon Ahn, Secretary General
Mr. Soon-Hyung Park, Director of Research
Kumho & Co., Inc.
Mr. II Ham, President*
Mr. Cha Y. Cho, Managing Director
Mr. Ahn Seok Kim, General Manger
LG Electro-Components Ltd. (Goldstar)
Mr. Yoon-Shik Lim, Plant Manager
Mr. Bu-Young Park, Manager, General Administration
Daewoo Electronics Co.. Ltd.
Mr. Kyung Suk Seo, Manager, General Administration*
Asia Motors Co.. Inc.
Mr. Jae Hoon Kim, Plant Manager
Mr. Bong Seoung Kim, Manager, Public Relations
Moodeung Plastic Industrial Co.. Ltd.
Mr. Woo Youn Kim, Executive Director
Daeshin Chemical Co.. Ltd.
Mr. Bong Sup Kim, President
Korea Federation of Small Businesses, Kwangju
Mr. On-Hi Yang, Director
Korea Small Scale Industry Promotion Corp., Kwangju
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Mr. Eung-Hee Yoo, Director of Operations
Korea National Labor Federation. Kwangju
Mr. Shin Won Lee, President
Yoesu Fishery Cooperative
Mr. Sang Yong Joo, President
NORTH CHOLLA PROVINCE:
Ministry of Construction and Transportation
Mr. Young 11 Ha, Director-General, Iri Regional Construction Office
Mr. Hak-Lae Son, Director-General since 1996
Mr. Su-Nam Park, Director, Iri Regional Development Bureau*.
Provincial Government
Mr. Jong-Jeong Lim, Director General, Construction Bureau*
Iksan Cit
Mr. Man Jong Kim, Mayor
Mr. Byung Sik Park, Vice Mayor
Chonbug National University. Chonju
Professor Eung-Kyo Ryu, Architecture Department
Chonju University
Professor Sung-Taik Lee, Chonbug Development Institute
Iri Export Processing Zone Administration
Mr. Oh-Joon Chung, Director
Mr. Young Choon Yoon, Chief of Operations
Iksan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mr. Hyun Kee Kim, Chairman
Mr. Hong Ki Sohn, Chairman since 1996*
Mr. Heun Jai Park, Secretary General*
Jeonju Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Mr. Hae-Sang Lee, Director General*
Hong Ik Metal Co.. Ltd.
Mr. Sang Sup Kim, Managing Director
Seoul Plant Engineering & Construction Co.. Ltd.
Mr. Bang-Ho Kim, Plant Manager
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Kode nshi Korea Corpr. Tae Hwa)
Mr. Sung Ik Park, Senior Managing Director
Mr. Ki-Jung Lee, Director
MEETINGS IN SEOUL:
Ministry of Construction and Transportation. Seoul
Mr. Yoon Ho Ryu, Director, Regional Planning Division*
Mr. In-Kee Shin, Director, Construction Management Division*
Mr. Doyoup Kwon, Director, Industrial Site Planning Division*
Mr. Yong Hwan Kim, Director, Water Resources Policy Division
Mr. Jae Chooni Lee, Director, Technical Training Division
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements. Seoul
Dr. Gun Young Lee, President*
Dr. Kyubang Lee, Vice President
Dr. Young-Hwan Jin, Director, Research Coordination*
Dr. Yang-Soo Yun, Director, Regional Planning
Dr. Dong-ju Kim, Senior Fellow*
Dr. Yong-Woong Kim, Senior Fellow
C.onstruction & Economy Research Institute of Korea
Dr. Sung-Woong Hong, President
Korea Environmental Technology Research Institute
Dr. Jong Gie Kim, President*
Korea Institute for Economics and Technology
Dr. Kyu Uck Lee, President
Seoul Development Institute
Dr. Sae-Wook Chung, President
Dr. Bun-Song Lee, President (since February 1995)*
Dr. Yeong-Joo Hahn, Director, Planning and Coordination*
Seoul National University
Prof. Sang-Chuel Choe, Graduate School of Environmental Studies*
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